University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
Political Science ETDs

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

8-28-2012

Church-State Ties, Roman Catholic Episcopacies,
and Human Rights in Latin America
Nicholas Rowell

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/pols_etds
Recommended Citation
Rowell, Nicholas. "Church-State Ties, Roman Catholic Episcopacies, and Human Rights in Latin America." (2012).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/pols_etds/6

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Political Science ETDs by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
disc@unm.edu.

Nicholas Rowell
Candidate

Political Science
Department

This dissertation is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication:
Approved by the Dissertation Committee:

Mark Peceny

, Chairperson

Benjamin Goldfrank

William Stanley

Richard Wood

i

CHURCH-STATE TIES, ROMAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPACIES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA

by

NICHOLAS ROWELL
B.A. Political Science & Latin American Studies,
University of Arkansas, 2004
M.A. Political Science, University of New Mexico, 2006

DISSERTATION
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Political Science
The University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico

July, 2012

ii

DEDICATION

To Robin

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people provided invaluable personal, professional and intellectual support
as I completed this dissertation, and it is my pleasure to thank them. First, I wish to
acknowledge the patience, hard work, and generosity of my Co-Chairs, Benjamin
Goldfrank and Mark Peceny. This dissertation grew out of a project Professor Goldfrank
graciously invited me to join while I was his GA at UNM. From the beginning of my
graduate study to the completion of this manuscript, Professor Goldfrank and Professor
Peceny provided me with invaluable support, guidance, and encouragement. I also wish
to thank William Stanley and Richard Wood who also served on my dissertation
committee. Both provided tremendous insight and encouragement from very early stages
of this project through its completion.
I also wish to thank the Department of Political Science at the University of New
Mexico for providing me with a generous assistantship during my time in Albuquerque,
and briefly, while I was away from campus. I also wish to thank Ron Faulk, Janet
Sheeran, and Dany Doughan of St. Gregory's University for consenting to a teaching load
reduction during the final stages of this project.
Many others provided support in various stages of work on this project. Harry
Moore, Fr. Robert Busch, Martin Edwin Anderson, Carlos Costa and several anonymous
reviewers provided insightful feedback on various portions of this study. Erika Murcia
provided expert and efficient research assistance during my time in El Salvador. With
kindness and professionalism, Shoshana Handel and Joann Buehler helped me navigate
the bureaucracy of completing a degree. Several others encouraged me in the pursuit of
this project at critical moments, especially Professors Charles Kenney, Daniel Philpott,

iv

John Anderson, and Sr. Marcianne Kappes. Early in my study, I benefitted from the
mentorship of Jeff Ryan and Steve Striffler. I would also like to thank Prakash Adhikari
and Meg Edwards; their friendship and camaraderie were among the most rewarding
aspects of my graduate study. I also benefitted enormously from the friendship of Brian
Risch, who pushed me to the end. My family provided encouragement and inspiration
throughout this project; thank you Charles and Jan Rowell and Jennifer, Michael, Rachel
and William Taunton.
Finally, for her sacrifice, patience, and unwavering support, I wish to thank my
wife, Robin Guthrie, a partner who challenges my thinking, refines my ideas, and
remains with me, steadfastly, through thick and thin.

v

CHURCH-STATE TIES, ROMAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPACIES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA

By

Nicholas Rowell

B.A. Political Science & Latin American Studies, University of Arkansas, 2004
M.A. Political Science, University of New Mexico, 2006
Ph.D. Political Science, University of New Mexico, 2012

ABSTRACT
From the 1960s through the 1980s, Latin America's Catholic bishops' conferences
diverged in their responses to state sanctioned human rights abuse. At the national level,
some bishops' conferences played leadership roles in nascent human rights movements,
others delayed public criticism while pursuing private human rights advocacy, and still
others responded with silence or public support for repressive governments. Why? To
answer this question, this study presents comparative case studies of the Catholic Church
in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil with secondary comparative case studies of Colombia, El
Salvador, and Guatemala. Drawing on the theoretical perspective of path dependence, I
argue that varied patterns of Church-state interaction arose, in large measure, due to
varied configurations in the institutional ties linking Church and state. Where ties are
dense, the Church derives its interest in conjunction with the state, relies on the state to
pursue those interests, and works to ensure a close and generally collaborative
relationship with successive governments via generally non-contentious political
vi

behavior. Where ties are sparse, the Church derives its interest from other sources (the
political ideology of bishops, the Vatican, the experience of clergy and/or adherents, etc.)
and must rely on sources other than the state to pursue those interests. The result is the
evolution of a Church that faces fewer obstacles discouraging confrontation when faced
with state practices or policies that it opposes. Where ties are of intermediate density, the
Church derives its interest from non-state sources (such as the Vatican), but often relies
on state assistance or state approval to organize and pursue those interests. As a result,
engaging in contentious interaction with the state can be discouraged by the state's
leverage over some Church programs. In this situation, pursuing confrontation with the
state necessitates difficult cost-benefit analysis for an episcopal conference. The
resolution of intra-episcopal conflict prompts delays in decisive responses.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

After Vatican II, Catholic bishops were explicitly charged with two principal
tasks: providing prophetic socioethical guidance to society and serving as organizational
managers of Catholic dioceses or other ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Attempting to
accomplish both of these tasks successfully created a set of ongoing challenges.
Inevitably, bishops must, at least in practice, prioritize some values, goals, or issues over
others. More difficult still, situations often arise in which the demands of consistent
prophetic leadership and skilled organizational management come into conflict. When
vigorous defense of some values place essential Church programs at risk or clergy and
followers in danger, which task takes precedence?
The resolution of such conflicts is no doubt important for the entire international
Church. However, during the late 20th century, Latin America witnessed one of the most
dramatic and politically significant examples of such a conflict in recent history. In the
wake of the breakdown of democracy that swept through much of Latin America in the
decade after 1964, the region suffered through waves of egregious human rights abuses.
In the name of halting the spread of communism, authoritarian regimes made widespread
use of torture, kidnapping, and murder against suspected 'subversives' while closing down
democratic institutions and censoring the press. If subsequent civil wars are included, the
total number of victims reaches well into the hundreds of thousands.
As these waves of human rights abuses transpired, Latin America's bishops had
the opportunity to respond in politically important ways. Focusing on the political
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responses of bishops, as opposed to other actors or levels of organization in the Catholic
Church, is a deliberate and important empirical decision. Bishops held administrative
authority over some of the better-developed, if under-resourced, domestic organizational
networks in Latin America, regardless of country. Support from pre-existing
organizational networks profoundly affected the development of domestic human rights
movements, especially the emergence of their earliest participants.1 Bishops' substantial
discretion over the use of Church resources, the assignments of Church personnel, the
Church's social priorities, and the flow of information within the organization gave
bishops an opportunity to support the emergence of broader human rights movements, or
not, with potentially meaningful consequences. Furthermore, bishops' relatively highprofile and high-status location in the hierarchy of the international Catholic Church
provided an opportunity to build or take advantage of existing transnational networks.
This type of opportunity has been a critical component in the emergence and operation
(and arguably the efficacy) of the international human rights movement (Keck and
Sikkink 1998).2
Despite their institutional power, bishops' responses to waves of human rights
abuses varied considerably as did the collective responses of national-level bishops'
conferences. Some bishops risked or sacrificed their lives to found, lead or publicly
support major human rights movements, winning support from the most important sectors
1

On the importance of such networks to the emergence of social movements see Tarrow (1994). On the
importance of Church networks to the human rights movement's early days in Latin America see Loveman
(1998).
2
Keck and Sikkink (1998, 90) specifically highlight the Chilean episcopacy's human rights office, the
Vicariate of Solidarity (see chapter 6 of this study), as an important example of an organization that
pioneered an international strategy for the human rights movement in Latin America. It is important to note
that bishops are not the only possible part of the Church imbedded in an international network. Catholic
religious orders and academic institutions are as well. However, bishops and bishops' conferences are
arguably the highest profile of these possibilities and more consistently present in cross-national terms.
2

of their national-level bishops' conferences. Others worked quietly behind the scenes to
persuade those complicit in human rights abuse to abandon such practices, while delaying
public denunciations of culpable regimes by their peers. Other bishops, along with the
most important sectors of their national conferences, ignored evidence and accusations of
human rights abuse from priests, the laity, and others. Some went so far as to lend their
public support to political leaders they knew were ordering the kidnapping, torture, and
murder of political rivals. Why did this divergence take place? Why did some bishops'
conferences gravitate toward public human rights advocacy, while others continued to
prioritize anticommunism in the midst of extreme and arbitrary state violence? In the
following pages, I attempt to answer this question.
Typology and Expectations
An empirical survey of Church responses to human rights abuse reveals three
distinct types of political commitments made by episcopal conferences as a group. The
first type of response included swift and forceful denunciations that surfaced while an
early wave of human rights abuses was ongoing. This response type is analogous to the
"early risers" described by Loveman (1998). In the pages that follow, I refer to this
response type as contentious denunciation. The second type of response included multiyear delays prior to unambiguous denunciations of human rights abuses. In such cases,
denunciations eventually occurred while abuses were occurring, but they began several
years after a pattern of systematic abuses began. Delays were characterized by a gradual
transition from a congenial to a conflictual relationship between the Church and the state
with respect to human rights. Once denunciations began, they were followed by sustained
episcopal involvement in the human rights movement. I term this response type delayed
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advocacy. The third type of response included broad denunciations of violence that cast
no blame on the state or denunciations that surfaced after the culpable regime lost state
power, typically many years after the wave of rights abuses in question subsided. While
rights abuses were ongoing, these episcopacies either offered public support to the rights
abusing regime or remained silent despite requests for intervention from victims and their
families. I refer to this response type as complicity. These divergent responses were most
pronounced from the 1960s through the 1980s, occurring under authoritarian regimes and
periods of civil war.
This study examines the nature of the relationship between different types of
institutional ties between Church and state and these three types of episcopal responses to
human rights crises. The central hypothesis is that pre-existing church-state relationships
structure the environment in which each episcopacy considers confrontation with the
state during periods of human rights abuse. Church-state relationships are defined as the
norms, expectations, and attitudes governing church-state interaction. These relationships
were primarily established during critical junctures in the early 20th century when
institutional ties linking the Catholic Church and the state were created, severed, or
reaffirmed. Such institutional ties included specific forms of official recognition of the
Church’s privileged role in society, state participation in the appointment of bishops, state
control over the organization of ecclesiastical jurisdictions, Church authority over parts of
civic life such as marriage and education, and material support such as state funding of
Church activity. These ties affected the amount of leverage the state, the Vatican and
other actors had with respect to the bishops' conferences' official positions and decisions
and, eventually, the evolution of the episcopacy's ideological center of gravity. Church-
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state ties also affected national-level adaptations of Vatican II-era reforms, protestant
competition, and political repression targeting Church actors. Over the long term,
different configurations of Church-state ties conditioned Catholic episcopacies to manage
and utilize their relationship vis-à-vis the state in different ways. The stability of these
Church-state ties produced stability in broader Church-state relationships, forming
patterns of interaction between the two institutions that followed distinct historical
trajectories. In this way, Church-state relations in Latin America exhibit path dependent
characteristics and are central to understanding the political behavior of the Latin
American episcopacy.
These stable trajectories of Church-state relations enhanced or mitigated the
effects of other forces acting on each bishops' conference over subsequent decades. The
most important of these was the set of relatively progressive Vatican-II era reforms
(1962-65) in the international Church, including major regional episcopal conferences in
Medellin (1968) and Puebla (1979). These reforms called on Church leaders to abandon
the Neo-Christendom model of unified church and state and “insisted that the Church
stand in defense of human rights” (Mainwaring and Wilde 1989, 10). Though never
monolithic, episcopacies generally exhibited a theological “center of gravity” which
accepted these reforms in either transformative or superficial terms (Mainwaring and
Wilde 1989, 5). Episcopacies that accepted these reforms in transformative terms called
for specific political reforms, such as plans to better recognize the rights of specific
marginalized groups or end militarized violence. Episcopacies that accepted these
reforms at a superficial level were more circumscribed in their actions, producing abstract
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documents condemning ‘structural sin’ but otherwise remaining unchanged in their
political posture with respect to the state and ongoing political struggles.
Figure 1.1 summarizes the three episcopal response types, their relationship to
church-state ties and post-Vatican II reforms, and the cases that exhibit them. Where
dense networks of Church-state ties were created, episcopacies offered support to the
state or remained silent. Where intermediate networks of church-state ties were created,
episcopacies were first reserved in their initial reaction to a wave of rights abuses,
gradually came to offer stark denunciations of culpable regimes, and thereafter
maintained a meaningful presence in the human rights movement. Where few or no
Church-state ties were created, episcopacies reacted to human rights abuse quickly and
contentiously. This dissertation argues that Church-state ties are a central feature of these
patterns as well as an explanation for the existence of the “empty” boxes (depicted in
Figure 1.1) of which Latin American political history offers no examples.
Figure 1.1: Episcopal Reaction Typology
No/Few
Intermediate
Church-State
Church-State
Ties
Ties
Superficial
Episcopal
Acceptance of
Empty
Empty
Progressive
Theological
Reforms
Transformative Contentious
Denunciation:
Episcopal
Acceptance of
Chile
Progressive
El Salvador
Theological
Nicaragua
Reforms
Uruguay

Delayed
Advocacy:
Brazil
Guatemala
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Dense
Church-State
Ties
Complicity:
Argentina
Colombia

Delayed
Advocacy:
Peru

Nonetheless, this study does not claim that Church-state ties alone explain
important instances of Church-state interaction. Instead, it argues that giving added
weight to the role of Church-state ties in theoretical explanations of such interactions
provides a valuable comparative framework for assessing the impact of several other
important variables. That framework places the historical evolution of a Church-state
dialectic at the center of its analysis.
This argument will not surprise observers of religious politics in Latin America
and in some respects this argument is not new. A literature published mostly prior to
1970 described variance in Church-state ties and Church-state relationships in some
detail.3 In addition, some more recent studies mention Church-state ties as being
potentially causally important in the religious politics of Latin America.4 Furthermore,
several historiographies of Church-state relations in individual Latin American countries
point to significant 'turning points' or the origin of certain continuities.5 Despite this, there
remains a literature-wide lack of systematic comparative analysis of such moments.
Studies prior to 1970 tend to engage in less theoretical analysis and studies after 1970
either bracket systematic analysis of this independent variable or neglect it all together.
The novelty of this study is that it deliberately articulates a theory describing the effects
of long-term Church-state interaction and conducts a careful comparative analysis of this
form of institutional variation. Challenges associated with the design of such a study are
the subject of the next section.
Comparative Analysis and Historical Processes
3

See, for example, Pike (1959), Mecham (1966), and Vallier (1970).
See Gill (1998), Philpott (2007), and, somewhat less explicitly, Levine (1981). These works are discussed
in greater detail in chapter 2.
5
See, for example, Ivereigh (1995) and Klaiber (1998) on Argentine Church-state relationship evolution.
Such instances of historiographical overlap are discussed in chapter 4.
4
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Probing the reasons why Church leaders in different Latin American countries
reacted so differently to similar human rights abuses presents two main methodological
puzzles. The first is how to best evaluate competing theoretical claims focused on longterm historical processes. The second is how best to contribute to a literature crowded
with complementary and conflicting hypotheses supported largely by case studies.
Solving the first puzzle demands rich historical and contextual detail. Solving the second
puzzle calls for better comparative analysis. Thus, the core empirical dilemma is a classic
methodological tradeoff. Given limited time and resources, how does one increase the
number of cases to be compared without sacrificing the important insights gained through
thorough investigation of one or two cases?
Arguments based on long term historical processes are distinct from those based
on constant causes (Stinchcombe 1968, 101-29; Collier and Collier 1991, 35-7).
Theoretical arguments based on constant causes argue that the continued presence of a
specific variable, or set of variables, produces a given outcome. If that variable
disappears, the outcome changes. Evaluating such causal arguments empirically calls for
demonstrations of hypothesized correlations, preferably over time, such as quantitative
time series analysis. In contrast, properly evaluating longterm historical processes as
causal factors requires additional attention to specifying and demonstrating the
mechanisms linking cause and effect over significant periods of time. Such mechanisms
may perpetuate alternative institutional relationships between actors, social groups, or
states. The sequence or timing of events in the history of such relationships may also
profoundly affect an outcome (Pierson 2004).
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Accomplishing this task requires amassing detailed contextual information that
allows one to make observations about how cases develop over time. The social sciences
offer excellent examples of such work, including Gerschenkron (1962), Moore (1966),
and Skocpol (1979). However, with recent work on path dependency and critical
junctures, this type of research has grown in methodological sophistication. This growing
sophistication includes better specification of distinct phases of these historical processes,
a practice that more precisely and rigorously elucidates how they unfold. Increased
attention to specific phases also facilitates more exacting comparisons across cases.
Collier and Collier (1991) and Mahoney (2001) are seminal examples of such work.
Recent work on path dependence has also begun to more thoroughly consider the causes
and consequences of institutional stability (Pierson 2004).
The second methodological puzzle stems from the multiplicity of plausible
theories that attempt to account for differing reactions by the Church to human rights
abuses in Latin America. A full discussion of these theories is presented in the next
chapter, but a short list includes: the overall level of poverty in a country or region; the
overall level of political repression; sources of Church funding; competition from
Marxists and evangelical protestants; and the Church’s pursuit of its own material
interests, social influence, or political influence.
This abundance of plausible causal relationships is the result of a proliferation of
single case studies or two-case comparisons of Church political behavior in the region.
Such research designs are ideal for examining complex social relationships and
generating hypotheses (Munck 2001, 119-20). Indeed, some of the most important and
well-regarded research on the Church in Latin America was produced by single-case
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studies or two case comparisons. A short list of such work includes Brian Smith’s (1982)
thorough examination of the Chilean Church, Scott Mainwaring’s (1986) seminal study
of the Brazilian Church, and Daniel Levine’s influential comparison of the Venezuelan
and Colombian Churches (1981). However, such research designs are limited in their
ability to test the broader cross-national applicability of each theory. Thus, as this
research design is reused, new theories continue to accumulate while older ones remain
untested outside of the cases that inspired them. Consequently, the literature on this
question has stagnated.
To advance a new theory one must amass an abundance of information about each
case. However, to meaningfully contribute to the literature, research must engage in more
thorough and systematic comparative analysis. In the pages that follow, I hope to balance
the requirements for achieving these goals by using detailed comparative historical
analysis of three cases, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, paired with shorter studies of three
additional cases, El Salvador, Guatemala and Colombia.
Organization of the Dissertation
Following this short introduction, the dissertation that follows is organized into
six chapters. Chapter 2 first reviews key insights and challenges in the literature on the
Church's varying responses to human rights abuse in Latin America. Next, it describes
the path dependent theoretical approach used in this project. The chapter then concludes
with a discussion of case selection and research design. Chapter 3 describes the historical
context in which Church and state collided between the 1960s and the 1980s. The chapter
emphasizes the era of reform in the social teachings of the international and regional
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Catholic Church from 1891 to 1979, the characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarian
regimes in general, and their manifestations in Argentina, Chile and Brazil.
Chapters 4-6 trace the path dependent evolution of Church-state relations in
Argentina, Chile and Brazil. Chapter 4 identifies each case's critical juncture in the
evolution of Church-state relationships. It does so by tracing each case's progression from
antecedent conditions to moments of political crisis that unleashed major sociopolitical
forces prompting a break with old institutions. These crises gave way to decisive
movements of reform. Though generally not central to debates surrounding them, these
reforms redesigned or reaffirmed pre-crisis Church-state ties. Chapter 5 traces the
trajectory of Church-state relations during the decades following the critical juncture in
all three cases. The chapter argues that these trajectories were set in motion by Churchstate ties that were established during critical junctures and sustained by specific selfreinforcing mechanisms of reproduction. Chapter 6 brings these three trajectories into the
authoritarian period. The chapter argues that despite the presence of progressive sectors
among the Church's clergy and grassroots in all three cases, the distinct trajectories of
Church-state relations (now long-established) shaped the response of each episcopacy to
pre-coup crises, the military's seizure of power, subsequent waves of repression, and
repression that targeted the Church.
Chapter 7 extends the argument presented in chapters 4-6 to three additional
cases, Colombia, Guatemala, and El Salvador. These cases exhibit comparable
divergence in episcopal responses to rights abuses, but they occurred in the midst of the
outbreak of full blown civil wars and the counterinsurgencies that followed. Chapter 8
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draws comparisons between all six cases. In doing so, this chapter concludes the study by
highlighting and discussing its main findings.

12

Chapter 2: Church State Ties and Human Rights Advocacy

National-level Catholic bishops conferences' willingness and ability to denounce
the state's role in ongoing human rights abuse was the result of a combination of different
factors that played out over the course of the 20th century. The groundwork for this
argument is laid out in the chapter that follows. In the next section, I argue that a critical
reading of relevant literature reveals two valuable insights in support of this perspective.
First, varying episcopal responses to human rights crises is the result of long-term
historical processes, not constant or proximate causes. Only with reference to historical
factors can key contemporaneous anomalies be adequately explained. In some cases, for
example, the escalation of repression targeting the Church is a clear proximate cause for
episcopal denunciation of human rights abuses. Yet elsewhere, episcopacies overseeing a
Church subject to comparable levels of repression remained silent. Second, these long
term historical processes are rooted in the historical institutions that separated or bound
Church and state. Attempting to explain episcopal political behavior without reference to
the production and reproduction of established norms of Church-state interaction is as illadvised as attempting to explain voting trends without reference to electoral rules and
party systems. Doing so omits a feature of political interaction that is so pervasive in its
effects that it may be taken for granted (quite erroneously) in the absence of adequate
cross-national comparison. In subsequent sections I provide a brief theoretical overview
of the path dependent, Church-state relations argument. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of issues related to case selection.
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The Catholic Church and Human Rights in Latin America
The historical and social scientific literature on church-state relations in Latin
America is expansive. However, it is possible to organize and assess the diverse range of
plausible theories offering social scientific explanations for the Church’s human rights
activity in the region by dividing them into three groups based on the type of causal
factors they emphasize. The first are theories suggesting broad, national-level factors or
conditions that operate, more or less, as constant causes. The second are theories that
credit change or reform within the international Catholic Church from the mid-1960s
onward. The third are theories suggesting that either changes or continuity in a long-term
relationship between the Church and other organized actors prompted changes in
episcopal reactions to rights abuses. The first two approaches provide valuable insights,
but posit causes that do not vary across cases with very different outcomes. This indicates
that additional variables are needed to fully explain episcopal political commitments. The
third approach, which includes the work of Anthony Gill, Daniel Levine, and Daniel
Philpott, provides a more nuanced and variable set of insights, though they are imperfect.
If evaluated as a family of theories, rather than solely as competitors, each sheds a ray of
light on the puzzle, suggesting the potential of path dependent institutional relationships
to explain moments when the Church ignored or denounced human rights abuses.
Broad factors or conditions hypothesized to facilitate denunciations include high
levels of poverty, worsening economic conditions, low or decreasing regime popularity,
and severe repression. Liberation theologian, Gustavo Gutiérrez (1973) proposes one
such theory. Gutiérrez links poverty with episcopal willingness to challenge state
practices by suggesting that as poverty and material suffering increase in an area, local
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bishops feel compelled to question the source of that suffering. Such investigations
inevitably led bishops to blame failed or inadequate state policies, thereby engendering a
willingness to criticize state policies. This political awakening based on observing human
suffering then spills over into a variety of areas, including the defense of human rights.
Bouvier (1983) adopts a different point of view. She sees the episcopacy, at least
in part, as a strategic and sophisticated political actor that seeks to protect church interests
in a given political environment.6 In her final analysis, Bouvier includes worsening
economic conditions and falling regime popularity as crucial components of a political
environment in which bishops find it politically feasible to criticize a rights abusing
regime. Bouvier (1983) and Smith (1979) have also suggested that the severity of
repression within a country plays a major role in the decision of the episcopacy to
denounce rights abusing regimes. Whereas minor levels of rights abuses may be
overlooked, shocking or pervasive human rights abuses are more difficult for hesitant
episcopacies to ignore.
Regardless of their assumptions about the primary motives of Church leaders, all
of these theories posit a similar relationship between cause and effect. Observable
material suffering worsens and dissatisfaction among local bishops leads them to speak
out against the state on behalf of their followers. The more prevalent suffering is in a
country or region, the larger and louder the collective voice of contentious, pro-human
rights bishops. This perspective is valuable, because it correctly acknowledges that
bishops and episcopal conferences are influenced by the social and political conditions in

6

It is should come as no surprise that this is a common assumption throughout the literature on Church
politics in the region. Other works in which this assumption figures prominently include Vallier (1970) and
Gill (1998).
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which they attempt to fulfill their organizational and normative obligations. Variability in
these conditions, as well as the causes Church leaders attribute to this variability, is an
important consideration in discerning the extent to which they explain the behavior of the
region's bishops.
However, such arguments are subject to important critiques that raise questions
about their relative importance across time and location. Mainwaring and Wilde (1989,
14, fn 12) note that during the authoritarian period, the overall level of poverty did not
increase so substantially as to warrant, in and of itself, a sudden political awakening of
bishops in the region. Moreover, they note that the overall levels of inequality were not
substantially different between those areas where bishops came to denounce the state and
those areas where they did not. Gill (1998, 43-4) makes a similar point about overall
levels of repression. Drastically different collective responses to rights abuses emanated
from the episcopacies in Chile and Argentina, with the Chilean episcopacy assuming the
role of vocal critic and the Argentine episcopacy remaining, at best, silent. These
reactions emerged despite the fact that during their respective authoritarian periods, the
total number of deaths and disappearances in Argentina were at least four times greater
than those in Chile (see Pereira 2005, 21). Finally, it is possible that low or declining
regime popularity is causally relevant, but it is difficult to demonstrate or refute such
claims conclusively because data about the popularity of authoritarian regimes do not
exist. Thus, broad and/or changing social conditions remain potentially important causal
factors in some individual cases. However, if causally relevant across the region, such
conditions' systematic correlation with progressive episcopal political commitments must
be influenced by additional factors.
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A second valuable group of theories credits a changing international Church with
prompting change in the political positions of local episcopacies. These include the
growth of the progressive sector within each Church, international sources of Church
funding, changes in the ideological leanings of bishops appointed by successive popes,
the effects of Vatican II era reforms and the positions adopted by CELAM, the Latin
American Episcopal Council, at major regional meetings.
Perhaps the most conventional account of how internal church reform pushed
segments of the church towards denouncing human rights abuses comes from Klaiber
(1998). Klaiber’s work is one of history more than theory-driven social science.
However, Klaiber’s regional survey of Catholic responses to human rights abuses tends
to highlight the extents to which sectors of each Church accepted the reforms of Vatican
II as well as some of the conclusions reached by CELAM at meetings in Medellín (1968)
and Puebla (1979). These reforms included new calls for bishops to adopt roles as socioethical leaders, rather than exclusively the leaders and defenders of the Church and its
interests. Moreover, during this period the international church began to extend its stated
mission from the religious and spiritual realm into the realm of social issues. This new
interest included promoting a social agenda based on issues like poverty, equity, rights,
and justice (Levine 1981, 35-41). Mainwaring (1986) argues that with Vatican II and
Medellín, the Church shifted its conception of its religious mission and that, “The way
the Church intervenes in politics depends fundamentally on the way it perceives its
religious mission” (7).
Like factors such as poverty and repression, reforms in the international and
regional church alone do not explain the widely varying episcopal responses to human
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rights abuses across national borders. Despite this, many social scientists correctly regard
these reforms as central to understanding episcopal responses to rights abuse because
they strengthened emerging groups of socially progressive Catholics across the region.
Mainwaring and Wilde (1989), for example, argue that differing episcopal reactions to
rights abuses were the result of uneven growth of the progressive sectors within each
national church after Vatican II. Where progressive sectors remained weak, no episcopal
denunciations were forthcoming. But where progressive sectors grew stronger, once those
sectors became victims of state repression, large segments of the episcopacy became
willing to denounce the state. Variation in the strength of progressive Catholic
organizations depended in part on whether or not a dictatorship existed to provoke
Catholic activists. However, once these groups emerged, their survival depended entirely
on each bishop’s willingness to allow them to continue to operate within his diocese (1221). Unfortunately, Mainwaring and Wilde leave unanswered the question of why
segments of bishops who either tolerated or encouraged such progressive groups grew so
unevenly in each national-level Church, and this is the central issue.
Vatican II and the Medellín and Puebla CELAM conferences prove unsatisfactory
as singular and direct causes of episcopal action on human rights. However, the
importance of sweeping changes they initiated in the Latin American Church is difficult
to overstate. With this recognition, the most important question becomes what varied in
each context so that the ideas of Vatican II and Medellín were put into practice
differently? The final group of theories considers how either continuity or change in long
term historical relationships interacted with Vatican II-era reforms in each national
context.
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Perhaps the most frequently cited work on this question in recent years is
Anthony Gill’s Rendering Unto Caesar (1998). Gill focuses squarely on the question of
episcopal denunciations of rights abuse during the authoritarian period. Gill’s core
argument is that the growth of evangelical protestant churches drove Catholic
episcopacies to adopt the defense and promotion of human rights as a strategy for
competing for religious adherents. Gill rests his argument on the assumption that
religious organizations compete for adherents in a religious marketplace by offering
different “religious goods.” Religious marketplaces become competitive when two or
more religious organizations actively and fairly compete for adherents. In competitive
environments religious organizations vie for adherents by offering improved goods
related to religious observance, such as a stronger sense of community among members,
denser social networks, or free meals on Sundays. Gill sees the Catholic episcopacy’s
defense of human rights as one such religious good, which arose in response to the rapid
growth of evangelical Protestantism over the previous century. Gill then uses crosssectional regression analysis on 12 cases to demonstrate a correlation between increased
competition from evangelical churches and Catholic episcopacies who were generally
more vocal defenders of human rights.
Gill’s work is part of a literature that examines religion using rational choice
theory, and for this reason Rendering Unto Caesar remains an important contribution in
its own right.7 However, Gill’s work remains controversial for a number of reasons.
First, Gill’s strong statistical correlation is vulnerable to some important critiques.

7

Key early works on rational choice and religion include: Iannaccone (1991, 1992), Stark and Bainbridge
(1987), and Stark (1995). See Warner (1993), discussed below, for an insightful early review of this
literature.
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Philpott (2007), for example, questions Gill’s interpretation of the important case of
Brazil, which experienced both high levels of protestant growth and a very active, prohuman rights episcopacy. Citing Brazilian census data, Philpott contends that the
explosion of evangelical protestant growth did not occur until the 1980s, well after the
episcopacy had already made very public commitments to defending human rights (513;
See also Frigerio 2007, 34). Ambiguity in the precise timing of religious competition's
acceleration in each case is compounded by the notorious lack of reliability in measures
of religious conversion in general (Steigenga and Cleary 2007, 11-2). If the case of Brazil
were removed from the statistical analysis of only twelve cases, Gill’s correlation would
fail to meet common standards of statistical significance.
Gill’s treatment of the Uruguayan case is problematic as well. Gill describes the
Uruguayan episcopacy as “pro-authoritarian,” but available evidence indicates that the
most powerful members of the small Uruguayan episcopacy initially denounced the
deteriorating human rights situation in Uruguay in 1972, only to be silenced by repression
and the intervention of the pope in the mid-1970s (Kaufman 1979, 45; Klaiber 1998,
114). According to Gill’s data, Uruguay had very low levels of protestant competition,
and if Uruguay were recoded as an anti-authoritarian case, his correlation loses its
statistical significance.
These empirical issues raise some questions about the strength of the evidence in
support of Gill's argument. However, Gill makes no claims that protestant competition
was a necessary condition for the emergence of episcopacies that denounced rights
abuses and the correlation appears strong if not conclusively robust. These problems do,
however, demonstrate some of the tradeoffs associated with such methodological
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approaches to this question. Relying on contested measures and regression analysis to
analyze twelve cases leaves little room for coding or measurement error. In addition, such
an approach sacrifices qualitative analytical leverage rooted in a strong knowledge of
each case.
More important than the empirical questions is Gill’s treatment of differing preexisting church-state relationships across the region and their relationship to his
competition-based argument. Gill devotes a chapter to tracing the development of
Church-state relations in Latin America over the previous century, placing Church-state
conflicts during the 1960s in historical context. Gill also asserts that, theoretically,
privileges provided by the state to the Catholic Church (but withheld from other religious
sects) contribute to the suppression of religious competition. The implication is a case of
increased religious competition coinciding with a Church that receives exclusive benefits
or privileges from the state is unlikely. Unfortunately, differences in Church-state ties
that existed across the region by the late 1960s go uninvestigated and ultimately do not
factor into Gill's quantitative or qualitative analysis. This is a critical omission because it
is tied to the logic of religious competition. If religious organizations compete for
adherents by offering new or improved services, why would a religious organization that
has a beneficial pre-existing relationship with the state choose to alienate powerful allies
by denouncing them as rights abusers? Such a strategy for competition seems remarkably
risky, given that such denunciations might cause state officials to revoke state-provided
benefits like subsidies and special legal status. Such a strategy might also place adherents
in harm's way by potentially provoking violent retaliation by the state.
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More sensitive to such differing national contexts is Levine’s Religion and
Politics in Latin America (1981), a broad analysis of Catholic political behavior. Though
Levine does not specifically examine Catholic human rights advocacy, many of Levine’s
insights speak to the question of why some Churches are more or less likely to challenge
state policy. Levine places Vatican II and Medellín-era reforms at the center of his
analysis. However, based on a comparison of Church politics in Colombia and
Venezuela, Levine offers a sophisticated explanation for the differing political
commitments of each national level church after this period of reform. He argues that the
varying political behavior of the Catholic Church in Latin America is driven by the
institutional strength of the Church as it exists within each country. Institutionally strong
churches are capable of influencing the state and protecting their interests alone and
privately. In such Churches authority follows clear channels from the top of the Church
hierarchy to the bottom. This phenomenon makes institutionally strong churches more
hierarchically rigid at the national level. It follows that in such Churches ideas from the
grassroots are less likely to either receive the support of bishops at the national level or
permeate the institution as a whole.
Institutionally weaker churches are forced to operate differently. They must form
alliances with other social groups to exert political influence. They are also somewhat
less capable of censoring ideas that spring from the grassroots. Consequently, in the
1960s and 70s, as the spirit of Vatican II and Medellín swept the Church, institutionally
weaker churches embraced new ideas of reform, such as the call for bishops to assume
new roles as socio-ethical leaders. International calls for new commitments to social
justice and human rights inclined episcopacies to cooperate with the organized political
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left (Levine 1981, 171-91). With the arrival of the authoritarian period, progressive
groups became the most vulnerable to human rights abuses. Levine’s analysis does not
directly consider this possibility, but conceivably once repression of the left began, new
ideas within the international church and new alliances with other groups in society drew
institutionally weaker Churches into denouncing rights abuses leveled against former
associates. Meanwhile, institutionally strong churches, insulated from grassroots pressure
from progressive Catholics and from unnecessary alliances with other social groups, and
hesitant to alter authority structures (142-70), may have had fewer reasons to publicly
denounce human rights abusing regimes.
Levine’s specific argument is rarely directly challenged or critiqued and its core
insights remain relevant in contemporary discussions of religious pluralism in democracy
(Levine 2009). However, its continued relevance is due in part to the fact that it is
derived from observing the politics of two Churches in countries that escaped much of
the rampant and egregious human rights abuses experienced elsewhere in the region
during the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, it was written before the return of insurgency
and counterinsurgency-related human rights abuse in Colombia during the 1980s and
afterward. That is, Levine explains much of Church politics in two countries with very
specific and atypical national contexts. Consequently, it remains to be seen if Levine’s
ideas about Church power, hierarchical norms and alliances might explain human rights
activity elsewhere in the region and during different periods of time.
Philpott (2007) takes a different perspective consistent with the historical
institutionalist school, which focuses on explaining outcomes as the result of “long
historic pathways eeked out by evolving institutions and ideas” (508; see Pierson and
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Skocpol 2002). Conducting an expansive examination of the varying political behavior of
multiple religious organizations and faiths worldwide, Philpott identifies very broad
patterns in the behavior of religious organizations. Generally, he sees the willingness of
religious organizations to become pro-democracy advocates as depending on the
historical intersection of the ties between religious organizations and the state (the level
of “differentiation,” or separateness) and each religious organization’s political theology.
These two independent variables are sometimes exogenous and sometimes endogenous.
However, according to Philpott, the ideal conditions for the emergence of a religious
organization that advocates democratization are political theologies supportive of liberal
democracy in the midst of high levels of church-state differentiation. In such scenarios,
religious organizations have greater independence (508). Of situations where
differentiation takes shape before a new political theology emerges, Philpott writes, “The
new [political theology] then serves as a proximate cause of the changes in the religious
actor’s political pursuits, though these pursuits will remain empowered or hindered by the
actor’s prior condition of differentiation. The Catholic Church in Latin America had
achieved differentiation decades before…it took up the liberal democratic ideas that led it
to support democratization. Once it did embrace these ideas, its differentiated position
empowered it to pursue them” (509).
In his discussion of the Catholic Church in Latin America, Philpott writes in very
broad terms. He argues that for much of the region, church and state became
differentiated during a period between 1850 and 1925. After that time, Church
episcopacies continued to seek political influence by establishing informal ties with the
state. However, by the middle of the twentieth century, grassroots groups and sectors of
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the episcopacy in a number of Churches began to adopt progressive political theologies.
Where these sectors grew strongest, Churches would eventually become very strong prodemocracy advocates. For Philpott, key examples include Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and
Nicaragua, with similar patterns in Peru, Ecuador, Panama, Bolivia and Guatemala by the
mid-1980s (512). Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay are depicted as Churches that took
either little or very late interest in democratization. Philpott characterizes these positions
of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay as arising because “liberal democratic political
theology” did not take root and episcopacies “perpetuated the ‘neo-Christendom’ model
of close ties to military rulers” (512). In other words, Churches that defended democracy
had strong progressive sectors that affected each Church’s political theology and
Churches that did not defend democracy had episcopacies that remained committed to
retaining close ties to the state and lacked strong progressive sectors.
The tremendous breadth of Philpott’s work leads to the omission of important
nuances in this story. For example, the formal and informal ties between Church and state
varied significantly across the region well into at least the 1970s, a reality demonstrated
by Gill (1999) and thoroughly described by a number of older works (Mecham 1966;
Vallier 1970). Thus, one of Philpott’s two central independent variables varies more than
his analysis seems to indicate. Furthermore, Philpott’s brief mentioning of the
Paraguayan episcopacy’s late opposition to the Stroessner regime fails to note the
considerable delays in denunciations from other episcopacies that he considers better
examples of pro-democracy advocates. The Guatemalan Church, for example, makes his
list of pro-democracy Churches, but its delay in becoming a pro-democracy advocate was
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longer than the Paraguayan Church’s.8 Also, Philpott, like Gill (1998) underestimates
powerful segments of the Uruguayan episcopacy’s efforts to denounce growing human
rights abuse and the gradual slide into authoritarianism (Kaufman 1979, 45; Klaiber
1998, 114).
Nonetheless, Philpott’s larger ideas about church-state differentiation and political
theology remain intriguing. Philpott’s broad insights tempered with greater attention to
the joint evolution of church-state differentiation and political theology suggest a
valuable line of research capable of shedding new light on the Church’s political
orientation during a critical period in Latin American political history. Philpott depicts
the degree of church-state differentiation and the emergence of pro-democracy Churches
as relatively consistent phenomena across the region, but in reality both varied
considerably across national borders. Taking this greater variance into account, and
focusing exclusively on the Catholic Church in Latin America, might reveal more about
the effects of church-state differentiation on the political behavior of religious
organizations.
Rival Explanations or Reinforcing Institutional Trajectories?
Sorting out the relative importance of the three theoretical perspectives presented
by Levine (1981), Gill (1998) and Philpott (2007) is a necessary and complicated
endeavor. The complexity is due to the multiple ways in which the identified causal
variables may plausibly interact with each other. For example, Gill (1999) has argued
that religious competition is lower in countries where the state provides a single dominant
religious organization with exclusive benefits such as tax exemptions, state funding,
8

This discrepancy assumes the ‘clock’ measuring delay in denunciation starts in 1962 for Guatemala (the
start of the civil war) and 1954 in Paraguay (the start of the Stroessner regime).

26

special legal status, or by placing legal restrictions on the operations of minority
religions. Such benefits provide dominant religious organizations with a competitive
advantage analogous to a subsidy. These subsidies may allow the continued domination
of the religious marketplace by a single religious organization. If accurate, close churchstate ties (Philpott’s low level of church-state differentiation) and low protestant
competition may appear together frequently. Alternatively, close Church-state ties may
act as a kind of life support system in an environment where the emergence of competing
religious organizations is still possible despite some forms of state support. Such a
scenario would allow high levels of competition to coincide with a Church closely tied to
the state espousing a social message largely disconnected from society, such as the
Catholic Church in France prior to the French Revolution (Warner 1993, 1056).
It is also plausible that stronger churches are in a better position to retain close
ties to the state. Levine’s (1981) depiction of the differing evolution of the Church in
Colombia and Venezuela seems to follow this trajectory. Stronger national Churches
may be in a position to retain such ties with the state and subsequently face little
challenge in the religious marketplace.
To varying degrees, Gill, Levine and Philpott all note the potential of using a path
dependent framework to better understand Catholic human rights advocacy, though they
may not use this exact terminology. Gill's (1998) analysis confines itself to the Catholic
episcopacy’s strategic choices over a relatively short period of time, but he is explicit
about the potential importance of path dependence. He notes:
While the central argument of this study is not strictly path dependent, I am
aware of and sensitive to the fact that historical events influence the set of
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strategic choices available to social actors. As will be discussed later, events that
appeared to have little impact at the time proved to be critical further down the
road. For example, the implementation of laws guaranteeing religious freedom in
the late 1800s opened the gates to a surge in competition when Protestant
missionary groups began to take advantage of this situation in the 1930s. (18)
Levine (1981) also hints at such a long term, relationship-based causation, asserting:
members and leaders of the Church…share in national history, deal with all kinds
of national institutions every day, and carry with them the memory of those
traditions, issues, and conflicts which have shaped national experience. As we
shall see, these experiences and memories condition subsequent perception and
action in powerful and often striking ways. (57)
Although he does not adopt the terminology, Philpott’s (2007) focus on the long-term
consequences of the interaction between changes in political theology and church-state
differentiation is remarkably in sync with a path dependent perspective. This is
particularly true when Philpott notes in his conclusion that both high and low levels of
church-state differentiation are likely to be long-lasting institutional relationships so long
as both religious organizations and the state consent to them (522). When this conclusion
is considered with Philpott’s central observation that the level of differentiation has the
capacity to restrain or empower changing political theologies, specifying the path
dependent characteristics of interactions between the state and religious organizations
seems to be the next logical step. Despite this and a recent resurgence of interest in
alternative church-state relationships and religious-based political activity, a work
exploring the ability of path dependency to explain the puzzling variance of human rights
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commitments made by the Catholic episcopacy in Latin America remains woefully
absent from this literature.9
Path Dependence and Church-State Relations in Latin America
Path dependent arguments are often complex multi-stage comparisons that extend
across many years and several cases. Within such major undertakings, two key elements
are the most important. The first is the identification of a critical juncture and the second
is the identification of one or more “mechanisms of reproduction” (Collier and Collier
1991, 31). A critical juncture is “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in
distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is
hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (29). These legacies are stable trajectories that
last for long periods of time. The stability of a legacy is generated by “mechanisms of
reproduction” which typically involve ongoing institutional or political processes that
continually reinforce the original direction pursued during the critical juncture and they
make shifting to some alternative course very difficult (31; see also Pierson 2004 and
Mahoney 2000).
The resolution of the conflict between conservative pro-clerical forces and liberal
anti-clerical forces (1917-1948) is a likely candidate for such a critical juncture. The
theoretical underpinning for identifying such moments as critical junctures is derived
from Warner’s description of a “new paradigm” in the sociological study of religion in
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Prominent examples of this resurgence include attempts to understand cross-national variance in the
political statements issued by Catholic episcopacies in contemporary Latin America (Hagopian 2008),
attempts to better describe, measure and categorize varying church-state relationships worldwide as a basis
for further investigation into the long and short-term repercussions of alternative church-state relationships
(Philpott 2007; Fox and Sandler 2005; Fox 2006; Fox 2007) and calls to further investigate the role of
religion in politics in both Latin America (Patterson 2005) and the rest of the world (Norris and Inglehart
2004).
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the United States (1993). Synthesizing approximately 20 years of research grappling
with the comparatively high level of religiosity in the US, Warner contends that
disestablishment of all churches in the US after 1789 (and then gradually in each state) is
the key starting point in influential explanations accounting for religious behavior in the
US (1050). These accounts posit that disestablishment created a highly competitive
environment which forced all religious organizations to “sink or swim” analogous to
firms in a market economy where followers are analogous to customers. The generalized
implication for social theory is the expectation that increased religious competition
(typically understood as ease of entry for new competitors, or “religious entrepreneurs,”
rather than an arbitrary measure of religious pluralism) drives increased religious
innovation (1057).
Beyond this shared foundation, theories emerging within this paradigm generate
conflicting expectations and vigorous debates over proper conceptualization and
measurement. Innovation resulting from increased competition may manifest itself in a
wide array of choices including theological and political adaptation.10 However, the
paradigm raises questions about how different types of church-state configurations might
alter prevailing ‘market conditions,’ how stable those configurations and resulting market
conditions might be, and what effect those conditions may have on the behavior of
religious organizations and religious leaders.
Thus, when institutional relationships linking the Catholic Church and the state
are rearranged and reinforced, cascading long-term effects permeate religious
marketplaces in ways that might account for the observations of Philpott, Levine, and
10

It is for this reason that practitioners of the application of rationale choice to religion have critiqued Gill
(1998) as presenting an underspecified model (Trejo 2009:326).
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Gill. Indeed, each may have identified one component in a larger system of reinforcing
causal mechanisms and spurious relationships related to the episcopacy’s ideological
development and response to state-sanctioned human rights abuses.
In the following chapters, I will argue that antecedent conditions in which
Church-state ties were sometimes stable but more often subject to change varied
considerably from country to country over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries.
This was due in part to the Church's involvement in the region's political conflict between
liberals and conservatives during this era. Antecedent conditions were disrupted and
critical junctures arose in response to three historic developments during the first half of
the 20th century. First, the rise of the organized left as an important political force, if not
always an important electoral force, fundamentally altered Liberal-Conservative conflicts
and the basic dynamics of political struggle. The Church's well-established position in
opposition to communism helped involve it in elite-driven reforms to forestall the growth
of the left. Second, the vigorously anticlerical Mexican Revolution and its bloody
aftermath for significant sectors of the Church raised the stakes for continued Church
involvement in zero-sum political conflicts. Third, in 1922 Pope Pius XI's papacy began
initiating a period of new Vatican openness to varying, negotiated Church-state schemes
ranging from the integral to the separated, so long as persecution of the Church was
avoided.
In the wake of these developments, when social and political crises erupted that
were disruptive enough to prompt the alteration of basic institutions of government,
political leaders in the state and episcopal leaders in the Church were able to rearrange
Church-state ties in pursuit of mutual benefits. However, in doing so, these leaders chose
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widely varying institutional arrangements that ranged from complete separation of
Church and state to the extension of already dense networks of Church-state ties. When
situated in broader moments of institutional transformation and agreed upon by both
Church and state leaders, such moments created critical junctures in Latin American
Church-state relations.
Some critical junctures resulted in the creation of a dense network of Church-state
ties that included formal state authority over internal Church affairs. In such cases, the
state was able to use its role in the selection of bishops, the approval of new ecclesiastical
structures, and the funding of Church operations as leverage to construct politically
quiescent episcopacies. Such episcopacies secured the protection and promotion of
Church interests by remaining in good favor with successive governments, constructing
images of the Church as a nationalist symbol and institution, and calling for
"conciliation" according to the terms of the powerful (those who controlled the state)
during moments of national crisis. This relationship with the state mitigated the influence
of the Vatican during the era of international Church reform and the influence of
progressive sectors of the Church calling for social transformation. The result was the
construction of more politically conservative episcopacies. Such episcopacies remained
silent or complicit during waves of human rights abuse in the 1960s-1980s.
Other critical junctures resulted in the creation of a network of Church-state ties
that was intermediate in density in comparison to the first group. In such cases, the state
lacked formal controls over internal affairs of the Church. This reduced state leverage and
increased the influence of the Vatican, clergy, laity and grassroots Catholic activists in
shaping episcopal priorities. Though the interests of such episcopacies were more heavily
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influenced by non-state forces during the era of Church reform, remaining Church-state
ties gave the state leverage over how the episcopacy pursued its priorities. Whether by
funding, tight control over the immigration status of foreign clergy, or some other
measure, the survival and success of Church programs and operations remained
contingent on state approval. Such leverage deeply divided episcopacies between those
willing to compromise with the state in pursuit of common goals, those disenchanted with
the state's obstruction, and those normatively committed to public advocacy for Church
priorities regardless of the state's response. Such divided episcopal conferences required
time, internal dialog, and additional impetus in the form of state repression targeting the
Church to begin unambiguous denunciations of rights abusing regimes during the 1960s 1980s.
Finally, a third group of critical junctures resulted in the creation of a complete or
nearly complete separation of Church and state. In such cases, the state possessed very
little leverage over the Church. This relationship heightened the influence of the Vatican
and the grassroots compared to Churches more closely tied to the state. This position with
respect to the state also encouraged the Church to pursue its self-defined interests through
the creation of its own institutions and/or its own channels of influence in state policy.
Often, public participation in political struggles was one such channel. Such Churches
immediately lost influence in the aftermath of military coups. So-called "wait and see"
periods were far shorter in such cases and unambiguous denunciations of rights abusing
regimes occurred within a couple of years of military coups and the onset of waves of
repression.
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Thus, the central hypothesis pursued in the chapters that follow is that alternative
configurations of Church-state ties established and maintained discernible and relatively
stable trajectories in Church-state relations in 20th century Latin America. This central
hypothesis leads to a series of additional related hypotheses including: (1) Churches with
minimal/no Church-state ties derive their interests from sources other than the state, such
as the Vatican; (2) Churches with denser networks of Church-state ties derive their
interests in part from the interests of those who hold state power; (3) post-Vatican II
Churches with minimal/no Church-state ties are more likely to denounce regimes that
tolerate or encourage systematic human rights abuses; and (4) post-Vatican II Churches
with denser networks of Church-state ties will be more likely to justify state repression or
to urge "conciliation" between rights abusing regimes and the victims of their repression.
Paired Comparisons and the Utility of Process Tracing
Methodologically rigorous examination of path dependent systems calls for
process tracing best exemplified by Collier and Collier (1991). Identifying the
incorporation of the working class into the political system as a critical juncture in eight
Latin American countries, the Colliers trace the evolution of four pairs of states. Each
pair displays a different type of working class incorporation, and this process creates a set
of mechanisms of reproduction which drives all four pairs of states down different multidecade political trajectories with radically different outcomes in late 20th century political
dynamics. Through the use of paired comparisons that juxtapose cases with similar
outcomes within a broader study of cases with different outcomes, the Colliers set out to
employ both “most similar systems” and “most different systems” comparison designs
(15; See Przeworski and Teune 1982). The Colliers offer a compelling and cohesive
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argument, despite grappling with a project of enormous historical scope, by consistently
following two qualitative methodological strategies: process tracing and the identification
and comparison of clearly defined stages of path dependence.
Process tracing involves the detailed investigation and description of the chain of
cause and effect relationships leading from a significant cause to the outcome one is
attempting to explain (George and Bennett 2005, 206; see also Brady and Collier 2004,
300). Because of its attention to detail and chronology, process tracing is particularly
adept at uncovering causal mechanisms and causal sequences.
The Colliers use process tracing to convincingly demonstrate clear causal linkages
between labor incorporation and political system dynamics, causes and effects that were
sometimes separated by 70 years or more. Using process tracing in side-by-side case
comparisons also reveals shared causal processes. Rather than determining the mere
presence or absence of variables as a test of a hypothesis, process tracing focuses
attention on the linkages between events as they unfold over time. Given the importance
of the evolution of the Church and its relationship to the social groups and the state
during the 20th century, this methodological strategy is well-suited for investigating the
dynamics that drove Church commitments to human rights advocacy.
If performed self-consciously, thorough process tracing is capable of testing
competing theories against each other. However, such tests may not be definitive due to
unavailability of important information or evidence definitively supportive of only one
causal explanation. In addition, process tracing runs the risk of allowing investigators to
attribute inordinate significance to evidence that confirms a priori assumptions. Yet,
process tracing is capable of transforming a single case into a series of observations about
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a hypothesized causal sequence. Each link in the hypothesized causal chain is
investigated and each piece of confirmatory evidence along this chain adds strength to the
argument being made while accumulated contradictory evidence or missing links weaken
the argument or identify needed modification. Thus, process tracing is a methodology
capable of testing theory, “not only because it generates numerous observations within a
case, but because these observations must be linked in particular ways to constitute an
explanation of the case” (George and Bennett 2005, 207).
In this way, process tracing complements comparisons of two or more cases
because only in extremely rare cases can controlled comparisons actually control for all
potentially relevant variables but one. Consequently, controlled comparisons could be
said to help generate theory and hypotheses in the social sciences, while process tracing
involves the search for evidence that actually tests those theories and hypotheses (George
and Bennett 2005, 214-5).
Finally, given the complexity of unraveling the evolution of church-state
relationships, process tracing offers a method of research that allows for the investigation
of complex causal relationships. Process tracing is a valuable test of theories that posit
reciprocal causation (Munck 2004, 108); different causal paths leading to a similar
outcome in different cases, or equifinality (George and Bennett 2005, 215), and
spuriousness (223). These alternative causal processes are distinct possibilities in the
study at hand, so a methodology capable of checking for them is important.
If process tracing forces scholars to perform better qualitative research by
focusing on details and connections within single cases, then clearly defined stages in
critical juncture arguments force scholars to remain clear about their theoretical claims
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when they rise to cross-case levels of abstraction. The Colliers do this by identifying and
comparing the same stages for all eight cases. Each stage represents a period with
different dynamics, but all within the larger cause and effect story. The most important
pieces are antecedent conditions, the critical juncture, and mechanisms of reproduction.
Antecedent conditions are the political and institutional dynamics that exist prior to the
critical juncture. The critical juncture is the period during which an opportunity exists for
sweeping changes that fundamentally reshape political or institutional arrangements. The
mechanisms of reproduction are those political or institutional processes that
subsequently reinforce the original choice made during the critical juncture (Collier and
Collier 1991, 29-39).
This study uses process tracing within specifically defined path dependent stages
to trace the evolution of Church-state ties from antecedent conditions, to crises and
critical junctures, and finally to mechanisms of reproduction and their impact on
episcopal responses to human rights abuse during the authoritarian period. To facilitate
case study depth appropriate to process-tracing, three cases (Argentina, Chile, and Brazil)
are examined in depth. To add breadth, these cases are paired with shorter examinations
of three additional cases (Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala). All comparison is
structured according to the stages of path dependent processes with side-by side
comparisons of antecedent conditions and critical junctures, mechanisms of reproduction,
and responses to waves of human rights abuses. The next section discusses
methodological issues related to the selection of these cases.
Case Selection
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Cases are classified according to the dependent variable, the reaction of the
episcopacy at the national level over a specified number of years. The episcopal response
to waves of human rights abuse must be assessed through a variety of indicators.
Important dimensions of each response include: the length of the interval between the
earliest instances of rights abuse and the first episcopal denunciation of that abuse; the
nature of the human rights-related activity of members of the episcopacy during such
intervals; the intensity and frequency of denunciations; the relative institutional power of
the specific bishops engaged in denunciations; the relative size of groups of bishops
engaged in denunciations; and the amount of rhetorical and practical support leant by the
episcopacy to organizations that supported victims or investigated allegations of human
rights abuse.
Cases were selected principally because they present contextually similar cases in
accordance with the comparative logic of a most-similar systems research design
(Pzeworski and Teune 1982), and they vary on the dependent variable in order to
minimize methodological problems associated with no variance designs (King, Keohane
and Verba 1994, 130). Despite this, selecting cases on the dependent variable is a
controversial choice to some. Applying the logic of regression analysis to qualitative
research strategies, critics warn that this practice truncates full variance of independent
and dependent variables. Truncation results, some argue, in overestimating the strength of
evidence supporting a causal relationship. Overgeneralization of findings may compound
this error (Geddes 1991). Others refute this critique, warning that truncation is instead
more likely to lead to underestimating the strength of evidence in support of a causal
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relationship, causing researchers to erroneously dismiss significant relationships (Collier
and Mahoney 1996).
At a more basic level, defenders of selecting on the dependent variable question
the assumption that qualitative research uses the same sources of analytic leverage as do
regression analysis and other large-N research designs. These rejoinders do not deny that
selection bias is a distinct possibility in such research designs. Instead, they argue that the
analytical leverage in small-N designs comes from multiple within-case observations
collected to support a theoretical argument. Collier, Mahoney and Seawright term such
within-case evidence “causal-process observations.” They contend that research relying
on such observations and including cases with high values on both dependent and
independent variables runs a greatly reduced risk of error resulting from selection bias.
Consequently, stern warnings about selection bias are overblown (2004, 93-8, 102). It
follows that strategic considerations involving the analytic purpose of the study and
judgments about the value of dependent variables of a given case are valid criteria in the
selection of cases for small-N studies (102; George and Bennett 2005, 83-4).
In light of these arguments, it is possible to observe a broad range of variance on
the dependent and independent variables within two distinct contexts, authoritarian rule
and civil wars with counterinsurgency measures effectively permitting the intensive
targeting of noncombatants. Counterinsurgency cases tend to exhibit spikes in human
rights abuse roughly a decade after authoritarian cases, but these two groups of cases
overlap chronologically and are therefore best considered distinct contexts rather than
distinct periods. Characterizations of these contexts follow along with the rationale for
selecting these six specific cases to examine episcopal responses to human rights abuses.
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Authoritarian and Counterinsurgent Rights Abuses
In authoritarian cases Church leaders were in a position to use the Church’s
network of personnel, parishes and dioceses to collect information about victims of
repressive state measures and to denounce them. Typical forms of human rights abuses
included unlawful detention of political prisoners, harassment, kidnapping, torture and
murder. Because of the Church’s prominence as an institution with deep historical,
cultural and political roots in the region and its position as an institution that concerns
itself with the values observed in society at large, each Church was in a position to issue
public statements denouncing rights abuses. The total amount or severity of repression
varies from case to case, but all selected cases exhibit significant levels of human rights
abuses perpetrated by the state. Table 1.1 presents data comparing authoritarian cases
with rough indicators of the institutional strength of each church (priests per 10,000
population circa 1970), competition from Protestants (percentage of population protestant
circa 1970), church-state ties, repression level, and response to repression. This table
indicates the wide variance in values for dependent and independent variables among
relevant cases. However, the quantitative nature of these measures renders them
somewhat superficial. The following chapters make related judgments about the relative
presence of these variables in each case by synthesizing quantitative and qualitative
observations.
The cases selected for study and comparison from this set include Argentina
(1976-1983), a complicit episcopacy; Brazil (1964-1979), a delayed advocate; and Chile
(1973-1989), a contentious denouncer. Relevant features shared by all three cases include
that each: (1) was a bureaucratic authoritarian, national security regime; (2) came to
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power via a violent military coup; and (3) engaged in widespread, violent repression of
labor unions, the press, social activists and elements of the Church in opposition to the
regime.

Table 2.1: Authoritarian Cases: Religious and Human Rights Data
Percent
Evangelical
Christian
197011

Priests per
10,000
Population12

Religious
Regulation
Index
Score13

Rights
Abuse14

Timing of First
Public Episcopal
Denunciations of
Human Rights Abuse

Argentina*
(1976-1983)

3.0

2.0
(1971)

12

4.19

Complicity for
Duration

Brazil*
(1964-1979)

11.6

1.5
(1970)

2

3.13

Moderate Delay
6-11 years

Chile*
(1973-1989)

15.2

3.0
(1971)

2

3.75

Minor Delay
2-3 years

Honduras
(1981-1988)

1.9

0.9
(1972)

6

2.17

No Delay?**

Mexico
(1968-1988)

3.0

1.9
Unknown

8

2.92

Major Delay
12 years

Paraguay
(1954-1989)
Uruguay
(1973-1985)

1.8

2.2
(1972)
3.8
(1970)

9

3.25

2

3.50

Major Delay
15 years
No Delay

Mean

5.4

2.2

5.9

3.27

1.5

* Denotes case selected for further study.
**Nature and timing of first denunciations and subsequent silence unknown due to conflicting
secondary reports which are temporarily irreconcilable.
11

Source: Barrett (1982): Sum of percentages listed for Evangelicals, Neo-Pentecostals, and Indigenous
Christians.
12
Source: Gill (1998, 86)
13
Source: Gill (1999, 300); This index variable is a count, with 21 different categories, of religious
regulations that gave privileged status to the Catholic Church up to at least the 1970s. High scores indicate
close church-state ties.
14
Source: Gibney, Cornett, and Wood. (2008) Political Terror Scale 1976-2006. Average of Political
Terror Scale scores for each year of authoritarian period in each country. Scores range from 1 to 5, with 5
being the most violations of human security. However, because data is limited to years from 1976 to 2006,
averages are calculated without scores years before 1976. Although this missing data is not optimal, the
relative scores are (1) generally consistent with a priori expectations of relative levels of repression, (2)
correctly demonstrate that significant levels of repression were consistent in all countries, (3) using PTS
scores allows for consistency in comparison with later cases, and (4) more accurate measures of repression
than alternative commonly used proxy measures of repression such as Freedom House and Polity scores.
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Human rights violations and episcopal responses during civil war cases generally
resemble authoritarian cases, but a few key differences must be considered in their
assessment. During Latin America’s civil wars, patterns of human rights abuses involved
kidnapping, torture and murder on an individual basis, but also larger events such as
village massacres and death squad activity. Like authoritarian cases, Church leaders were
in a position to collect information and denounce repressive measures used and
sanctioned by the state during counterinsurgencies particularly in remote rural areas.
However, some features of the civil war context largely absent in authoritarian cases may
have tempered the response of Church leaders. First, it is possible that Church leaders
feared the perception that they were sympathetic to insurgents given the historical ties
between elements of the grassroots Church in each country and early forms of secular
political organizations tied to early stages of insurgent movements (Berryman 1984).
Also, unlike authoritarian cases, Church leaders may have faced greater temptation to
interpret rights abuse during periods of open violence as regrettable but inevitable.
Finally, Church leaders may have felt compelled to refrain from harsh criticism of either
party in a conflict in order to position itself as a possible mediator for a negotiated
ceasefire (Klaiber 1998). The potentially relevant cases include Colombia (1962ongoing), El Salvador (1979-1992), Guatemala (1962-1994), Nicaragua (1961-1979,
1981-1988) and Peru (1980-1995). Table 2.2 presents a comparison of civil war cases
with rough indicators of the institutional strength of each Church (priests per 10,000
population circa 1980), competition from protestants (percentage of population protestant
circa 1980), church-state ties, repression level, and response to repression. As with Table
2.1, Table 2.2 indicates the wide variance in values for dependent and independent
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variables among relevant cases. However, the dissertation assesses the relative presence
of these variables in each case synthesizing quantitative and qualitative observations.

Table 2.2: Civil Wars in Latin America: Religious and Human Rights Data
Percent
Evangelical
Christian
198015

Priests per
10,000
Population16

Religious
Regulation
Index
Score17

Rights
Abuse18

Timing of First
Public Episcopal
Denunciations of
Human Rights
Abuse

Colombia*
(1962-ongoing)

1.8

1.92 (1982)

10

4.34

Major Delay
33 years

El Salvador*
(1979-1992)
Guatemala*
(1962-1994)
Nicaragua
(1981-1988)
Peru
(1980-1995)

3.8

3

4.29

No Delay

6

4.24

1

3.56

Moderate Delay
20-22 years
No Delay

2.6

1.1
(1970)
1.2
(1970)
1.4
(1970)
1.36 (1982)

11

4.09

Mean

4.3

1.4

6.2

4.1

7.3
6.2

Minor Delay
2-3 years

*Denotes cases selected for further study.

The cases selected for study and comparison from this set include Colombia
(1962-ongoing), a complicit episcopacy; Guatemala (1962-1996), a delayed advocate;
and El Salvador (1979-1992), a contentious denouncer. As with the authoritarian cases,
these cases were selected principally because they present contextually similar cases and
15

Source: Barrett (1982): Sum of percentages listed for Evangelicals, Neo-pentecostals, and Indigenous
Christians.
16
Source: Data for Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua is from Gill (1998, 86). Data for Colombia and
Peru is from the Catholic Almanac and is presented in Religion and Latin America Statistics, Table 4
available at http://www.providence.edu/las/Statistics.htm .
17
Source: Gill (1999, 300); This index variable is a count, with 21 different categories, of religious
regulations that gave privileged status to the Catholic Church up to at least the 1970s. High scores indicate
close church-state ties.
18
Source: Gibney, Cornett, and Wood. (2008) Political Terror Scale 1976-2006. Average of Political
Terror Scale scores for all years from beginning of conflict to end. Scores range from 1 to 5, with 5 being
the most violations of human security. Data is limited to years from 1976 2006. Thus, Colombia’s score is
the average from 1976 to 2006 and Guatemala’s score is the average from 1976 to 1994.
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they vary on the dependent variable. Relevant features shared by these cases include: (1)
Bitter conflicts triggering the repressive capacity of the state, which always involved the
military, but often also involved forces with direct or indirect ties to the state, such as
police, militias, or death squads and to varying degrees targeted noncombatants. (2)
Rights abuses committed by the ‘forces of order’ during counterinsurgencies vastly
outnumbered the rights abuses committed by insurgents (Goodwin 2001, 198-9, 237-44).
(3) All three insurgencies were strong enough to mount sustained military campaigns. (4)
Although the institutional power of the Church in each of the four countries did vary, the
Church remained an important political actor. Moreover, all three Churches possessed
elements with informal ties (sanctioned or unsanctioned) to nascent stages of secular
organizations later tied to insurgent movements. (5) Because counterinsurgency-related
human rights abuses all peaked around the 1980s, the Church in each country faced
similar international pressures as the political stances of activist progressives and
liberation theologians faced increasing criticism from the Vatican.
The rationale for the exclusion of the Nicaraguan and Peruvian cases warrants
further discussion. The Nicaraguan episcopacy is arguably an example of a contentious
denouncer vis-à-vis the Somoza regime prior to the 1979 revolution and the FSLN
afterwards, though the episcopacy largely overlooked the abuses of the Contras during
the civil war of the 1980s. However, the Nicaraguan case is excluded from this study
because the Nicaraguan episcopacy’s tenuous and shifting relationship with the FSLN
(before and after assuming state power) complicates comparison with other cases where
revolutions did not occur. Such dissimilarity undercuts the most similar systems research
design that guided the selection of other cases.
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The Peruvian case is excluded also because of its complicated history with
various elements of the Peruvian left. First, unlike other radically progressive Catholic
grassroots movements in the region, the Church as a whole was the target of attacks by
Sendero Luminoso (Klaiber 1998, 153; TRC 2003). Second, unlike episcopacies in other
countries, the reformist military government that came to power in a 1968 coup
maintained a tenuously collaborative relationship with socially progressive segments of
the Peruvian episcopacy (Fleet and Smith 1997). This relationship affected the power
dynamics of the Peruvian episcopal conference. Thus, as in Nicaragua, the Peruvian case
does not conform to the most similar system design due to a complicated and atypical
relationship between elements of the Peruvian Church and elements of the Peruvian
left.19
Despite the different political contexts in authoritarian and civil war cases,
striking similarities exist in the diverging patterns of episcopal reactions to human rights
crises. In the next section, I sketch the similarities between three pairs of cases. Each pair
follows its own path with respect to church-state ties and each pair manifests a distinct
response type during human rights crises. These three pairs are Argentina and Colombia
(complicity), Chile and El Salvador (contentious denunciation), and Brazil and
Guatemala (delayed advocacy).
Complicity: Argentina and Colombia
The reaction of the Argentine episcopacy to the human rights abuses committed
during the authoritarian period in Argentina is perhaps the most infamous. During the
period between 1976 and 1983, security forces killed, disappeared, and imprisoned tens
19

The Nicaraguan and Peruvian Church’s atypical relationships represent an interesting pair themselves as
relationships with segments of the left impacted power dynamics in each episcopal conference. However,
these interactions digress from the study at hand and will be set aside for further study in the future.
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of thousands of individuals for political reasons. The use of torture was widespread. As
many sought to avoid this fate, the number in exile reached approximately half a million
(Pereira 2005, 21; See also CONADEP 1984). A small group of progressive bishops
spoke out against human rights abuses as did a radical group of priests known as Priests
of the Third World, but the vast majority of bishops either remained silent on the question
or defended the military regime and its tactics. The Argentine episcopacy’s collusion
with rights abusers is well-documented.20
Despite the presence of competitive elections, by the beginning of the 1980s, the
already serious human rights situation in Colombia was growing far worse. Death squads
linked by both activists and academics to security forces grew in urban areas during the
1980s (Chernick 1988, 56). Part of this war against 'subversion' was the systematic
eradication of members of the Unión Patriótica, the emergent political wing of the
FARC, including the murder or disappearance of over 3,500 party members (Pardo 2000,
72). By the mid-1990s, the military and various paramilitary forces were responsible for
“kill[ing] thousands of peasants suspected of supporting the guerrillas and displac[ing]
hundreds of thousands” (Goodwin 2001, 241).
The growing human rights problem of the 1980s prompted few if any public
episcopal responses. Although the episcopacy denounced the broad moral failings it saw
in Colombian society, the Colombian bishops remained unwilling to document military
and paramilitary-linked rights abuses or produce moral appeals denouncing the officials,

20

See Mignone (1986); Klaiber (1998); Verbitsky (2005); Feitlowitz (1998); and Gill (1998), among
others.
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governments, or institutions that tolerated them. The episcopacy remained silent and
provided minimal or no assistance to victims of repression until the mid-1990s.21
Contentious Denunciation: Chile and El Salvador
Human rights abuses during the authoritarian period in Chile were egregious as
well. During the authoritarian period, political prisoners were often subjected to torture
(Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación 1991). Between 1973 and 1989, the
number of people killed or disappeared fell in the thousands, while the total number of
political prisoners and exiles reached into the tens of thousands (Pereira 2005, 21).
Although at first the Church welcomed the coup, within about two years the episcopacy
began to issue major collective denunciations of rights abuse. The Chilean Church’s
Vicariate of Solidarity was founded by Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez and helped
document cases of rights abuse. The Chilean episcopacy's role in founding and
supporting the Chile's human rights movement is well documented.22
By the late 1970s professing social progressivism in El Salvador was to invite
state repression (UN 1993, 43). Rights abuses committed by the state during the early
1980s were rampant, with the total number of victims reaching into at least the tens of
thousands (18-30). Frequent victims of murder and disappearance included trade
unionists and members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), a socialdemocratic coalition of parties that would align itself with the FMLN (238).
Indiscriminant violence in the countryside, extrajudicial killings in both rural and urban
areas, and the widespread use of torture against suspected subversives (which included
21

See CELAM's extensive online record of episcopal documents.

22

See Loveman (1998); Smith (1982); Klaiber (1998); Gill (1998); Lowden (1996); and Aguilar (2003,
2004), among others.
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nearly all of the political opposition) were characteristic of the late 1970s, and
particularly the early 1980s (UN 1993, 43-44).
Before and during El Salvador’s civil war, the Catholic Church in El Salvador
was divided into two camps. The most vocal and politically significant was based in the
Archdiocese of San Salvador and followed the lead of Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar
Romero, and, after Romero’s assassination, Bishops Rivera Damas and Gregorio Rosa
Chavez. These and other Church leaders with the help of priests and members of the laity
monitored and denounced the deteriorating human rights situation from the earliest days
of the war. They also created a legal support network for victims of repression and their
families through Tutela Legal, a human rights office often compared to Chile’s Vicariate
of Solidarity. Outside of San Salvador, many Salvadoran Church leaders were critical of
this human rights work. Despite this internal opposition and the murder of Romero,
priests, nuns and members of the laity, the pro-human rights faction of the Church
remained outspoken (Klaiber 1998, 173-92).
Delayed Advocacy: Brazil and Guatemala
Human rights abuses during the authoritarian period in Brazil were significant,
but less extreme than those in Argentina and Chile. Though the use of torture was
widespread, Brazilian security forces killed or disappeared several hundred people (rather
than thousands) and the total number of political prisoners and exiles reached into the
tens of thousands (Catholic Church, Dassin, and Wright 1998; Pereira 2005, 21). The
Brazilian episcopacy denounced human rights abuses and became a vocal and integral
proponent of democratization. However, there was a considerable delay between the
military’s seizure of power in 1964, the subsequent increase in rights abuses after military
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hardliners rose to power in 1968 and the earliest broad, unambiguous episcopal
denunciations of human rights abuses committed by the regime in 1976 (LADOC 1976,
30). During much of this period of delay (1970-1974), representatives of the episcopacy
were engaged in secret negotiations with the military that often involved advocacy for
specific victims of human rights abuses, including the disappeared and political prisoners
(Serbin 2000). After that time the Commission on Peace and Justice, particularly its São
Paulo office, worked to document and eventually publish reports of rights abuses across
the country. This work contributed to near consensus votes of support for official
episcopal conference statements denouncing the regime for its human rights record from
1977 until the end of the military rule (Klaiber 1998, 31-6).
Human rights abuses were a persistent feature of the government’s
counterinsurgency during Guatemala’s prolonged civil war (1962-1994). However,
human rights violations rose steadily after 1974, and sharply during the regimes of
Generals Romeo Lucas Garcia (1978-1982) and Efrain Rios Montt (1982-1983). During
the late 1970s, successive waves of political murders targeted urban labor and grassroots
leaders and activists. However, the total number of human rights abuses skyrocketed
during Lucas’ “scorched earth” highland counterinsurgency offensives during 1981 and
early 1982, and stayed tremendously high during the Rios Montt-led counterinsurgency
offensives during the second half of 1982 and 1983. Serious rights violations continued
after this time, but the period between 1980 and 1983 represents the peak of state
sanctioned repression and violence. Characteristic forms of human rights abuse during
this period included village massacres, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances,
rapes, irregular detentions and torture (REMHI 1999, 211-41, 302). Moreover, the vast
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majority of rights abuse was attributed to security forces tied directly to the state,
including the army, civil patrols, and death squads (REMHI 1999, 290-91, fn 3).
Despite the Lucas and Rios Montt regimes’ sweeping use of brutal violence and
intimidation during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the forced exile of human rights
advocate Bishop Gerardi, the forced closure of the El Quiché diocese, and the targeting of
progressive priests and catechists, the Guatemalan episcopacy at large remained silent for
a period of several years. It is possible that escalating repression forced the progressive
church into silence, particularly in rural dioceses. However, the delay is also partly
attributable to a faction of the episcopacy, led by Archbishop Casariego, which blocked
forceful denunciations of state rights abuses. Throughout 1980 and 1981 the episcopacy
remained "conciliatory" and "did not point to those responsible for the repression" (Jonas,
McCaughan and Martinez 1984, 146). Public statements in 1982 took a slightly harsher
tone, but still sought dialogue with the military regime (146). In January of 1984
Casariego was succeeded by Archbishop Próspero Penados. Penados became a highprofile defender of human rights helping to present the new unity position of the
episcopacy that called for respect of human rights and an end to violence. In 1984 the
bishops conference published To Construct Peace, a document that described the
massacre and exploitation of the peasantry at the hands of the military and proposed
specific steps to address the problem. In 1989, Penados founded the Office of Human
Rights of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, which rapidly grew from a staff of 4 to a staff of
29, including "lawyers, educators, sociologists, [and] economists" (Klaiber 1998, 229).
Subsequent chapters provide a comparative examination of the path dependent
evolution of Church-state relations in these countries. The next chapter begins the
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comparison of the three principle cases, Argentina, Chile and Brazil, by providing an
overview of the historical and political context in which Church and state interacted. The
era of international Church reform, characteristics of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes,
and patterns of repression are emphasized.
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Chapter 3: The Changing Church and the Rise of
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

During the late 19th and 20th centuries the international and Latin American
Catholic Church fundamentally altered its relationship with the modern world. A broad
segment of Church leaders, including a succession of popes, pushed Catholic bishops to
engage with the era's rapidly changing social conditions, secular ideologies and political
regimes. As the politically diverse national and subnational-level Churches in Latin
America grappled with the implications of this reform movement, various groups within
the Church expanded their participation in political struggles, sometimes provoking
conflict with the state and Church leaders.
Significantly, the climax of the era of Church reform coincided with a period of
major political and economic instability in Latin America. In Chile, Brazil and Argentina
this instability included economic crisis producing runaway inflation, increased popular
sector militancy, and military coups that overthrew elected governments. Each of these
crises culminated in the creation of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime, the adoption of
some variant of "national security doctrine," and waves of repressive violence targeting
citizens. Thus, just as Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean Church leaders were instructed to
play larger public roles in socioethical leadership on social problems, each national-level
Church was confronted with major human rights abuses in the midst of larger economic
and political crises.
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This chapter describes the broader historical and regional context in which the
dramatic Church-state interactions of the late 1960s through the early 1980s played out.
First, I briefly sketch the era of international Church reforms. After that, I outline key
political developments in Latin America's southern cone during the 1960s and 1970s.
Finally, I describe specific timelines and features of the crises, coups and waves of
repression as they occurred in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 take
up the specifics of evolving Church-state relations in each of the three cases.
The Era of Church Reform
The seeds of Latin American Catholic bishops' widely varying relationships with
rights abusing regimes were sown by a series of major social encyclicals promulgated by
the Vatican between 1891 and 1971. These encyclicals, issued by Popes Leo XIII, Pius
XI, John XXIII and Paul VI provided guidance to the international Church as it reacted to
the rise of liberalism, socialism and fascism; global economic crises; world wars;
decolonization and the prospect of nuclear war. Typically, these documents comment on
the moral acceptability of various systems (democratic, authoritarian, capitalist, socialist,
etc.) or practices (strikes, infringement of rights, etc.) related to large-scale social
problems. Rooted in notions of fundamental human dignity and the presumption of an
achievable "common good," social encyclicals used the voice of the Church to describe
and defend the rights of groups and individuals the Vatican believed were vulnerable.
Major social encyclicals and the popes who issued them are summarized in Table 3.1.
Social encyclicals were not politically radical in part because they consistently
called for reconciliation between the powerful and the victim whether the parties in
question were individuals, organizations, states or classes. In doing so, social encyclicals
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implicitly asserted a largely discursive but nonetheless enhanced role for the Church in
20th century politics.

Table 3.1: Popes and Major Social Encyclicals, 1878-1978
Papacy
Dates of Papacy Major Social Encyclicals
Leo XIII
(1878-1903)
Rerum Novarum (1891)
St. Pius X
(1903-14)
Benedict XV
(1914-22)
Pius XI
(1922-39)
Quadragesimo Anno (1931)
Pius XII
(1939-58)
Blessed John XXIII (1958-63)
Mater et Magistra (1961)
Pacem in Terris (1963)
Paul VI
(1963-78)
Populorum Progressio (1967)
Octogesima Adveniens (1971)

However, within each encyclical, tension existed between either (1) calls to
specific action and conciliation, or (2) condemnations of profound injustice and calls for
gradual reform. These tensions maintained a certain level of ambiguity about how
national and local-level Church entities were to respond to modern social, political and
economic problems. Emblematic of this tension is the first of these social encyclicals,
Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum (1891), which defended the rights of workers to organize
unions, urged respect for the welfare of workers in specific terms such as adequate
wages, work hours and leisure time, and called on states to take action to address poverty
and the causes of conflict between workers and employers. At the same time, this
encyclical strongly criticizes socialism's focus on the material well-being of the working
class. Above all, Rerum Novarum seeks class conciliation and envisions the Church
playing a central role in this endeavor. Leo writes, "There is no intermediary more
powerful than religion (whereof the Church is the interpreter and guardian) in drawing
the rich and the working class together, by reminding each of its duties to the other, and
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especially of the obligations of justice" (Rerum Novarum,section 19).23 Similar themes
were addressed in the midst of the Great Depression in Pius XI's Quadragesimo Anno
(1931).
Three decades later, similar tensions appeared in Pope John XXIII's Pacem in
Terris (1963), in which the Vatican defends broader human rights. This encyclical lists
and defines specific rights with reference to the idea of fundamental human dignity while
insisting on gradual reform and not revolutionary change. Again, seeking connection with
the modern world, the Vatican lent support, tempered by conciliation, to the UN's
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Referring specifically to the declaration, Pope
John writes,
We are, of course, aware that some of the points in the declaration did not
meet with unqualified approval in some quarters; and there was
justification for this. Nevertheless, We think the document should be
considered a step in the right direction, an approach toward the
establishment of a juridical and political ordering of the world community.
It is a solemn recognition of the personal dignity of every human being; an
assertion of everyone's right to be free to seek out the truth, to follow
moral principles, discharge the duties imposed by justice, and lead a fully
human life. (Pacem in Terris, sections 143-144)
Additional important papal social encyclicals followed, especially Pope Paul VI's
Populorum Progressio in 1967, which stressed a connection between oppressive social
systems and the outbreak of social and political violence. The central insight of the
23

All major encyclicals issued by popes from 1878 to the present are archived and available in English
online at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/index.htm .
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document was that development and a just political system are among the prerequisites
for establishing peace and order.
Intellectually sophisticated, social encyclicals tend to employ ambiguity rather
than self-contradiction. This ambiguity allowed for flexibility at the local and national
level whether bishops chose to emphasize conciliation or confrontation, the insistence on
protection of rights or gradual reform. What was not ambiguous was that, relative to
earlier currents in Catholic social thought, these social encyclicals were progressive.
Without the impetus they provided, it would be difficult to image a national-level
episcopacy forcefully denouncing a rights abusing state that did not undermine material
Church interests.
By the mid-20th century, continued Vatican interest in engagement with the
modern world also led to a series of practical, organizational reforms in the international
and Latin American Church. These reforms encouraged lower levels of the Church's
hierarchy, particularly bishops, to enhance their social leadership and engagement with
modern social problems. Prior to the 1950s, bishops acted as local Church administrators,
whose primary responsibility entailed defending Church interests with the support of
local followers by "maintaining ecclesiastical structures and promoting the growth of the
Church" (Gonzalez and Gonzalez 2008, 243). In doing so, most Latin American bishops
prior to the 1950s rarely interacted with other bishops and rarely left the city in which
their offices were located. Information was gathered by maintaining a steady regimen of
visitors, but systematic data collection about sociological trends was infrequent at best
(Cleary 1985, 28-9).
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These norms began to change in the mid-1950s. First, bishops conferences began
to form at the national and regional level, with the support of the Vatican. This new level
of organization was intended to promote the episcopacy's ability to respond to real world
challenges, such as the region's endemic shortage of priests. Brazil was the first country
in Latin America to establish a national-level organization that would bring together its
bishops. Founded in 1952, the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) was
among the first such organizations in the world. The CNBB was established under the
leadership of Dom Hélder Câmara, who first proposed the idea though he was an
auxiliary bishop in Rio de Janeiro (Mainwaring 1986, 48). In 1955, the Latin American
Bishops Conference, CELAM, held its first general meeting in Rio de Janeiro. Bishops in
a few other countries, including Chile, formed their own conferences by the beginning of
the 1960s. For many bishops, recognizing and discussing common problems for the first
time in such venues was a powerful experience (Levine 1981, 35; Cleary 1985, 20). In
addition to directing attention to common, real-world problems faced by bishops in their
diocese, as national episcopal conferences formed, the dissemination of new ideas
accelerated (Cleary 1985, 12).
This experience took place on an even grander scale during the second Vatican
Council (1962-1965). This general council of the world's bishops was called by Pope
John XXIII in an effort to update the Church. In preparation, the Roman Curia prepared a
series of documents laying out various reforms, which the assembled bishops discussed,
sometimes substantially amended, and approved by vote. The proceedings stretched
across 10 sessions and produced a series of fundamental reforms ranging from day-to-day
religious practices to issues of church doctrine. For example, Vatican II reforms
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translated mass from Latin into the local vernacular and opened dialogues with other
faiths (Gonzalez and Gonzalez 2008, 241-2).
This effort to engage with society is particularly evident in the Council's Decree
on the Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church, or Christus Dominus, which
substantially reformed the jobs of bishops. In addition to preexisting administrative
duties, after Vatican II bishops were charged with responding to the needs of society and
playing more active and outspoken roles in socioethical leadership (Levine 1981, 36).
Henceforth, bishops were called by the Church to act as leaders in society who "unite and
mold their flock into one family that all, conscious of their duties, may live and act as one
in charity" (Vatican Council and Flannery 1996, 292). Bishops were now responsible for
more than the faithful in their diocese and were instructed to approach various social
groups, engage in dialog, and explain Church teachings to all humanity (289-90).
Episcopal messages were to "present Christ's teaching in a manner relevant to the needs
of the times, providing a response to those difficulties and problems which people find
especially distressing and burdensome" (290). Preferred methods for sharing this message
include education and public statements on current events (290-1). In this way, Vatican
II's efforts to encourage bishops to exercise public moral leadership in society at large
took on political significance consistent with papal social encyclicals (Crahan 1992, 155).
In support of their newly prescribed role as leaders in society, bishops were directed to
establish "institutes of pastoral sociology" to begin conducting systematic research on
spiritual, moral, social, demographic and economic problems (Vatican Council and
Flannery 1996, 293). Bishops were also directed to organize regular meetings with other

58

bishops through the creation of regional and national episcopal conferences as had
already been accomplished in Brazil and Chile (311).
While in Rome, Latin American bishops held the first meetings to plan for
CELAM's second general conference to be held in Medellín. The goal of that conference
would be to devise ways of applying Vatican II reforms to the realities of the Latin
American Church.24 In 1966, after Vatican II's conclusion, planning began in earnest. In
the two years of preparation that followed, all national-level episcopacies were invited to
contribute to preparations with several preliminary meetings held around the region.
In August of 1968, the Medellín conference was convened with Pope Paul VI in
attendance for the first few days. Bringing together bishops from across the region to
discuss common challenges, the conference produced a series of collective documents
designed to push the regional Church to be more in line with the major tenets of Pope
John XXIII’s and Pope Paul's VI's recent social encyclicals and Vatican II reforms.
Bishops attending the conference were also influenced by a number of regional
developments and insights gained over the previous decade. In addition to searching for
ways to respond to the modern world, nearly all bishops sought to demobilize small
pockets of radicalism among the laity and some priests, typified by the example of slain
guerrilla-priest, Camilo Torres. In addition, new and more systematic research about the
Latin American Church had become available. This included research conducted by a
network of regional Catholic scholars who sought to describe and explain the root causes
of social conditions prevalent in the region. Bishops were also increasingly familiar with
24
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the emerging economic literature on dependency, which describes Latin America's
commodity-based export economies as extremely vulnerable to changing economic
conditions in developed countries. Thus, the conference opened with a sociological
overview of the region and discussions based on several thematic committees.
Discussions were then organized around the production of a series of concluding
documents and recommendations for the regional church. Bishops then voted on the
concluding documents, with every document securing near unanimous support (Cleary
1985, 44).
The Medellín conference's concluding documents shook the Latin American
Church and attracted attention from the international community. In particular, the
documents on poverty, justice and peace stood out for a level of progressivism that
marked a radical break with the past. Bishops denounced social injustices, deploring the
state of social conditions in the region and their structural origins (which the Church
admitted to having played a role in creating and sustaining), and they called for the
Church to begin acting on behalf of the poor. The document on justice pledges "The
Church—the People of God—will lend its support to the down- trodden of every social
class so that they might come to know their rights and how to make use of them. To this
end the Church will utilize its moral strength and will seek to collaborate with competent
professionals and institutions" (CELAM 1968a, section 19). Making explicit reference to
the responsibility of the state, the same document explains, "Faced with the need for a
total change of Latin American structures, we believe that change has political reform as
its pre-requisite" (CELAM 1968a, section 16). While warning against the use of violence
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to achieve this end, bishops went on to describe the unjust structures of Latin American
society as a form of violence.
As the Christian believes in the productiveness of peace in order to achieve
justice, he also believes that justice is a prerequisite for peace. He recognizes that
in many instances Latin America finds itself faced with a situation of injustice
that can be called institutionalized violence, when, because of a structural
deficiency of industry and agriculture, of national and international economy, of
cultural and political life, 'whole towns lack necessities, live in such dependence
as hinders all initiative and responsibility as well as every possibility for cultural
promotion and participation in social and political life,'...thus violating
fundamental rights. This situation demands all-embracing, courageous, urgent and
profoundly renovating transformations. We should not be surprised, therefore,
that the 'temptation of violence' is surfacing in Latin America. One should not
abuse the patience of a people that for years has borne a situation that would not
be acceptable to anyone with any degree of awareness of human rights. (CELAM
1968b, section 6)
The Vatican officially approved the concluding document, but other responses to
these statements varied widely. The nascent liberation theology movement saw the
approval of the most progressive documents as legitimizing their activities (Klaiber 1998,
5).25 Moreover, the dissemination of these statements helped create a space for nonviolent
grassroots progressivism to continue growing in the Latin American Church (Mainwaring
and Wilde 1989, 7). Meanwhile, some members of the laity offered critiques questioning
25

Indeed, noted liberation theologian Gustavo Guitierrez played a significant role in shaping the
conference's thematic agenda (Cleary 1985).
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the ability of the episcopacy to understand Latin America's social realities given their
separation from it.26 Many Catholic and non-Catholic conservatives, including the
region's militaries and existing national security states, disapproved of the conference's
pronouncements (Cleary 1985, 43; Levine 1981, 49-50).
In addition to CELAM, many bishops elsewhere in the international Church
worked to articulate the challenges of Vatican II and papal encyclicals during this period
as well. In 1971, the Second Synod of Bishops issued "Justice in the World," a statement
echoing much of the content of CELAM's Medellín documents. In it, the bishops
denounced domination and oppression, including the remnants of colonial structures and
the exploitation facilitated by international capitalism. The bishops specifically position
the Church as the "voice of the voiceless," emphasizing the need to face injustice with
action. The bishops explain, "The mission of preaching the Gospel dictates at the present
time that we should dedicate ourselves to the liberation of man even in his present
existence in this world. For unless the Christian message of love and justice shows its
effectiveness through action in the cause of justice in the world, it will only with
difficulty gain credibility with the men of our times" (reprinted in Gremillion 1976, 518,
521). The bishops continue, "the Church has the right, indeed the duty, to proclaim
justice on the social, national and international level, and to denounce instances of
injustice, when the fundamental rights of man and his very salvation demand it" (521).
For bishops worldwide, the document indicates a rhetorical shift from urging others
toward social concern and action to acknowledging such a responsibility for themselves
and for the Church in general (Tombs 2002, 143).
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(Conferencia Episcopal Peruana 1970).
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When the era of Church reform was at its height, progressive, moderate and
conservative tendencies within the Church emerged in response. Each can be identified
by its interpretation of this period of church reforms, particularly vis-à-vis social
problems (Levine 1981, 41-53; Klaiber 1998, 15-6). Progressives interpreted reforms as a
call to participate in political struggles aimed at addressing the structural causes of
poverty and other social injustices. At its extremes, progressives included Colombia's
Galconda Group, Argentina's Priests of the Third World and Chile's Christians for
Socialism. These groups were in perpetual conflict with the vast majority of the Church's
ecclesiastical authority. Less radical, but still remarkably progressive voices, such as
Brazil's Bishop Hélder Câmara and the Bishops of the Third World, also called for the
Church's political involvement. Moderates, the largest of the groups regardless of country
or level of the Church hierarchy, interpreted reforms as a call to bear witness to suffering
while avoiding direct attachment to political organizations, instead focusing on reform
efforts within the Church. By 1968, moderates constituted the majority of Latin American
bishops. However, maintenance of such a position was fraught with ambiguity given the
explicit calls made by the bishops themselves to engage with the social realities of the
modern world, such as attending to victims of structural violence (Levine 1981, 51).
Conservatives interpreted reforms to be largely liturgical in nature rather than political
and adopted many of those reforms slowly, cautiously and, in some cases, not at all
(Klaiber 1998, 15). To conservatives, social problems were the result of the moral failing
of individuals, not the result of an unjust and inequitable social order. At its most
extreme, this group included Opus Dei, a quasi-religious order, and Societies for the
Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property (TFP), both of which openly criticized
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Vatican II reforms (Levine 1981, 49-50). Less extreme conservatives simply sought to
retain close relationships with the oligarchy, military and state along with the privileges
such relationships provided the Church.
The beginning of the end for the era of international Church reform arrived in
1978 with the election of John Paul II as pope. John Paul II was a compromise candidate
selected by a conclave divided between theological conservatives and progressives with
different perspectives about how to complete the reforms initiated during Vatican II
(Coppa 2008, 183). Though John Paul II's papacy did not shy away from its own
diplomatic engagement in international politics, after 1978, the Vatican began working to
rein-in what it viewed as the excesses of liberation theology on the Catholic left and the
extreme conservatism denouncing Vatican II on the Church's right (185). In this sense,
after 1978 the Church showed a clear interest in strengthening hierarchical authority and
internal unity across the international Church (Klaiber 1998, 13). In Latin America, the
Vatican's primary message to bishops was to control the Catholic left, especially after
clerical involvement in the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979. The clearest signal of this
reorientation in the Vatican was the pope's message to bishops assembled as CELAM's
1979 general conference in Puebla, the first since the monumental conference in
Medellín. In a speech to the assembled bishops, John Paul II criticized variants of
liberation theology that flirted with Marxism or that reduced the New Testament to
singularly material or political terms. Rather, the pope stressed that bishops' sociopolitical
involvement was to be rooted in the defense of human dignity. John Paul stressed,
however, that a century of Catholic social teaching included property rights as one
dimension of that human dignity and that communism was incompatible with Catholic
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promotion of human rights (Weigel 1999, 284-6). The significance of this message was
that the defense of human rights remained an important and very genuine priority for the
Vatican. However, the Vatican's tolerance of Catholic political solidarity with the
preponderance of the victims of political repression in Latin America, many of whom at
least sympathized with the goals of the Marxist left, now became far more circumscribed.
After 1978, the Vatican began to appoint relatively conservative bishops in Latin
America as well. This was most noticeable where high-profile progressive bishops were
replaced with more conservative figures. Such was the case in Chile, when human rights
leader and Archbishop of Santiago, Cardinal Raúl Silva, was replaced by the relatively
conservative Bishop Juan Francisco Fresno. Apparent as well was John Paul II's very
public criticism of priests involved in the Sandinista government, at the same time that he
was generally silent, at least in public, about the Argentine episcopacy's lack of
opposition to human rights abuse in that country (Klaiber 1998, 13-4).
Resultant changes in the Latin American episcopacy were neither stark nor rapid,
but the tide had shifted in the international Church. After John Paul II's address,
CELAM's 1979 Puebla general conference reaffirmed its "preferential option for the
poor," adopting that specific language for the first time. In Chile, Archbishop Fresno
helped organize the political opposition while the Pinochet regime planned a plebiscite to
legitimize its continuation in power (Meacham 1987). But by the early 1990s, Vaticanled changes produced noticeable effects. CELAM's next general conference in Santo
Domingo in 1992 was more circumscribed in its political pronouncements and Chile's
Vicariate of Solidarity was closed. Some episcopal conferences once noted for their
forceful progressive voices in Chile and El Salvador took a conservative turn, reorienting
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their messages around issues of individual morality (Hagopian 2008). As the Cold War
ended and the 20th century drew to a close, the era of international Church reform ended.
In sum, the era of international Church reform genuinely increased the Church's
political engagement with social problems in the modern world, especially in Latin
America by the late 1960s. However, within this evolution multiple voices came to
coexist with different perspectives about how to respond to social problems and relevant
secular authority. This religious "multivocality" (Stepan 2000, 44) would be significant
as ongoing political and economic instability prompted responses from the region's
bishops.27 As these new political commitments prompted backlashes from forces both
inside and outside of the Church, the Vatican and many bishops backed away from
political struggles during the 1980s. This gradual, but far from total withdrawal was
rooted in concerns about the consequences of the politicization of the Church and its
mission, but its concern about decades of progressive-led reforms marked the end of the
era of international Church reform. The remainder of this chapter describes the political
and economic circumstances the Church faced during the height of this era of reform, the
1960s to the 1970s.
The Authoritarian Context in the Southern Cone
As the reform era of the Catholic Church in Latin America reached its apogee,
military coups overthrew elected governments in Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973 and
Argentina in 1976. Two common features distinguish these regimes from other variants
of authoritarianism: the establishment of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes and the
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application of National Security Doctrines. After briefly sketching these two features, the
pre-coup crises and key characteristics of post-coup rights abuse are sketched for each
case.
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism
By the early 1960s, Latin America had entered a period of economic, social and
political instability. Explanations for the rising tide of disorder vary widely and a
comprehensive survey is well beyond the scope of this chapter. However, O'Donnell's
(1973) conceptual framework of bureaucratic authoritarianism is helpful in describing the
political context in which the Church and rights abusing regimes interacted.28
O'Donnell argues that the series of regime crises and breakdowns that swept
relatively developed countries in Latin America (including Argentina, Chile and Brazil)
in the 1960s and 1970s was the product of structural factors long at work in the region's
history. Briefly, by the 1960s, Latin America was emerging from decades of relatively
populist regimes that sought to promote the interests of domestic capitalists through
industrial modernization. Toward this end, import substitution, in its earlier "easy" phase,
was able to capitalize on limited domestic markets through the near exclusive production
of consumer goods. Protecting the development of these industries from foreign
competition necessitated various combinations of tariff barriers and subsidies that made
possible the increase of wages and other benefits for workers. To organize support for
these reforms, modernizers sought out the political activation and inclusion of popular
sectors who benefited from these policies.
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that this perspective, though influential, is contested.
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However, by the 1960s the "easy" phase had concluded. Further industrial
expansion necessitated increased access to foreign markets and more orthodox economic
policies. Pursuit of this strategy would negate many benefits won by workers who were
now part of the political system and increasingly organized. Where Latin American
industrial expansion had once created a multiclass coalition, in the 1960s it was entering
a phase in which the interests of the domestic bourgeoisie and workers were pitted
against each other. Resultant political struggles helped produce the decade's most
profound social, political and economic crises.
During moments of the most profound crises, the military intervened,
overthrowing elected governments and instituting regimes designed to combat this set of
structural programs. The broad features of these regimes are what O'Donnell terms
"bureaucratic authoritarian" regimes. The hallmark of such regimes is their primary
objective of restoring order through the forced depoliticization of state-society relations.
More specifically, a bureaucratic-authoritarian state is a type of authoritarian state in
which: (1) the main social base of the regime is the transnational upper bourgeoisie, (2)
institutions of government are designed to hand the predominance of power to forces of
coercion (military and police) and economic normalization (market-oriented technocrats)
for the purposes of restoring "order", (3) popular sector organizations that became
politically active under previous regimes are deactivated and excluded, (4) citizenship
rights and democracy are suppressed, (5) the popular sector is economically excluded,
exacerbating existing inequalities, (6) decision making about social issues is depoliticized
and handed over to technical experts, and (7) democratic channels to government are
closed (O'Donnell 1988, 31-2).
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In practice, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes closed congresses and elected
subnational governments, allowed minimal or no public input in the radical redesign of
economic and social policies, repressed the left and its organized constituencies and
pursued market-friendly economic reforms. O'Donnell explicitly identifies such regimes
as seizing power in Brazil in 1964, Uruguay and Chile in 1973, and Argentina in 1966
and again, more violently, in 1976 (1988, xi), and this assessment is shared by other
prominent works in the field.29 Combined with the most extreme interpretations of the
national security doctrine, bureaucratic authoritarianism produced draconian repression.
The National Security Doctrine
In addition to bureaucratic authoritarianism, military regimes in Brazil, Chile and
Argentina were influenced by varying applications of the National Security Doctrine
(NSD) (Pion-Berlin 1989). NSD elevates the importance of national security to the
extent that it is the paramount standard by which all other government policies are
judged. Developed in part by the French in Algeria and Vietnam and promoted by the
United States in the wake of the Cuban Revolution, the NSD focuses primary attention on
internal security threats that seek to subvert existing institutions. In its Latin American
form during the authoritarian period, the NSD's overriding concern was the threat of
"subversion" posed by Marxism. Launching attacks against this perceived enemy, the
military's publicly stated intentions were to defend Western and Christian values against
agents of atheism and communism (Pion-Berlin 1988, 385-6; Klaiber 1998, 7).
The proliferation and entrenchment of this ideology in Latin American militaries
can be traced to the growth of what Stepan terms the "new professionalism of internal
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warfare and military role expansion" during the early 1960s (1973, 57). Essentially, in the
wake of the Cuban revolution, the primary focus of the military's central mission to
defend the state from threats shifted from preparing to engage external threats (e.g.
foreign invasion) to preparing to counter internal threats (e.g. rural or urban guerrillas). In
doing so, the military began to identify and anticipate threats emanating from groups of
civilians whom the military believed challenged, or were preparing to challenge, the
legitimacy of the state.
Emerging in the context of the Cold War, the NSD cast security challenges in
terms of geopolitics, counter-insurgency and development. Geopolitics framed internal
struggles as a part of the global struggle against the Soviet Union. Counterinsurgency
saw the most important internal threats as arising from asymmetric, unorthodox combat
with guerrilla forces relying on support from noncombatants. Thus, primary targets of the
military became "insurgents" or "subversives" who must be eradicated from the general
population. Security was also bound to efforts for social and economic development,
because the military, among others, believed successful development would increase the
long-term stability of the state and undermine the appeal of communism (Pion-Berlin
1988, 386-92).
To develop skills necessary to accomplish this new mission, militaries began
major transformations of the curricula used to train officers at key institutions such as
Brazil's Superior War College (ESG) and General Staff School (ECEME). Curricula
included training in political and managerial skills, and continued officer indoctrination
into NSD's basic assumptions about looming internal threats (Stepan 1973, 53-9).

70

The NSD profoundly distorted the relationship between militaries and
government. The military was an institution created for the purpose of defending the
nation. By assuming the responsibility of distinguishing between internal threats and
loyal opposition, the military was necessarily politicized. This led to the expansion of its
role in society, including the military's own willingness to set up long term governments
(Stepan 1973, 47-53). As a result, the military now had two roles: national defense and
the administration of government. The merger of these two roles conflates many
legitimate civilian criticisms of the military's administration of government with internal
threats to the nation as a whole. As Pion-Berlin explains, "the military reifies itself as the
only depository of the interests and values of the nation by virtue of its retention of state
power; all dissent and denunciations of the military regime are viewed as attacks on the
nation itself; conversely, attacks on the nation are considered to be direct challenges to
the regime" (Pion-Berlin 1989, 98; see also Calvo 1979).
At its worst, the military's internal campaign against subversion culminates as the
state, controlled by the military, assumes "special prerogatives," which are used to
"illegally, repeatedly and flagrantly" violate individual rights (Pion-Berlin 1991, 69;
Comblin 1976). In Latin America during the authoritarian period, elements of this
doctrine were frequently employed to justify state violence and repression. Thus,
throughout periods of military rule in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the agents of the state
frequently made reference to shadowy subversive agents and fabricated or exaggerated
instances of confrontation with guerrillas to justify continued suppression of basic
citizenship rights and democratic institutions. Furthermore, in many instances, to criticize
the military's policies, including human rights abuse, was to be identified as subversive
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and become a target for repression. While all of these dynamics played out in Brazil,
Chile and Argentina, several specific circumstances varied, such as the intensity of
repression. Brief individual sketches of these distinct pre-coup crises, military takeovers
and subsequent waves of repression follow.
Brazil
Social, economic and political instability preceded the March 31, 1964 military
coup in Brazil. Between 1940 and 1964, Brazil's population doubled. During the period
between 1950 and 1960 the population in urban areas alone increased from 19 million to
32 million. Political demands and political mobilization increased during this period also.
In addition to expanding electoral participation, the early 1960s witnessed a sharp
increase in strike activity, rural labor organizing, and ideological polarization (Stepan
1978, 112-3). Meanwhile, with the establishment of the National War College (ESG) in
1949, the 1950s and early 1960s produced a cadre of military officers who had received
substantial technical training in matters of national policy. The ESG's instruction and
seminars drew on the national security doctrine to discuss matters of internal security as
well as the policy of development and political administration. The ESG had the effect of
increasing the confidence of many officers that the military could competently intervene
and manage the Brazilian state (Roett 1978, 94-5)
In the midst of these profound social changes a political crisis involving the
military erupted. In 1961, Brazilian President Jânio Quadros resigned suddenly after only
eight months in office. In accordance with the 1946 Brazilian constitution, Quadros was
to be replaced by his vice president, João Goulart, who had been elected on a separate
ballot and at the time was out of the country on a trade mission to China. Deep skepticism
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existed within powerful factions of the Brazilian military about handing power to
Goulart, who came from Brazil's political left and was seen as a successor to authoritarian
populist reformer Getulio Vargas. Goulart was first advised by Brazilian congressional
leadership not to return to Brazil, but then the military and congressional leaders reached
a compromise agreement allowing Goulart to assume the office of the president. The
compromise fundamentally altered Brazil's democratic institutions by adopting elements
of a parliamentary system, stripping the president of several powers (Skidmore 1988, 9).
This sudden reform combined with pre-existing conditions of political polarization and
party system instability, creating institutional paralysis. Political compromises necessary
to select prime ministers were difficult to achieve, cabinets were reshuffled and the
parliamentary experiment ultimately failed. Through a plebiscite in January 1963,
Goulart regained full presidential powers (Roett 1978, 95-6).
Meanwhile, the Brazilian economy experienced sudden and rapid decline during
the early 1960s. During most of the 1950s Brazil's GNP per capita experienced some of
the strongest growth in the world and in 1961 GNP grew at a rate of about 4%. However,
the rate of GNP growth slowed in 1962 such that by 1963 Brazil's GNP per capita was
contracting by a rate of about 1% annually. As the Brazilian government increased
spending (and took in less tax revenue), deficits grew larger while new development aid
from the US declined (Stepan 1978, 115). This acute period of economic decline was
accompanied by rapid inflation, which increased from 50% in 1962, to 75% in 1963 and
to 140% during the 3 months prior to the military coup (Stepan 1978, 113-4; see also
Skidmore 1988, 11-3). Goulart first attempted to confront these problems via
collaboration with technical experts of the center left. These efforts, which included
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currency devaluation and cuts in public sector jobs, proved too politically costly among
his base of support among unions and were abandoned after six months (Skidmore 1988,
13). This situation was described by newspaper editorials and political elites of both the
left and right as a crisis of regime rather than a crisis of government, warranting major
changes in Brazil's basic governing institutions (Stepan 1978, 118; see also Skidmore
2007, 255).
Beginning in June of 1963, Goulart moved sharply to the left, calling for
sweeping structural reforms related to land redistribution, education, taxes and housing.
Meanwhile, in the midst of mounting strikes, a failed military insurrection led by junior
officers in September 1963 led Goulart to ask Congress for emergency powers. This
move was met with skepticism from both the right and the left, who feared repression
would follow (Skidmore 2007, 261-2). Despite this signal that his government lacked
disciplined support among popular sectors, when Goulart was unable to pass his
structural reform measures in Congress he attempted to draw on mass support for
leverage.
On March 13, 1964, at a publicly broadcast mass rally, Goulart announced a land
reform decree expropriating a total of 1,270 acres of unutilized land near federal
highways and dams, the nationalization of all privately owned oil refineries, and future
plans to legalize the Communist Party and expand the voting franchise by eliminating
literacy requirements (Stepan 1978, 125; Roett 1978, 97-8). Then, during March 26-7,
over 1,000 soldiers rebelled and forcibly occupied an armory in Rio de Janiero in
response to disciplinary action taken against a soldier who had been attempting to
unionize enlisted soldiers. The minister of the navy moved to quell the rebellion. Goulart
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removed the minister, allowed trade union representatives to participate in the selection
of his replacement, and then granted the new naval minister authority to deal with the
situation as he wished. The new minister granted the soldiers an amnesty provoking
intense reactions across the officer corps (Stepan 1978, 129-31; Roett 1978, 98).
This political crisis took place amidst rising social and political confrontation and
violence elsewhere in Brazil. Urban strike activity and radical student organizing were
increasing during the early 1960s. In São Paulo, the MAC and CCC, two anti-communist
paramilitary groups, were already targeting leftwing student activists before the coup
(Skidmore 1988, 17). In the countryside, organizing among peasants was growing
rapidly. By 1963, peasant leagues were increasingly carrying out land invasions
(Skidmore 2007, 254). In response, landowners frequently hired their own armed gunmen
to intimidate and kill peasant activists (Skidmore 1988, 17).
Goulart's political miscalculations alarmed his critics in the Brazilian military to
such an extent they staged a coup (Stepan 1978). On March 31, 1964, the military
successfully overthrew the Goulart regime. As the coup took place, Goulart fled the
country and what remained of his coalition of support crumbled. The military faced little
resistance at first. In the aftermath of the coup, the military launched an initial wave of
repression that declined sharply after several weeks (Pereira 2005, 21). This early wave
of repression targeted activists on the left in urban areas, such as labor and student leaders
and was largely carried out by the Departamento de Ordem Política e Social (DOPS).
The Catholic left, especially the JUC, was among the most targeted groups. The largest
portion of this wave of repression, however, targeted peasant organizers and rural union
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activists in the country's Northeast. Repression in this area was carried out by the Fourth
Army with support from state and local police (Skidmore 1988, 17).
After the initial wave of abuses in 1964, some democratic institutions were
permitted to continue operating, though their activity was restricted. For example, after a
purge of the left, Congress was permitted to continue conducting some business.
Elections continued to be held, but military-imposed hurdles to party formation limited
competition to two parties, the pro-government Aliança Nacional Renovadora (ARENA)
and the opposition Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) (Pereira 2005, 20;
Skidmore 1988, 48).
Then, public dissent and protest within Congress and from university students
increased, particularly between 1967 and 1968. This change provoked a crackdown from
the hardliners in the military beginning under the administration of General Costa e Silva.
The military suspended habeas corpus for those accused of political crimes, suspended
Congress and various provincial legislatures indefinitely, began heavier media
censorship, and purged party members, justices and universities (Skidmore 1988, 81-4).
A second wave of violent repression followed, intensifying during 1969 with the
emergence of an urban guerrilla insurgency and the October installation of hardliner
General Emílio Médici as president. This wave of repression was more centralized than
the first and was coordinated by the military government's Serviço Nacional de
Inteligência (SNI) and carried out by each state's political police, the Departamento
Estadual de Ordem Político e Social (DEOPS). The DEOPS were later forced to share
jurisdiction with the military regime's special military police units, the Departamento de
Operações Internas / Comando Operacional de Defensa Interna (DOI-CODI). Aimed at
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guerrillas and groups the military believed to be their subversive bases of support, the
second wave of repression targeted students, academics, journalists and religious
personnel (Pereira 2005, 20-1).
The military's use of torture began within days of the 1964 coup. Afterwards, the
use of torture against political prisoners was widespread, with approximately 17,000
cases between 1964 and 1979 documented by one Church study (Catholic Church, Dassin
and Wright 1998). The use of torture declined somewhat during the interval between
waves of repression, but intensified after 1968. Torture was used intensively during the
campaign against urban guerrillas in 1969-70, and did not begin to decline in urban areas
until 1972. This decline came at least a year after the defeat of the urban guerrillas
(Skidmore 1988, 125).
Meanwhile, a rural counterinsurgency in the north of Brazil conducted mostly
between 1972-74 produced half of the total disappearances during the military period
(Pereira 2005, 21). After 1974, internal divisions in the military led to a change in
leadership that was more supportive of plans for gradual liberalization. After this period,
repression declined. Initial liberalizing reforms took effect in 1979 and included an
amnesty for political prisoners. Some instances of repressive activity continued, though
they were relatively mild, and the return to institutional democracy was completed in
1985 (Pereira 2005, 22).
Though severe, repression during Brazil's authoritarian period was less extreme
than in Chile and Argentina. Between the 1964 coup and the beginning of a gradual
transition to democracy in 1979, Brazilian security forces were responsible for the deaths
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and disappearances of 284 - 664 people, the detention of 25,000 political prisoners, and
the flight of 10,000 exiles (Pereira 2005, 21).
Chile
The early 1970s in Chile was a period of economic and social upheaval and
extreme political polarization. Unlike Brazil and Argentina, prior to the 1973 military
coup, Chile was a long-standing and relatively stable democracy. In the 1964 presidential
elections, Chileans elected Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat. Frei pursued a series of
progressive policies including increased investment in social services, expansion of
unionization rights for agricultural workers, land reform and increased government
control of copper mines owned by US companies (Wright 2007, 48).
In the 1970 presidential elections, Chileans narrowly elected Salvador Allende, a
long-time member of Congress and leader of the Socialist Party who garnered support
from a coalition of leftwing parties called Popular Unity (UP). Pledging to work within
the confines of Chile's constitution, Allende immediately accelerated reforms begun by
Frei, including land reform and the expropriation of large industry.30 By the end of 1971,
the state had taken control of at least 150 industries, including the country's twenty
largest firms (Falcoff 1991, 59-60).
In the midst of these reforms, preexisting political polarization spiraled out of
control. Radical movements sympathetic to the UP and emboldened by the pace of
reform initiated 1,700 land occupations during the first year and a half of the Allende
government. Many such occupations provoked vigilante-style retributive violence from
land owners (Loveman 1976, 266; Falcoff 1991, 103). Meanwhile, the number of strikes
30

Expropriations included copper mines owned by US corporations Kennecott, Anaconda and Cerro
(Falcoff 1991:60).
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increased from 1,819 in 1970 to 3,325 in 1972 and 2,050 in 1973 (Falcoff 1991, 137).
Although strikes in the copper industry slowed production in that vital sector, the most
significant strike was undertaken by truckers during the summer of 1973. Fearing
government interference in this private industry and frustrated by shortages of
mechanical parts, truckers launched a work stoppage with effects that rippled across
Chilean society, exacerbating food shortages, halting housing construction, preventing
delivery of milk to school children, and threatening hundreds of thousands of workers
with layoffs (Sigmund 1977, 228-9). Civil society and business interest group opposition
to Allende was well organized and particularly active by mid-1972, especially through
professional organizations known as gremios (Falcoff 1991, 264). At the fringes but
garnering headlines, radical factions of the UP called for the arming of people's militias
while elements of the extreme right, notably the paramilitary group Patria y Libertad,
carried out hundreds of acts of sabotage and assassinations of leftwing figures (Falcoff
1991, 264).
During the first year of Allende's government the Chilean economy experienced a
boom. During that year the GDP grew at a rate of 7.7%, output increased across a wide
range of economic sectors, including construction, unemployment in major urban centers
declined, and the interest rate, which had grown to a burdensome 34.9% in December of
1970, declined to 22.3% by December 1971 (Falcoff 1991, 57). Increases in wages,
falling unemployment, growing GDP and an increased share of income for both blue
collar and white collar workers followed (Stallings 1978, 131-2; Smith 1982, 185).
However, the following year the economy abruptly began to decline. In 1972, output
decreased in most sectors, and by the end of that year GDP contracted at a rate of .08%.

79

Far worse, by December of 1972 inflation shot up to 163% (Falcoff 1991, 61). By 1973,
the Chilean economy was in complete disarray. During that year, GDP declined at a rate
of 3.62 percent, food shortages emerged, and the rate of inflation reached 508% (71).
On September 11, 1973 the Chilean military staged a coup, including an aerial
bombardment of the presidential residence at La Moneda. Allende died during the
assault. Pockets of resistance persisted for no longer than 48 hours, after which the
military gained control of the country. A military junta led by General Augusto Pinochet
immediately declared a state of siege and began an initial wave of violent repression
designed to detain and eliminate Allende supporters (Pereira 2005, 23). Chile's borders
were temporarily closed, and high-ranking officials from the Allende government were
seized and taken to a prison on Dawson Island in the Straits of Magellan.
The armed forces and police (carabineros) proceeded to carry out sweeping acts
of violence and repression in the months immediately following the September coup. In
the initial wave of security activity, approximately 50,000 people were rounded up and
held in various locations across the country, including soccer stadiums, military bases,
and government buildings. The largest detention centers held thousands and included the
National Stadium and the Esmeralda, a navy ship anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso.
Suspected Allende supporters, particularly members of the Socialist and Communist
parties, were the military's chief targets (Pereira 2005, 23). Many of the detained were
subjected to torture, about 300 were executed immediately, and just fewer than 2,000
were quickly tried in military tribunals. Meanwhile, vigilante groups carried out a wave
of retributive violence in rural areas directed at campesinos, whose political activity had
included participation in unions and land occupations (Wright 2007, 52). Though the
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military regime would remain in power from 1973 through 1989, the most intense wave
of rights abuses, and about half of the deaths, occurred in the 2-3 months immediately
following the coup. Between September and December 31, 1973, over 1800 people were
murdered by the regime, 621 were disappeared and over 20,000 people were detained
(Policzer 2009, 88-91, see also Wright 2007, 54).
As the rapid initial wave of violence transpired, democratic institutions and
sources of potential opposition were routed and civil liberties were suspended. Congress,
provincial governments, and municipal governments were closed, with military officers
assuming administrative roles to replace them. The jurisdiction of military courts was
dramatically expanded, the national labor federation was dissolved, and military officers
were appointed to oversee universities. Leftwing parties and unions were banned, and the
political activity of all other parties was suspended. Finally, media organizations
sympathetic to Allende were closed, with remaining media outlets subject to heavy
censorship (Wright 207, 52-3).
In mid-1974, the organization and strategy of military repression changed,
impacting the scale of repressive activity. At this time, the National Directorate of
Intelligence, DINA, assumed control of coordinating and carrying out repressive activity,
functioning as the military junta's secret police. The head of DINA reported directly to
Pinochet, which made DINA an important political resource for Pinochet as he
consolidated his power over the military regime (Valenzuela 1995, 49). During DINA's
period of operation (1974-1977), repressive activity became much more centralized and
the number of disappearances declined, though they became more secretive and
systematic. Repressive violence, particularly disappearances, began to specifically target
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remaining members of the MIR and the Socialist and Communist parties (Policzer 2009,
88-97). DINA employed 4,000 agents at its peak and established several secret detention
and torture facilities across Chile, including Villa Grimaldi (Wright 2007, 63-4). Owing
to internal disputes within the military and international pressure in the wake of DINAorchestrated assassinations abroad, DINA was reorganized and renamed the National
Center for Information, CNI, in 1977 (Valenzuela 1995, 49). The number of murders
decreased, though murder, disappearances and torture continued until the transition to
democracy began in 1989 (Policzer 2009, 9; Chilean National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation 1993).
In sum, repression in Chile was particularly violent for a country of only 9.5
million inhabitants. Between the 1973 coup and the beginning of the transition to
democracy in 1989, state security forces were responsible for the deaths and
disappearances of 3,000-5,000, people, the detention of 60,000 political prisoners and the
flight of 40,000 exiles (Pereira 2005, 21).
Argentina
In Argentina, the decade between 1966 and 1976 was one of multiple and
escalating political and economic crises. In 1966, General Juan Carlos Ongania led a
military coup, which overthrew an elected government and established a bureaucratic
authoritarian regime resembling the military government in Brazil after 1964. The
banning of political parties, repression of labor unions, and censorship of the independent
press immediately followed (Wright 2007, 97). When market-oriented economic reforms
led to the withdrawal of various benefits afforded industrial workers in May 1969, a brief
but major insurrection in Cordoba, known as the Cordobazo, erupted. On May 28-29
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workers, students and various middle sectors successfully repelled police and attacked
government buildings and the property of transnational corporations using rocks and
Molotov cocktails. The military used force to occupy the city and put down the rebellion
(O'Donnell 1988, 159).
The Cordobazo accelerated the radicalization of significant portions of the
Argentine left and several guerrilla movements were organized shortly afterwards. By
1970, multiple guerrilla organizations coalesced to form two significant insurgencies, the
ERP and the Montoneros. During this period, guerrillas robbed banks, staged
kidnappings for ransom, attacked police installations, and carried out assassinations of
high-profile military targets, including General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, a former head
of state (Wright 2007, 97).
In June 1970, Ongania was overthrown by General Roberto Levingston, who was
replaced by General Alejandro Lanusse in February 1971. During this time, the
Montoneros, militant labor and a resurgent Peronist Youth movement all sought the
return of former president Juan Perón who had been in exile for 18 years. Lanusse
responded to growing radicalization of the left with increased repression, including
expedited trials for suspected guerrillas, torture, executions and disappearances (Wright
2007, 98). However, in 1973, Lanusse decided to allow elections with participation by
the Peronists. The elections produced a Peronist caretaker government, which recalled
Perón from exile. Perón returned in June, was elected by a sizeable majority in a
September plebiscite, and inaugurated in October (Romero 1994, 206).
Unlike Chile and Brazil, violent government repression in Argentina preceded the
military coup (Pereira 2005, 26). The coalition that had united to demand Perón's return
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proved too ideologically diverse and difficult to maintain once Perón was in power. In an
effort to regain control over his party, Perón expelled the radical left, including the
Montoneros and some regional governors. Then, using ERP violence as a pretext, Perón
began to take repressive measures against the broader left. Perón's Minister of Social
Services, Jose Lopez Rega, created the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, or "Triple A",
a paramilitary death squad composed of police and military personnel which operated
outside official government channels (Wright 2007, 99; see also Romero 1994, 206-8).
The AAA proceeded to carry out attacks on the armed left.
Perón died suddenly in July 1974, and he was succeeded by his wife Isabel. With
limited experience in government, Isabel Perón inherited a Perónist Party still militant
despite the expulsion of its far left wing. As unions began negotiating large wage
increases, Isabel restructured her cabinet, removing members from the moderate left. In
the midst of this party turmoil, inflation spun out of control, soaring from about 15% in
mid-1974 to 776% in 1976 (O'Donnell 1999, 16). Capital flight ensued, production
ground to a near halt and in 1976 inflation approached 1,000 percent (Lewis 1993, 171).
Meanwhile, the Marxist ERP launched a series of political assassinations and attacks on
police and military installations in an effort to destabilize the government. The
Montoneros, who viewed Isabel Perón's government as illegitimate, resumed tactics they
had employed during the previous military government, including kidnappings,
assassinations and brief military exercises (Romero 1994, 211-2). By the spring of 1975,
the Argentine military judged that, while the Montoneros were the numerically larger
organization, the ERP constituted the larger military threat (Johnson 1976, 15). The
government responded by authorizing a military campaign against the ERP in rural
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Tucumán province in February 1975. Later, in October 1975, while Isabel Perón was
briefly hospitalized, acting president Italo Ludor issued decree 2772, which authorized
the armed forces to "carry out the military and security operations that may be necessary
to annihilate the activities of subversive elements in all the country's territory" (Wright
2007, 100).
It was in this chaotic environment that the Argentine military seized power in
March 1976. The coup took few by surprise and was welcomed by many (Wright 2007,
101). However, under a military junta led by General Jorge Rafael Videla (until 1981),
the military appropriated sweeping powers and systematically eliminated all civilian
government and potential sources of opposition. The constitution was suspended;
political parties were banned; Congress, provincial governments and city governments
were closed and replaced with military administrators; free press was curtailed;
universities and courts were purged; and union activity was prohibited (Wright 2007,
100-1). In doing so, the military re-established a bureaucratic authoritarian regime and,
guided by their application of NSD to Argentina's security situation, intensified its antiguerrilla campaign targeting suspected "subversives." This "dirty war" continued until
1983 when divisions within the military, a declining economy and the disastrous war in
the Malvinas led to the start of a democratic transition.
During this 7-year period, human rights abuses sanctioned by the state were
rampant. Abuses included murder, torture, forced disappearance and arbitrary detention.
Repression tended to target union members, the Peronist and Radical parties,
intellectuals, students, journalists and lawyers for political prisoners (Pereira 2005, 26). 31
31

Military and police intelligence began preparing lists of leftist suspects prior to the coup (Wright
2007:107).
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Abductees were taken from their homes, workplaces, schools and the street. A majority
of victims were seized at night, but many were seized in broad daylight in front of
numerous witnesses. Repression was organized by the military and carried out by all
branches of the military and police (Wright 207, 109). Moreover, the organization of
repression was relatively decentralized, with each branch of the military and police
maintaining their own intelligence agencies and jurisdictions based on different zones
dividing the country. Though the repressive apparatus remained under the control of the
military junta, at the operational level commanders had wide discretion, and in practice
the severity of repressive activity varied by locale and was often arbitrary (Pion-Berlin
1989, 103-4). As a consequence of this and other factors, state violence was far more
lethal and sweeping in scope in Argentina than in Chile and Brazil, with a massive wave
of violent repression that did not abate for the first 4 years of military government.
Repression only began to decline in 1980, though it continued for the duration of the
military government (Pereira 2005, 26). During this time, the military established 380
secret detention facilities across the country where prisoners were kept off of official
police roles, physically and psychologically tortured, and usually executed (Wright 2007,
110). The largest of these centers was located at the Navy Mechanics School, ESMA,
which received over 5,000 prisoners during this period (110-11). Bodies were disposed of
in unmarked or mass graves, burned or thrown into the ocean from aircraft (113-4).
Throughout the dirty war, the military consistently justified repressive measures
with reference to a supposed ongoing war with guerrillas. While the ERP and
Montoneros included sizeable fighting forces prior to 1976, both forces were decimated
within a few years of the coup. The ERP was essentially inoperative after 1977. The
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Montoneros persisted longer, but annual casualty totals inflicted by guerrillas on military
and police personnel peaked at 156 in 1976 and then declined to 6 by 1978 and zero
thereafter (Wright 2007, 102). Meanwhile, disappearances perpetrated by security forces
and documented by CONADEP increased sharply to 350 in 1975, peaked at 4,200 in
1976, and then declined only from 3,200 in 1977 to just over 1000 in 1978. By 1983, the
total number of disappearances annually was less than 100 (Wright 2007, 114;
CONADEP 1984).
In terms of absolute number of victims of repression, the case of Argentina clearly
surpasses Brazil and Chile. Between 1976 and 1983, in a country of about 24 million
inhabitants, security forces killed or disappeared between 20,000 and 30,000 people, held
roughly 30,000 political prisoners, and forced about 500,000 people into exile (Pereira
2005, 21). Table 3.2 presents comparative indicators of political repression and human
rights abuses committed during the military governments in Brazil, Chile and Argentina.

Table 3.2: Repression in Authoritarian Cases
Brazil
Chile
Argentina
Period of Military Rule
1964-1979
1973-1989
1976-1983
Period of heaviest military
1964, 19691973-1977
1976-1980
repression
1973
Deaths/Disappearances
284-664
3,000-5,000
20,000-30,000
Political Prisoners
25,000
60,000
30,000
Exiles
10,000
40,000
500,000
Total Population (1970)
96,800,000
9,500,000
24,000,000
Sources: Pereira (2005, 21) provides repression figures and periods. United Nations
Demographic Yearbook, Historical Supplement (1997, 85-7) provides 1970 population
figures (rounded to nearest 100,000).
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Conclusion
During the mid-20th century, a rapidly changing religious institution and the
tendencies it contained grappled with long-term structural injustices in the midst of
rapidly devolving political and economic crises and the rise of repressive military
regimes. Religious leaders who pledged to challenge social injustices met military
governments bent on dismantling democratic institutions and extinguishing the left. Thus,
by the 1960s, significant segments of the Catholic Church and Latin America's military
governments were on a collision course. Despite this, the response of Catholic bishops'
conferences varied, from the Chilean conference's relatively rapid denunciation of the
Pinochet regime, to the Brazilian conference's private negotiations with various generals
and long delay in denouncing the military government, to the Argentine conference's
complicity with the military's rights abuse.
The next two chapters explain this variation by identifying a critical juncture in
the historical trajectory of Church-state relations in Chile, Brazil and Argentina (chapter
4) and then tracing the effects of key features of those trajectories to each national-level
episcopacy's response to major waves of human rights abuse occurring between the late
1960s and the early 1980s (chapter 5). Together, the following chapters argue that
varying responses to waves of human rights abuse were shaped by the Church-state ties
that structured the interaction of these two institutions for decades prior to the rise of
bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. Different types of Church-state ties created varying
dominant ideological tendencies within each episcopal conference as well as varying
material inducements and constraints structuring episcopal interaction with the state. As a
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result, waves of human rights abuse met very different episcopacies and provoked very
different responses.
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Chapter 4: Antecedent Conditions and Critical Junctures in
Argentina, Chile, and Brazil

This chapter describes a critical juncture in church-state relationships in Chile,
Brazil and Argentina, respectively. The central claim is that a critical juncture in Churchstate relations occurred in all three countries during moments of major political upheaval
between the 1910s and 1930s. During these moments, reformist governments redesigned
secular political institutions during large-scale sociopolitical crises and created an
opportunity for Church leaders and state officials to revisit fundamental questions about
the proper institutional relationship between Church and state. Arriving at answers to
these fundamental questions involved collaboration and negotiation unseen in prior
decades. The products of this collaboration were generally consensual agreements
between representatives of the Church and state involving three distinct levels of Churchstate ties. As a result, this period gave rise to relatively stable, but otherwise dissimilar,
forms of Church-state relationships which persisted for the majority of the 20th century.
Adequately distinguishing between alternative forms of Church state relationships
in 19th and 20th century Latin America necessitates scrutiny of two related variables.32
The first variable is the level of Church-state differentiation. Differentiation refers to the
relative amount and importance of institutional ties linking Church and state, such as
recognizing Catholicism as the official state religion, state involvement in the selection of
bishops, state subsidization of Church activities, and special authorities and privileges
32

This interaction and Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 are based on Philpott (2007, 508).
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granted to the Church.33 Thus, the level of differentiation in each state may range from
highly differentiated (Church and state are completely separated) to highly integralist
(Church and state are heavily intertwined).
The second variable is whether or not key actors in the Church or the state seek
substantial change to the level of differentiation. Church and/or state may agree with or
seek to change a differentiated relationship or an integralist relationship. When at least
one of these two institutions seeks change but is blocked from doing so, the relationship
becomes conflictual. When both institutions generally accept the level of differentiation,
that relationship is consensual. Thus, Church-state relations of this period could be
differentiated-consensual, differentiated-conflictual, integralist-consensual or integralistconflictual. These relationships are summarized in Figure 4.1.
To adequately demonstrate the existence of the hypothesized critical juncture, the
narrative for each case is divided into three sections. First, antecedent conditions are
described. Antecedent conditions “form the ‘baseline’ against which the critical juncture
and its legacy are assessed” (Collier and Collier 1991, 30). In this study, antecedent
conditions refer to typical church-state relations as they existed prior to the critical
juncture. These conditions may or may not exhibit relatively stable institutional ties
linking church and state (close ties, minimal ties, etc.) and may or may not exhibit
generalizable church-state relationships (conflictual relationships, congenial
relationships, etc.). However, subsequent stages of the narrative for each case will
demonstrate a moment during which a decisive break with relationships typical of the
past is possible, and sometimes, chosen by representatives of Church and state.

33

For a full list of key institutional ties linking Church and state see chapter 5.
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Figure 4.1 Church-state Ties and Church-state Relationships34
Church Consents to Extent of
Church-State Ties

Differentiated
Church-state
Ties

Church Contests Extent of
Church-State Ties

Result:

Result:

Church and state
mutually consent to
institutional separation.

Church is forcibly
separated from state;
Significant efforts to
substantially alter
arrangement are feasible
but blocked.

Integralist
Church-state
Ties

Result:

Result:

Church and state
institutions overlap by
mutual consent.

Church and state institutions
overlap; Significant efforts to
substantially alter arrangement
are feasible but blocked.

Antecedent conditions began to take shape during the 19th century as each country
won independence from colonial powers and the Catholic Church retained significant
state-provided privileges. As the century unfolded, liberal, anti-clerical parties ascended
to power and Church-state relationships began to face political challenges. During the
1880s and 1890s, anti-clerical governments initiated substantial anti-clerical reforms
stripping the Church of many of the old privileges born of the colonial era. However,
such early periods of conflict over appropriate types and amounts of Church-state ties

34

Figure adapted from Philpott (2007).
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reflect a pattern of generally unstable relationships (Philpott 2007, 507) and thus do not
represent critical junctures themselves. In all three countries, these reforms pushed the
Church into a period of conflict with the state typified by Church-led efforts to (1) roll
back anticlerical reforms and (2) reevaluate the Church's strategy for exerting influence in
society. In Chile and Argentina, anticlerical reforms dismantled several Church privileges
during the 1880s. In Brazil, the 1889 revolution gave rise to the 1891 constitution that
severed Church and state. Afterwards, the Church in all three countries actively sought to
reestablish lost privileges, provoking conflictual Church-state relations. Antecedent
conditions are summarized in Figure 4.2.
After antecedent conditions, a large scale socio-political crisis is identified and
described.35 This period of crisis gives rise to the larger critical juncture and thus is
significant enough to genuinely threaten status quo relationships. The identified crisis in
each case provides an opportunity for reformist political leadership to effectively
challenge fundamental institutional questions for each state.
Major crises arose in Argentina, Chile and Brazil during the 1920s through the
1930s. During this period all three countries grappled with major shifts in the political
mobilization of the working class (Collier and Collier 1991), episodes of large-scale
social violence, and contestation or breakdown of the constitutional order, each of which
were major issues in which the Church had a long-standing normative and political
interest. During these tumultuous periods, competing political factions within the Church
and among secular political figures (which coalesced around identifiable ideological

35

Collier and Collier refer to this stage as the “cleavage” or crisis (1991, 30).
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tendencies) adopted different positions with respect to the proper institutional relationship
between Church and state.

Figure 4.2 Church-state Ties and Antecedent Conditions

Church Consents to Extent of
Church-State Ties

Church Contests Extent
of Church-State Ties

Differentiated
Church-state
Ties

Brazil (1891):
Liberal Constitution,
Contested by Church.

Chile (1880s):
Liberal Reforms
Contested by Church
Argentina (1880s):
Liberal Reforms
Contested by Church

Integralist
Church-state
Ties

Finally, the critical juncture itself is identified and described. The critical juncture
is a discrete and relatively brief period of time during which status quo relations between
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church and state might be rearranged with lasting effect.36 During a critical juncture,
choices are made about the institutions linking Church and state. These choices reaffirm,
sever or reestablish Church-state ties. These choices are made by key figures with the
power to redesign state institutions; and, in all three cases considered here, these figures
seek input from key players in the Church.
A shift in Church thinking about the ideal institutional relationship between
Church and state occurred during this period as well. After 1917, many Church leaders
were more receptive to renegotiations of Church state ties. In the 1910s, several other
nominally Catholic countries underwent intense periods of conflict involving the issue.
Many of these conflicts produced forms of church disestablishment in which the Church
lost all privileges previously held while still being heavily controlled by the state.
Examples of such “separations” included those in France (1905), Portugal (1911), and
Mexico (1917) (Smith 1982, 75-6). Then, in 1922 Pius XI was elected pope and began
actively pursuing negotiations with numerous governments to update institutions and
protect the interest and status of the Church (Coppa 2008, 102-3). Pope Pius XI’s papacy
was much more willing to accept church-state separation schemes so long as they
prevented internal church conflict and burdensome restrictions imposed on the church by
the state (Smith 1982, 76).
In all three cases, a major social or political crisis related to the rise of middle and
working class political participation gave way to a critical juncture. Entire systems of
government were literally rewritten in new constitutions in Chile (1925) and Brazil (1934
36

Collier and Collier use the term "mechanism of production" referring to the initial choice affecting an
institution. Mechanisms of production are distinct from mechanisms of reproduction, which are institutions
that stabilize the long term trajectory of the initial choice made in the mechanism of production.
Mechanisms of reproduction will be discussed in the next chapter (See Collier and Collier 1991, 30-1).
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and 1937), and the constitutional order challenged in Argentina (1930). By this period
(1920s-1930s), Church-state ties were not the most high-profile issues of the day.
However, major decisions were made in all three cases that solidified the particular
institutional relationships between Church and state as each polity experienced broader
changes. In all three cases this was due largely to two factors: the Church's increased
political leverage as it sought alternative forms of social influence and political
calculations made by state actors about including or excluding the Church and its allies in
a political coalition.
In Chile, a political crisis sharply dividing Liberals and Conservatives produced a
critical juncture in the Constitution of 1925 that severed Church-state ties with the
consent of the Church. In Argentina, a socio-political crisis culminating in the 1930
military coup produced a critical juncture during the first two years of the Justo
government (1932-34). During this critical juncture, existing dense, consensual Churchstate ties were strengthened in ways that benefitted the Church significantly. In Brazil,
the political crisis that unraveled the Old Republic produced a critical juncture in the
1937 creation of the Estado Novo and the consensual reestablishment of moderate
Church-state ties. Critical junctures as functions of integral versus separate ties and
consensual versus conflictual Church sociopolitical response to those ties are summarized
in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.4 summarizes the general sequence of these changes with respect
to the stages of path dependence.
The lasting effect of each critical juncture is produced by specific mechanisms of
reproduction, the recurring institutional and noninstitutional dynamics that reinforce the
original choice made during the critical juncture. These mechanisms and the stances on
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state-sanctioned human rights abuses they facilitated will be the subject of the next
chapter.

Figure 4.3 Church-state Ties and Critical Junctures

Church Consents to Extent of
Church-State Ties

Differentiated
Church-state
Ties

Church Contests Extent
of Church-State Ties

Chile (1925):
Constitution severs
Church-state ties;
Church Consents

Brazil (1934-37):
Estado Novo restores some
Church-state ties; Church
Consents

Argentina (1932-34):
Justo Government reaffirms
Church-state ties;
Church Consents

Integralist
Church-state
Ties
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Chile

Through the first half of the 19th century, Church and state in Chile were bound

together through a dense network of Church-state ties and Church-state relations were
largely congenial and collaborative. During the second half of that century, politically
ascendant liberals promoted reforms eliminating many Church privileges. By the 1880s,
Church-state ties and broader Church-state relations were eroding in the face of intense
politicization. Many Church-state ties remained, but their future was much less certain
and Church-state relations were often strained. The Church responded to this situation
through the pursuit of a larger presence in civil society. By the 1920s, Catholic leaders
began to voice concern about the politicization of Church activity and secular politicians
associated with liberal and radical parties returned to calls for disestablishment. In 1925,
in the midst of a tumultuous period of liberal rule, a new constitution was written and
Church and state were disestablished though a process that included negotiation with the
Vatican and Chilean bishops. By 1930, Church and state in Chile were bound by
minimal institutional ties.
Antecedent Conditions
Chile won independence from Spain in 1817. After independence, church-state
relations remained largely as they had been during the colonial period. Church and state
were substantially intertwined institutions. During the 19th century, it was the preference
of most bishops as well as the Vatican to retain an integral relationship with the state
because it guaranteed the Church special social status, formal authority over the private
lives of citizens and privileges all granted by the state. An integral relationship was also
the preference of many conservative state actors who could rely on support from the
Catholic episcopacy that came from the same elite social network. In exchange, the state
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retained significant authority over church inner-workings, including clerical
appointments, clerical pay and some forms of official communication with the Vatican.
Due to the Church's specific authority in discrete areas of Chilean social life and the
state's oversight of internal Church affairs, the Chilean Church often resembled a
component of the state's bureaucracy.
Within this framework, the specifics of close church-state relations fluctuated in
the post-independence period and through the civil wars of the 1820s. However, a dense
network of church-state ties was institutionalized in the Constitution of 1833. After the
constitution's implementation, Catholicism became the official religion of the county and
the public exercise of other religions was prohibited. The oath of office for the presidency
included swearing to observe and protect the Catholic religion. In turn, the Chilean
president played a key role in church-state affairs. The president was responsible for
nominating all archbishops, bishops and various other special positions within the
Chilean Catholic hierarchy. Nominees were selected from a list of three candidates
prepared by the Council of State (a small body of presidential advisors chosen by the
President and the Chilean Congress) and nominations were subject to approval by the
Senate.37 In addition, the President and Council of State oversaw all patronage decisions,
held the right to refuse decrees, councils or papal bulls sent from the Vatican and
maintained diplomatic relations with the Vatican, including the negotiation of
concordats.38 In addition, the state paid the salaries of all bishops and priests and
37

The constitution mandated the inclusion of certain representatives within the Council of State. In addition
to representation of Cabinet Ministers, Generals, the Treasury, etc., one member of the Council was to be
chosen from the appointed members of the Chilean Catholic episcopacy (Chilean Constitution of 1833,
Art.102).
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Constitution of 1833 Chapter III; Chapter VIII, Art.59-83, 102, 104; See also Mecham (1966, 206).
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controlled any internal organizational changes such as expanding the number of dioceses
to accommodate demographic changes. The Chilean Congress held ultimate authority
over these matters (Smith 1982, 73, fn 20).
In exchange for surrendering an enormous amount of its autonomy to the state,
the Church became an important repository of information and gained formally
recognized authority over significant moments in the private lives of Chileans. Through
baptism, the Church maintained the only civil registry, recording of the birth and known
lineage of children. The Church ran its own schools in an era prior to the emergence of
widespread public education, and it retained exclusive authority to administer the
institution of marriage. Prior to 1853, the state administered all tithing on behalf of the
Church. After 1853, tithing was replaced with appropriations channeled directly from the
state treasury. In addition, the Church administered all cemeteries, which included the
right to refuse burial. Consequently, even though 19th and 20th century Chile is sometimes
noted for its lack of practicing Catholics, average Chileans were beholden to the Church
for basic services (education, burial of family members) and legitimation of family units
(marriage, baptism/civil registry) (Mecham 1966, 201-207).
Some privileges benefited the Church more than others. Most notably, the
constitutional restrictions barring the practice of competing faiths often were unenforced
or circumvented. The prohibition of non-catholic religious practices was typically
understood not to apply to religious activity conducted indoors. Thus, British investors
and managers working in the budding nitrate industry were able to establish Anglican
enclaves and non-Catholic missionaries began arriving in Chile as early as the 1830s
(Mecham 1966, 207).
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In the second half of the 19th century, power shifted from Conservatives to the
Liberal party. The affinity between the Chilean episcopacy and oligarchy that once
fostered the creation of dense church-state ties now led to the politicization of Church
privileges. Liberal ideology criticized close church-state relationships and liberal
platforms typically sought measures to sever church-state ties. Legislation passed by the
Chilean Congress began to roll back some Church privileges. First, toleration of nonCatholic religious activity practiced indoors was established in law in 1865. In addition,
Protestant schools were allowed to form and provide instruction in non-catholic religious
doctrine (Mecham 1966, 207).
Between the mid-19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, some
powerful segments of the Chilean episcopacy responded to the changing political
fortunes of the Church's traditional class allies by reevaluating how the Church might
best continue to exert social influence. Many Chilean bishops experienced two
fundamental socio-political reorientations. The first reorientation involved calls for
increased autonomy from the state. The second reorientation involved calls for increased
Church presence in Chilean civil society.
During the mid-19th century some bishops began to identify some types of
church-state ties as conditions that restrained or prevented necessary Church activity. The
most influential and outspoken of these bishops was Rafael Valdivieso, Archbishop of
Santiago for an impressive 30-year tenure (1847-1878). Valdivieso and other like-minded
bishops sought to protect and expand the Church's state-provided privileges, while
decreasing state involvement in internal Church affairs. The archbishop often issued
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public calls for the dissolution of the latter form of Church-state ties, though these calls
for reform were generally unsuccessful (Scully 1992, 33-4).
During the second half of the 19th century, the episcopacy at large experimented
with efforts to forge deeper connections to Chilean society. This reorientation was
encouraged by Rerum Novarum, the first major social encyclical issued by the Vatican in
the modern era. Promulgated by Pope Leo XIII in 1891 this statement criticized what the
Vatican viewed as the excesses of both socialism and capitalism. Rerum Novarum also
recognized the legitimate right of labor to organize collectively, but cautioned that the
goal of such organization must be the pursuit of social harmony rather than class
antagonism. Thus, the Chilean episcopacy sought connection to society through the
construction of various Catholic worker organizations as the 19th century drew to a close.
After the turn of the century, these were replaced by Catholic trade unions. By the early
1920s, earlier efforts evolved into the forerunners of Chilean Catholic Action and
included Catholic women's and student groups (Landsberger 1970, 78-9; Adriance 1992,
53).
Despite these two efforts to increase the Church's influence in Chilean society,
Church privileges remained frequent targets of attack, some of which were successful. In
1883 and 1884, President Santa Maria and Minister of the Interior Jose Manual
Balmaceda encouraged the Chilean congress to adopt a series of reforms wresting power
from the Church. Congress was dominated by a coalition composed of the Liberal,
Radical and Nationalist Parties. All three parties in the coalition were anti-clerical and the
reforms passed. First, the civil authority replaced exclusive Church control of cemeteries
(in 1883), marriage (in January, 1884) and the state began maintaining its own civil
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registry (in July, 1884). From the mid-1880s through the beginning of the 20th century the
vocally anti-clerical Radical Party led a series of legislative efforts in congress to end all
legal prohibitions of non-Catholic religions and formally sever all Church-state ties.
These efforts were narrowly defeated (Mecham 1966, 213-6).
The wave of 1880s reforms subsided after 1884, and Church-state relations
entered a 35-year period during which the Church routinely sought the restoration of its
privileges via alliance with the pro-clerical Conservative Party (Blakemore 1993, 58;
Loveman 1988, 207). However, the mere absence of additional major reforms should not
imply the existence of a stable Church-state relationship. The 1880s do not constitute a
critical juncture in Church-state relations because this shift in differentiation produced
sustained conflict rather than consensual reform. This first wave of liberal anti-clerical
reforms typified antecedent conditions in Church-state relations because the level of
church-state differentiation remained a politicized issue and thus subject to dynamics and
outcomes of post-1880s political struggle. The influence of the pro-clerical Conservative
Party waxed and waned as the party joined various coalitions with nationalist parties and
segments of the ideologically amorphous Liberal Party (Blakemore 1993, 58). The
potential for future revision prevented the 1880s reforms from founding an established
relationship.
Crisis: Liberal-Conservative Clashes and the 1924 Coup
The opportunity for drastic change arose in 1920 as Arturo Alessandri ascended to
the presidency. Alessandri's electoral success came on the heels of just over two decades
of social turmoil involving increasingly militant labor unrest, major conflict between
executive and legislative branches of government and partisan-legislative paralysis.
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Between 1895 and 1920, Chile's population increased from just fewer than 2.7 million to
over 3.7 million inhabitants (Blakemore 1993, 59). This leap was accompanied by
accelerating urbanization, rapid growth of the working class and increasing calls for
social reforms. Meanwhile, Chile's voting franchise remained highly restricted and the
party system proved resistant to pressure in this area (Blakemore 1993, 58-9). These
political struggles unfolded in the midst of tremendous volatility in the nitrate market, an
export sector which formed the centerpiece of the Chilean economy by the end of the 19th
century.
With the nitrate sector deeply embedded in the early 19th century Chilean
economy, shocks to nitrate export revenue filtered through virtually all of Chilean
society. With each crash of the nitrate market, thousands of workers lost their jobs and
homes and began to migrate south in search of work (Blakemore 1993, 69). Meanwhile,
with each crash imports fell and state revenue and spending declined (Stanton 1997, 3).
This cycle proved relentless as the nitrate market experienced major periods of decline
during the periods 1896-98, 1907, 1909,1914-15, 1919-20, and 1922 (Loveman 1988,
203). Between 1919 and 1920, exports fell by 66 percent, recovered and then fell again
by 50 percent the following year (Collier and Sater 2004, 202).
To economic instability was added expanding labor organization and militancy,
with dramatic events unfolding in the years just prior to the 1920 election. The frequency
and magnitude of major strikes increased from 16 strikes involving 18,523 workers in
1916 to 105 strikes involving 50,439 workers in 1920 (Loveman 1988, 203). Repressive
responses on the part of the government often followed. During a strike in Puerto Natales
in February 1919, fighting between workers and soldiers killed 15 people and seriously
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injured another 28. In September of 1919 a general strike was called in Santiago and by
November 50,000 workers in that city joined a massive demonstration (Blakemore 1993,
69)
Recurring economic and labor crisis caused a heightened sense in many sectors
that Chile's basic institutions were incapable of adequately addressing the problem
(Stanton 1997, 3).39 In Chile's parliamentary system, 60 ministries were formed between
1891 and 1915 (Blakemore 1993, 68).40 Meanwhile, after 1915 opposing coalitions
unable to compromise on any significant legislation dominated each house of Chile's
legislature, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.
Alessandri's electoral victory came from a campaign employing vitriolic rhetoric
promising major social reforms and confrontation with the opposition. During the
campaign, Alessandri successfully assembled the Liberal Alliance coalition, which drew
support from the middle class Radical Party, the Democratic Party and some progressive
members of the Liberal Party. Conservatives joined mainline Liberal Party members in
support of an opposition candidate, but Alessandri narrowly won the election (Blakemore
1993, 71).
While economic, institutional and labor reforms took center stage, Alessandri’s
platform also included calls for complete separation of Church and state. However,
additional circumstances helped bring the Church-state question to a head. First, some of
the most prominent church leaders were uncomfortable with clerical involvement in
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In their seminal work, Collier and Collier (1991) argue that the same political crisis gave rise to the
critical juncture that then shaped the incorporation of the working class into Chilean politics.
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During Alessandri's first administration, 16 cabinets were formed and fell in a period of only 4 years
(Blakemore 1993, 73)
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politics. Archbishop of Santiago Crescente Errázuriz wrote a pastoral letter in 1922,
“strictly forbidding priests from participating in political rallies, meetings, and banquets,
and from acting as agents or representatives of parties” (Smith 1982, 73).
Second, other nominally Catholic countries were undergoing intense periods of
conflict as Church-state separation continued to spread across the globe. Many of these
conflicts produced forms of church disestablishment in which the Church lost all
privileges previously held while still being heavily controlled by the state. Examples of
such “separations” included those in France (1905), Portugal (1911), and Mexico (1917)
(Smith 1982, 75-6).
Third, Pope Pius XI was elected pope in 1922. Pope Pius XI’s papacy was much
more accepting of church-state separation schemes so long as they prevented internal
church conflict and burdensome restrictions imposed on the church by the state. Pius XI’s
papacy would become known for responding to dictatorships in Portugal, Italy and
Germany with diplomacy and signing concordats that disestablished Church and state
(Smith 1982, 76).
Alessandri took office in May of 1920 and began the pursuit of his reform
program. On June 1, 1923, Alessandri delivered a speech to congress calling for the
dissolution of church-state ties, arguing that a politicized Church served the interests of
no one, including the Church. However, all aspects of Alessandri’s reform effort met
legislative deadlock. The Liberal Alliance that made possible Alessandri’s election did
not control a majority in the Chilean Congress. Conservatives blocked all Liberalproposed reforms to the extent that no significant legislation was passed between 1920
and 1924. After a new round of congressional elections in 1924, the Liberal Alliance
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won a majority, but divisions within the coalition continued to prevent any meaningful
legislative progress (Collier and Collier 1991, 176).
By September 1924 the military began to show signs that it planned to intervene.
Anticipating such action, Alessandri invited the military to present Congress with a list of
demands. Within two days, led by Majors Carlos Ibáñez and Marmaduke Grove, the
military offered a list of reforms that included the provision of a legal basis for
unionization and various forms of social assistance. Under pressure, Chile’s congress
passed the measures quickly, but when the military failed to dissolve the junta that served
as the military’s political leadership, Alessandri resigned and left the country. In short
order, a conservative faction of the military took control of the state in a military coup
and the military closed the Congress (Collier and Collier 1991, 177).
Critical Juncture: The Catholic Church and the Constitution of 1925
During Alessandri’s time abroad, the deposed president began negotiations with
the Vatican, including a visit to Rome, in an effort to achieve amicable separation of
Church and state. Negotiations took place mainly between Alessandri, Pope Pius XI, the
Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Gasparri and the Archbishop of Santiago Mgr.
Crescente Errázuriz. These negotiations produced a successful dialog and both sides saw
advantages in avoiding protracted conflict over the issue as had occurred in the midst of
disestablishment in France, Mexico and elsewhere (Smith 1982, 75-6). For Alessandri,
amicable Church-state separation laid out in a new constitution would remove an issue
from the political arena that the Conservative Party was able to use to galvanize voters.
Consequently, Alessandri could focus electoral politics on his social agenda, through
which he believed he had a strong advantage over Conservatives (Smith 1982, 72-3). For
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the Chilean Church, separation could free the institution from a number of burdens such
as the patronato and legislative control over the creation of new dioceses. The Church’s
main goal was to avoid terms of separation that restricted Church freedoms or stripped it
of its assets as had occurred in Mexico after the revolution (Smith 1982, 76). When a
compromise was reached that allowed the Church to retain its property, schools and
financial support from the state over a brief transitional period, Church representatives
believed disestablishment to be in the Church’s best interest (Mecham 1966, 219).
Alessandri’s brief exile ended when a second military coup occurred in January of
1925. This coup, led by Ibáñez and Grove, overthrew the first military junta and recalled
Alessandri to complete his presidential term. However, congress was not reconvened and
Alessandri, now with military support, proceeded with large-scale sociopolitical reforms
backed by Ibáñez and the military. In addition to social reforms, the military also
supported Alessandri's efforts to write a new constitution for Chile (Collier and Collier
1991, 177). This profound moment of institutional redesign created an opportunity to
codify in Chilean law the terms of disestablishment that Alessandri had negotiated in
Rome.
The process of writing the new constitution was completed in June of 1925 and
Archbishop Errázuriz personally oversaw the drafting of all portions pertaining to
religion and the Church (Smith 1982, 77). The Vatican approved of the final document
and, via the papal nuncio, Chile’s bishops were instructed to support it. Though some
bishops had previously spoken out against church-state separation and many more were
hesitant about the reforms (Klaiber 1998, 44), following the pope’s instructions, the
bishops did not offer any strong opposition to the constitution when it was offered as a
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plebiscite to the nation’s voters in September 1925. The Conservative Party abstained
from the plebiscite in opposition to Church-state separation (Blakemore 1993, 78).
However, after ratification the bishops issued a pastoral letter accepting the decision and
the new constitutional order. The letter struck a conciliatory tone recognizing the
increased freedom the new set of institutions would provide for the Church (Smith 1982,
73-4).
When the new constitution was promulgated on September 18, 1925, church and
state were separated and nearly all church-state ties were severed. The constitution
disestablished church and state, no longer recognizing Catholicism as the official state
religion. Old forms of state involvement in internal church affairs were also eliminated.
The patronato ended, thereby excluding the state from the process of selecting and
installing Church leadership and the Church alone now made decisions about the creation
of new dioceses.
State funding for Church activity ended, with a few significant exceptions. For
five years, state funding of church activity would continue as the Church underwent a
transitional period. After 1930, all preferential financial ties between church and state
were severed as well. However, the language of the 1925 constitution only banned state
payment of clerical salaries and funding for the maintenance of church property. Later,
the specifics of this prohibition would allow the return of heavy state subsidization of
Catholic education in the 1950s.
Finally, freedom of religion was guaranteed. However, the Catholic Church was
granted juridical personality while other organized faiths were not. No other special
distinctions were given to the Church. All organized faiths were given tax-exempt status
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on assets used exclusively for the promotion of faith. The Church was given no role in
public education and all organized faiths were given the right to establish their own
schools (Mecham 1966, 221).
Two key features of Chile’s disestablishment stand out. First, the process was
relatively amicable. Alessandri negotiated the change directly with the pope, and an
influential archbishop was given a meaningful oversight role as relevant portions of the
new constitution were drafted. Segments of the Church had long viewed some Churchstate ties as contrary to Church interests, and Catholic leaders who disagreed with
disestablishment were urged by the pope himself to accept the new institutional
arrangement. Second, the 1925 Constitution succeeded in thoroughly separating the two
institutions. No longer would the Church depend on the state for financial support, nor
would the state play a role in the Church’s internal affairs. In the decades to come, this
new institutional relationship would help to create an autonomous Church, which sought
to defend its interests and advance its mission through both private channels and
increasingly public political activity.
Argentina
From the second half of the 19th century through most of the 20th century, the
Catholic Church and the state in Argentina were bound together by a dense network of
church-state ties. However, Church-state ties gave the state the upper hand in this
institutional relationship and the Church spent the better part of 200 years in a
subordinate position in its relationship with the state. Thus, while Church leaders were
not always satisfied with the specifics of the relationship, instances of major Church-led
confrontation with the state were rare in 20th century Argentina. Elsewhere in Latin
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America during the early decades of the 20th century, modernizing forces within the
international Church, dissatisfaction with state interference in internal Church affairs, and
ascendant liberal or radical parties led to disestablishment of Church and state. When
Church and state passed through such a period in Argentina during the first period of
Radical Party governance (1916-1930), the major institutional tenets of this intertwined
historical relationship went largely unchallenged. Then, in the wake of the 1930 military
coup, a critical juncture in Argentine Church-state relations occurred in which the Justo
government (1932-1938) reaffirmed Church-state ties and strengthened the ideological
affinity between conservative forces in both institutions.
Antecedent Conditions
Argentina won independence from Spain in 1810 and from the beginning, Church
subordination to the state was a cornerstone of Argentine Church-state relations. First,
during the chaos of the civil wars of the 1820s, communication with the Vatican became
extremely difficult. Bishopric vacancies went unfilled, including Buenos Aires' diocese.
In the meantime, the state assumed authority over the Church, imposing secular authority
over monastic orders (Mecham 1966, 226-7). With the return to a semblance of order in
the 1830s, Pope Gregory XVI was allowed to appoint a bishop to the Buenos Aires
diocese, but his choice, Mariano Medrano, was required to swear an oath to obey all laws
of the state. In subsequent decades, state involvement in Church appointments and
organizational activity allowed the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosas (1835-52) to
effectively control the Church and use it as a propaganda machine for his government
(Rock 1993a, 19; Mecham 1966, 232-3).
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Rosas was overthrown in 1852 by General Justo José de Urquiza, and
representatives from provincial areas were assembled to write a new constitution
(Skidmore and Smith 2001, 70; Mecham 1966, 233). Promulgated in 1853, this
constitution articulated a set of Church-state ties that perpetuated the Church’s dependent
and subordinate position to the state. Religious freedom was guaranteed to individuals
but otherwise a dense network of ties linking Church and state was established. Key
clauses included that, “The Federal Government supports the Roman Catholic Apostolic
religion” and that Congress was empowered to promote conversion among indigenous
peoples and to reject concordats with the Vatican (Mecham 1966, 234). The president
was required to be Roman Catholic and was empowered to nominate bishops from a list
of three candidates submitted by the Senate and accept or refuse statements, councils,
bulls or instructions issued by the Vatican, and conclude and sign any agreements with
the Vatican. State support for the Church included significant financial contributions
from the state treasury to its religious activities (Mecham 1966, 234-5).
State authority over internal church affairs ensured that the dependent and
subordinate position of the Church persisted even as the Church enjoyed numerous
privileges. The Church wielded little independent political power, but as long as the
traditional oligarchy retained control of the state, Church interests and authority in the
social sphere were protected.
During the 1880s, changes in the Argentine economy resulting in liberal
challenges to the traditional oligarchy’s power structure arose to threaten the status quo
Church-state arrangement. This was the period of liberal ascendance in Argentina. Parties
allied with liberals made substantial inroads in the Argentine Congress, sponsoring and
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passing several reforms stripping the Church of several privileges. These reforms
included:


Ecclesiastical tribunals were made subordinate to civil courts, subjecting clergy to
civil law for the first time since the 1820s (1881).



Parochial registration of births, marriages and deaths were replaced with a state
civil registry (1884).



Civil marriages and secular cemeteries replaced final Church authority in these
matters (1888).



Educational Reform Law 1420, created a national administrative structure for
primary education and mandated that primary schooling be tuition free, lay and
obligatory. After its implementation, there was no clerical religious education in
public schools until 1943 (1884) (Burdick 1995, 23-5).

These reforms, especially the education reform, were vigorously opposed by the Church,
which formed alliances with conservative political forces. Nonetheless, efforts to prevent
reform failed. From the 1880s to the 1920s the Church actively sought to roll back these
reforms. As in the Chilean case, politicized Church-state relations remained a common
feature of Argentine political competition. Potential for future revision of this relationship
prevented the 1880s reforms from founding an established, accepted relationship.
During this period, the Argentine Church was presented with a unique opportunity
to claim a new source of influence over Argentine society. From the 1870s through the
1920s, a massive wave of immigration brought workers to Argentina from southern
Europe. When they arrived, they found harsh working conditions in urban areas and
significant hurdles to owning land in rural areas. As social problems multiplied, the
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Church began playing a major role in serving immigrants through the creation of
institutions like mutual aid societies and Catholic labor unions. Much of the ideological
impetus behind these moves was to produce “class conciliation” by addressing the
immediate material concerns of the poor and bringing workers and management together.
One strategy for accomplishing this goal was the creation of Catholic Workers’ Circles,
which, despite the name, brought together workers and management for dialogue
(Deutsch 1993, 37). Later, additional efforts to extend the Church's reach into civil
society included the creation of Catholic Action Argentina (ACA) in 1928.41 The result of
the Church’s new role, according to Burdick, was two-fold. First, through the social
welfare programs and organizational efforts the Church regained some social and
political status eroded by the anti-clerical reforms of the 1880s. Second, the Church
became an active and willing participant in the acculturation of immigrants (Burdick
1995, 17). Thus, the Church regained some political and social power while helping to
construct a perception of common, nationalist, Argentine values.
Thus, the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century was a
period in which the Church lost privileges, but gained some socio-political influence by
deepening connections to immigrant and working-class populations. However, churchstate ties largely remained intact, and the Church maintained closer political ties with the
Conservatives, the one party perceived to be ideologically predisposed to restore Church
privileges.
However, the political relevance of the Conservatives soon entered a period of
decline, once again calling into question the future of Church-state ties. During the first
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decade of the 20th century, political agitation among many of Argentina's working-class
sectors grew and middle-class parties saw workers as a potentially important source of
support. Partially a result of these dynamics, universal male suffrage was granted in
Argentina in 1912 over the objections of many in the traditional oligarchy
(Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992, 178, 198). Ill-equipped to rapidly adjust to
this massive change, the oligarchy's Conservative Party lost any remaining assurance of
electoral dominance for at least the next two decades. Meanwhile, the reforms produced
no immediate results for workers as the state continued to aid management during strikes,
most notably during a major railroad worker strike in 1912 (Rock 1975, 92).
In 1916, under the banner of the Radical Civic Union (UCR), Hipolito Yrigoyen
was elected president, ushering in a period of liberal (or “Radical”) electoral dominance
lasting until 1930. On the right, the UCR faced opposition from Conservatives who were
still reeling from disorganization in the wake of expanded voting rights. On the left was
the Socialist party, which was benefiting from the waves of European immigration and
increased labor militancy.
As a result of these developments, the period between 1916 and 1930 was the first
serious opportunity to secure separation of Church and state in Argentina since the 1880s.
Conservative disorganization would have prevented serious political opposition,
Socialists were already calling for such action, and the UCR had inherited the legacy of
liberals who had stripped the Church of several privileges during the 1880s. In
neighboring Chile, calls for separation of Church and state were being issued as well, and
formal disestablishment of Church and state would occur there in 1925. However,
Yrigoyen and the UCR sought to attract partisan support from segments of the Argentine
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Church rather than antagonizing the entire institution in pursuit of support from some
other constituency.
Yrigoyen and his populist wing of the UCR attempted to build a constituency that
encompassed parts of the elite, middle and working class segments of the population.
Anticlericalism beyond the liberal reforms of the 1880s was not part of the UCR’s
agenda. Yrigoyen attempted to attract support from within the Church in a variety of
ways. In addition to donating his presidential salary to a clerical charity, Yrigoyen
frequently employed Catholic imagery in his political rhetoric and his views on class
relations sought the ‘common good’ through class conciliation, much like Catholic social
teachings elaborated in Rerum Novarum. Some of Yrigoyen’s social reform programs
were based on pre-existing Church proposals (Rock 1993b, 60-3, Mendez 1985, 227).
Yrigoyen also opposed Socialist legislative proposals to legalize divorce (Burdick 1995,
25). Rock observes that from the outset, Yrigoyen's administration was "more markedly
clerical than most of their predecessors" and cites an April 1918 article in La Vanguardia
stating that, "Never has the influence of the Church been greater than at present…The
government is pursuing a Christian Democrat policy with the help of the Church, a
paternalistic and protective attitude towards the workers, so long as they remain
submissive and resigned" (Rock 1975, 96).
For the most part, Church-state issues were not a major national issue during the
period of Radical government. Instead, labor militancy and multiple rounds of related
retaliatory violence that erupted in the streets of Buenos Aires during the Semana Trágica
in 1919 came to dominate Yrigoyen’s first period in office. Yrigoyen and his faction
within the UCR responded to increasingly militant labor unrest by taking populist
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positions, increasing government spending dramatically and expanding the bureaucracy
to reward supporters with political patronage. Thus, Yrigoyen dramatically increased the
national debt in the years before the onset of the worldwide depression. Generally,
Yrigoyen navigated this period by attempting to retain the support of the middle class and
segments of the elite. One component of this goal included courting the Church by
retaining Church-state ties and supporting its interests, at least at the margins, and its
preference for continued ties to the state. Faced with comparable pressures and
alternatives in Chile, Alessandri did exactly the opposite.
Despite Yrigoyen's overtures, most Church leaders remained suspicious of liberal
ideology. It was in this environment, particularly during the 1920s, that Catholic
nationalism began to mature as a force in Argentine politics. The Catholic nationalist
ideological tendency was born in the Church's service to the immigrant community in
decades past and was now articulated and promoted by Catholic intellectuals. Burdick
refers to Catholic nationalism as a "religio-political movement," describing it as generally
hostile toward liberalism, socialism and democracy (1995, 4). The ideology's foundation
was the idea that Catholicism was a basic part of the Argentine national identity and thus
Catholicism was an essential component of efforts to counter any actor perceived as
stoking social divisions, be they Marxist, liberal or democratic in origin. The ideology
lent itself quite well to support for integralist notions of continued Church-state union and
governing schemes seeking to rid society of politicized divisions. This ideology became
politically powerful as it brought together conservatives, nationalists, the armed forces
and other defenders of the status quo within a common and superficially benign
framework (Burdick 1995, 29-31).
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State-provided Church privileges were not seriously threatened by the Radical
Party government. However, the long-term interaction between liberal leaders in control
of a state and a Church dominated by conservative forces was a source of persistent
friction. Open Church-state conflict occasionally erupted over the operation of Churchstate ties rather than threats to the continuance of those ties. The most prominent example
was the protracted conflict over the selection of a new archbishop in Buenos Aires. Under
the terms of the patronato as they existed in the 1920s, the state selected all bishops and
archbishops while the Vatican only granted final approval. In 1923, President Marcelo
Alvear (successor to Yrigoyen and also a member of the UCR) selected Monsignor
Miguel de Andrea to be the new archbishop for the Archdiocese of Buenos Aires.
Monsignor de Andrea’s selection was of political significance because de Andrea had
assumed a major role in the Argentine labor movement as an advocate of labor reform
during the Semana Trágica in 1919. However, the Vatican refused to recognize de
Andrea’s selection. Alvear and the Vatican remained at loggerheads and the position
remained vacant for three years. The crisis was resolved in 1926 when the government
offered an alternative selection and the Vatican accepted (Mendez 1985, 227-8). As the
1920s began to draw to a close, ideological incongruity between leaders in control of the
state and the dominant tendency within Argentina's episcopacy made Church-state
relations strained and instable in a political arena where these two institutions were
tightly bound to one another.
Crisis: Radical Party Mismanagement and the 1930 Coup
In 1928, a split within the UCR led to the reelection of Yrigoyen as president.
During the same year, the Argentine episcopacy founded Argentine Catholic Action and
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Criterio, a weekly Catholic magazine. While Catholic Action was strictly forbidden from
engaging in political activity, by 1930 Criterio became an outlet for traditionalist,
nationalist Catholic commentary (Mendez 1985, 229-30; Klaiber 1998, 68). In 1930,
Yrigoyen was overthrown and replaced by the military government of José Uriburu, who
drew on both Catholicism and nationalism to legitimize his seizure of power (Burdick
1995, 28). Criterio supported the coup (Klaiber 1998, 68). Ironically, Yrigoyen's Churchstate partnership was solidified by the coup that overthrew him.
Uriburu justified the coup in part by publicly berating the Radical Party, blaming
it for eroding the "spiritual and social cohesion of the Argentine nation" and emphasizing
Catholic values as the basis for national reconciliation (Mendez 1985, 232). Once in
power, Uriburu appointed other Catholic nationalist figures to high-ranking positions in
his corporatist military government. In subsequent interviews, Uriburu named Criterio
and La Nueva República as two publications that significantly influenced his political
evolution. Both periodicals were founded by Catholic intellectuals and both provided
forums for the Catholic nationalist movement (Burdick 1995, 30-1).
Despite this, the episcopacy played almost no role in Uriburu's coup and found
itself in the difficult position of being praised by a figure who helped end 80 years of
constitutional rule in Argentina. In navigating this difficult moment, the episcopacy's
response to the Uriburu government was "conciliatory yet unenthusiastic" (Mendez 1985,
232). Specifically, in preparation for elections in 1931, the Argentine bishops published
a letter designed to be a voting guide for Argentine Catholics promoting many of the
views espoused by Uriburu, though not defending or promoting Uriburu's government,
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and advising Catholics not to support any party that advocated church-state separation, a
laicized education system or legalized divorce (Mendez 1985, 232).42
Critical Juncture: Strengthening Church-State Ties
During the turmoil of the 1930s, Argentina's decada infame (infamous decade),
the Church avoided controversy in service to its calls for national unity and garnered new
favors while Catholic nationalists and the nationalist faction of the military forged lasting
alliances. In 1932, Uriburu was replaced by General Agustín Justo, a member of the
liberal tendency within the military, who won dubious national elections through fraud
and military coercion (Burdick 1955, 35). Despite Justo's liberal outlook, to the extent
that Catholicism was embedded in prevailing notions of nationalism, support for the
Church helped bind together much of the Argentine episcopacy, military and the
oligarchy. Consequently, Justo set about providing a number of benefits for the Argentine
Church. Most important, in 1933, Justo exercised the patronato to double the number of
dioceses and bishops in Argentina and elevate six dioceses to the status of archdioceses
(Mendez 1985, 235). This was the first diocesan reorganization in 25 years and it
dramatically increased the organizational capacity of the Argentine Church (Burdick
1995, 33).43
After the new appointments were complete, the episcopal conference's ideological
center shifted away from bishops who emphasized action against social problems
through, for example, the creation of organizations like Catholic workers' circles. As a
result, the influence of Argentina's social Catholicism movement declined. By the end of
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diocesan boundaries (Ivereigh 1995, 84).
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the 1930s, the transformed episcopal conference was more closely tied to organizations
like Argentine Catholic Action (ACA), which sought to Catholicize Argentina's existing
institutions rather than establish Catholic unions, professional organizations or women's
organizations that competed with secular counterparts (Ivereigh 1995, 85-86).44
Founded in 1931, ACA fell under the direct authority of the bishops who selected
its lay leaders and were responsible for shaping its theological orientation. ACA's lay
leaders tended to be middle class professionals and operated as a kind of activist arm of
the bishops. By design, this activism tended to be on behalf of the institutional Church
rather than of a partisan or syndicalist nature. However, episcopal leaders defined the
interests of the institutional Church in ways that entered the partisan arena, such as the
1931 voting guide. From its inception, ACA grew rapidly, with formal membership
peaking at 98,000 in 1943 (Burdick 1995, 32-3).
With Church expansion underway, Buenos Aires hosted the International
Eucharistic Congress (IEC) in 1934, which was organized through a major collaborative
effort between Church leaders, the state and elites.45 This international gathering brought
together 200,000 Catholics, the armed forces, political leaders and the future pope, Pius
XII, who visited from Rome. The chief episcopal organizer was Archbishop Santiago
Luis Copello, the episcopal head of ACA at the national level (Burdick 1995, 33).
However, right-wing intellectuals and major families from Buenos Aires elite circles
dominated the main planning committee. In support of the conference, Justo secured
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legislation exempting all ships carrying pilgrims from port taxes, docking fees and
inspections; Buenos Aires mansions were used to house foreign delegations; and a
national holiday was declared to encourage attendance (Mendez 1985, 233-6). The
proceedings were dominated by Catholic integralists who supported Church-state union.
Addresses offered by Catholic nationalist intellectuals celebrated Argentina's Catholic
and Hispanic heritage while denigrating the excesses of liberalism. Meanwhile, in
separate ceremonies the military pledged itself to the Virgin of Luján with 14 generals
and 3 admirals in attendance, 7,000 soldiers in uniform received communion on their
knees and Justo consecrated the nation to the 'protection of the Blessed Sacrament'
(Ivereigh 1995, 80; Klaiber 1998, 69-70; Mendez 1985, 241).
Conciliation with Uriburu, the transition from Catholic worker's circles to the
integralist ACA, and Church-state collaborations of 1932-34 were precedent setting
moments in the 20th century history of Church-state relations in Argentina, with the
pattern of Church-state interaction they established remaining largely intact through at
least the 1980s.46 The transformative importance of this decade is noted by many.
Summarizing the lasting effect of the 1930s, Klaiber writes, "From that moment on
[Catholic nationalism] became the connecting link between generations of the military
right up to and including the military regime presided over by General Videla," and "all
political leaders in the country---the military, Perón, and even the weak democratic
governments that followed Perón---felt obliged to have recourse to the church to
legitimate themselves" (1998, 68-69). Similarly, describing the legacy of changes
experienced in the 1930s, Ivereigh (1995) observes that the IEC marked the beginning of
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a period of accelerating linkage between the Church and the nation. Ivereigh also
characterizes the 1930s as a decade in which the Church and the army forged lasting ties,
as "the increased presence of the Church was evident in field masses, army chaplains, the
blessing of swords issued to graduates of military academies, and the frequent
proclamations of loyalty to patron saints. Equally, the presence of the Army in major
Church events…became common" (1995, 80).

Brazil
Church-state relations and Church-state ties experienced pendular swings in 19th
and 20th century Brazil. But by the 1930s, Church-state ties came to rest in an
intermediate position with a denser network of institutional ties linking Church and state
than existed in Chile, but far sparser Church-state ties than existed in Argentina. Church
and state were completely disestablished in Brazil in 1889. This early separation
prompted the Church to begin building a presence in civil society. However, beginning in
the 1910s, the Brazilian episcopacy devoted serious and sustained effort to establishing
close informal relations with each successive government. During Brazil’s politically
tumultuous 1930s, this two-pronged strategy for increasing the Church’s social influence
enjoyed considerable success. The Church experienced noteworthy organizational
success among the middle class and established a very close relationship with presidential
candidate turned modernizing corporatist dictator, Getúlio Vargas. As a result, the
Church regained significant state support for its activities in the new constitutions of
1934 and 1937.
Antecedent Conditions
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After independence from Portugal, Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution stated,
"the Roman Catholic, apostolic religion will continue to be the religion of the Empire."47
Church and state remained largely intertwined in Brazil until the late 19th century.
During the period between Brazil's independence from Portugal in 1822 and the end of
monarchical rule in 1889, the Brazilian state was heavily involved in various internal
affairs of the Brazilian Church. The emperor, for example, had authority over Church
appointment of bishops and all papal laws and decrees. The emperor also controlled
Church finances by collecting tithes and paying clerical salaries. Thus, for the majority
of the 19th century, the relationship between Church and state in Brazil closely resembled
that which would persist in Argentina.
However, the 1870s witnessed the rise of the “religious question” in Brazilian
politics. In brief, a conflict erupted between the Brazilian Emperor Pedro II, Brazilian
Freemasons and elements of the Catholic episcopacy. Papal encyclicals forbidding
clerical association with freemasonry were never approved by the Emperor and some
segments of the Church became intertwined with freemason associations. In an effort to
pull the Brazilian Church in line with the Vatican, some bishops began attempting to
discipline clergy too closely tied to the organization. Pedro II intervened and a dispute
erupted about who had ultimate authority over religious matters in Brazil. At its height,
the controversy provoked hostile denunciations of Catholicism by the Freemasons’
national leadership, a letter from Pope Pius IX, and two of the 12 Brazilian bishops
sentenced to four-year prison terms with hard labor for impeding the lawful use of
executive power. The result was a growing sense among much of the Brazilian clergy and
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several bishops that the state’s significant authority over the Church was harmful to
Church interests (Mecham 1966, 270-4).
In 1889 the Brazilian Empire fell and the provisional government that took its
place severed nearly all ties linking Church and state. Such separation was in line with
calls from contemporary Republicans, Positivists and Socialists who sought to limit
Church influence in Brazilian society. Following Pedro II’s heavy intervention in Church
affairs, the episcopacy generally accepted the separation. However, the separation
included the loss of several important state-provided privileges, to which Church leaders
did object (Mecham 1966, 275-6). Taking shape officially with the ratification of the new
Constitution in 1891, the Republicans initiated freedom of worship, secularized public
education (which removed religion from the curriculum and prohibited the subsidization
of religious education), phased-out over a period of one year the state payment of clergy,
ended the civil recognition of religious marriages, and disenfranchised priests and all
others who had taken a vow of obedience (Bruneau 1986, 16-7).
During the resultant period of strict separation from 1891 to 1930, the church was
forced to grow, doing so through its own organizational efforts and with the support of
the Vatican. Detached from the state, the Brazilian church was, for the first time, allowed
to accept the appointments and decrees of the Church in Rome. As the Brazilian Church
underwent a process of "Romanization," it remained oriented toward and influential
among the middle and upper classes. Also, a number of new dioceses, seminaries,
convents and monasteries were established, adding to the density of the Church as a
nationwide network (Bruneau 1982, 17). Meanwhile, during this period hundreds of
thousands of mostly urban, middle-class Catholics were organized into lay movements.
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Important organizations ranged from the League of Brazilian Catholic Women active
during the 1910s to Workers’ Circles organized during the 1930s (Mainwaring 1986, 31).
These organizations included a conservative strain, akin to Catholic nationalism
in Argentina. Such lay organizations included Acção Integralista Brasileira which was
founded in 1932. Such organization's found some support among the "Neo-Christendom"
faction of the episcopacy which sought "the reconquest of society by an elite corps of
Catholics" (Klaiber 1998, 21). Klaiber cites the leadership Leme, Alceu Amoroso Lima,
and Hélder Câmara, as playing a crucial role in preventing this faction within the Church
from rising to a position of dominance (1998, 21).48
Beyond efforts within civil society, the Brazilian episcopacy clung to the political
strategy of attempting to establish close informal ties with each successive executive and
his administration. Leme was able to establish close relationships with the presidents of
the 1920s (Mainwaring 1986, 27).49 This “neo-Christendom” strategy was pursued from
1916 to at least the mid-1940s under the leadership of Dom Sebastiao Leme, Archbishop
of Rio de Janeiro.50
Crisis: Breakdown of the Old Republic and the “Revolution” of 1930
Brazil’s 1930 presidential election was disastrous. Sitting president Washington
Luiz undermined the terms of a bargain reached by regional elites by endorsing a
candidate from his home state of São Paulo rather than Minas Gerais. Luiz’s preferred
candidate won the election, stoking long-simmering divisions among elites in São Paulo,
48
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Minas Gerais and smaller states (Roett 1978, 36). Meanwhile, Brazil's currency value and
coffee exports were thrown into chaos with the onset of the global depression of the
1930s. Regional and economic sector cleavages erupted into major elite conflict,
culminating in the military overthrow of President Luiz and the installation of Getúlio
Vargas as chief executive during October and November of 1930. Vargas attempted to
manage elite conflict by centralizing power in the national government, shifting
regulation of coffee production and trade from state governments to the federal
government, appointing new state governors and creating a new Ministry of Labor aimed
at depoliticizing the growing labor movement (Collier and Collier 2001, 172-3). Between
the end of 1930 and 1937, Brazil was thrown into a period of political turmoil which
included the promulgation of two new constitutions, the outbreak of regional armed
rebellions against Vargas in São Paulo and Pernambuco, the foundation and rapid mass
mobilization of the fascist Integralist movement (1932-1935), the ascent and subsequent
repression of Brazilian workers under the National Liberation Alliance (ALN) in early
1935, and a brief communist insurrection in November 1935. This period of turmoil, and
the communist insurrection in particular, made it possible for Vargas to seize emergency
power with the consent of the Congress and begin a period of rule by decree. During this
period, Vargas intensified repression, targeting both the Communist Party and the fascist
Integralists (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 155-8; Roett 1978, 37-8).
Meanwhile, during the 1930s the Brazilian episcopacy – led by Archbishop Leme
–continued its dual sociopolitical strategy of building lay organizations and pursuing
close informal relationships with successive governments. Clerical movements of the
1930s included Bible Circles and the Catholic Youth Workers, which were established to
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offer alternatives to more progressive trade unions (Mainwaring 1986, 33; Della Cava
1976, 15). In 1932, Leme created the Catholic Electoral League (LEC), which advised
Catholics how to vote. Advice typically steered Catholics toward conservative parties and
candidates who supported Catholic issues. The LEC’s biggest impact came in 1933 when
most of the candidates it supported were elected to the Constituent Assembly that drafted
a new constitution in 1934 (Mainwaring 1986, 33; Della Cava 1976, 15; Williams 1974).
During this period, Archbishop Leme built a close personal friendship with
Vargas and the pair often dined together privately (Levine 1970, 28). Vargas’s religious
beliefs tended toward agnosticism, but Vargas’ and Leme’s views aligned on a number of
important political issues each found pressing. Both shared a commitment to halting the
influence of communism in Brazil; Vargas maintained a strong distaste for Spiritism
(arguably the Church’s chief religious competitor at the time); and Vargas saw expanding
the Church’s role in education as an important cost-saving measure (Levine 1998, 36).
The mutual benefits of Church-state collaboration were obvious.51 Leme could offer
public support from the Church for Vargas’ efforts to stomp out communism while
Vargas could provide the Church with a level of access to power it had not enjoyed since
disestablishment (Bruneau 1982, 19). Though Brazil’s bishops never explicitly declared
public support for the Vargas regime, most bishops, clergy and religiously active lay
people approved of his government.52 This was due at least in part to the congruity
between corporatist structures Vargas created and Catholic social teaching regarding
class conciliation issued by Pope Leo XIII and Pius XI (Mainwaring 1986, 32; Levine
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1998, 37). Vargas welcomed any legitimacy the Church was able to provide for his
regime (Levine 1998, 36). Consequently, the two became political allies, establishing a
relationship that would come to serve Church interests remarkably well.53
Critical Juncture: The Catholic Church and the Foundation of the Estado Novo
The Church’s construction of new organizational strength, its close ties to Getúlio
Vargas and its influence on the election of candidates to the Constituent Assembly in
1933 were sociopolitical strategies that came to full fruition in the period between 1934
and 1937.
In 1934 the Constituent Assembly produced a constitution with a preface that
invoked God and content that restored many of the state-supplied privileges stripped from
the Church under the terms of the 1891 disestablishment. After 1934, the Church
reentered public politics with the return of substantial state financing for the Church in
the pursuit of the ‘collective interests’ of both, religious education in public schools,
subsidization of Catholic schools, the return of voting rights to clergy, the prohibition of
divorce and legal recognition of religious marriage (Mainwaring 1986, 33; Bruneau 1982,
19). The Church’s public political strategies, typified by the gradual increase of Church
clergy and dioceses, investment in lay movements, and finally the LEC, succeeded with
the promulgation of the 1934 constitution.
The failed Communist insurrection of 1935 facilitated Vargas’ seizure of power
and in November 1937, Vargas issued a new constitution giving birth to the Estado Novo
(New State). Vargas’ new regime further centralized power in the hands of the national
government, but the 1937 constitution retained the special privileges given to the Church
53
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by the Constituent Assembly three years earlier. By 1938, Vargas outlawed elections,
banned all political parties, and began a state-led drive toward modernization. Still,
Church access to power was retained through the efforts of Archbishop Leme to maintain
close personal ties with Vargas. Thus, while perhaps the public strategy to secure
sociopolitical influence for the Church first prompted the return of Church-state ties,
Leme’s private interactions with Vargas helped secure their institutionalization. Both
Bruneau (1982) and Della Cava (1976) explicitly acknowledge the transformational
importance this moment held for the future of Church-state relations. Bruneau highlights
the enduring impact of this reconfiguration stating, "the significance of these
constitutional measures was that religious influence was guaranteed through political
power" (1982, 19). Della Cava points to the historically contingent nature of the
reconfiguration, stating that its occurrence "owed much to both the 'unique' historical
conjuncture of the 1930s as well as to Leme's consummate political skill in acting upon
that moment " (1976, 13). Although not a complete return to the pre-republican type of
Church-state union, the separation between Church and state had once again become
blurred.
Two key features of Brazil's reestablishment of Church-state ties stand out. First,
the ties resulting from the 1934 and 1937 constitutions were of an intermediate density.
Far more ties linking Church and state -- significant financial support, subsidization of
religious education, and informal access to power -- returned to the Brazilian Church than
was available to Chile after 1925. Conversely, even after the 1930s the Brazilian Church
was not as closely bound to the state as was the Argentine Church. Unlike in Argentina,
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the Brazilian Church was not recognized as Brazil's official religion and it retained full
control over its internal affairs.
Second, to arrive at this juncture, the Brazilian Church had pursued a two-pronged
strategy of gradually building its influence in middle-class civil society (even through the
creation of overtly political organizations like the Catholic Electoral League) and
attempting to establish lines of private influence with each successive government. As
this strategy began to mature, the Brazilian Church was well-positioned to exert influence
privately, to a large extent, because it had the capacity to exert influence publicly should
it choose to do so. The inducements and constraints of this Church-state relationship
would profoundly influence the Brazilian episcopacy's political behavior in the decades
to come.
Critical Junctures in Authoritarian Cases
Between the 1910s and the 1930s, Chile, Argentina and Brazil designed distinct
institutional arrangements with varying levels of Church-state ties. Secular political
figures and Church leaders were, of course, influenced by historical contingencies of their
day. However, institutional choices were not pre-determined by broad antecedent
conditions in part because Church-state issues were at best of secondary importance to
the crises that gave rise to calls for reform. In Chile, Alessandri could have excluded
pursuit of Church-state disestablishment from reforms focused on more pressing issues of
institutional paralysis and economic instability. Instead, he personally negotiated
amicable severance of Church state ties while in exile in 1924 and then allowed a major
figure in the Chilean episcopacy to oversee the drafting of all Church-state related
segments of the 1925 constitution that formalized disestablishment. In Argentina, Justo
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could have pursued the severance of Church-state ties as a member of the liberal faction
of the military. Given the episcopacy's lukewarm reaction to both Yrigoyen and Uriburu's
efforts to attract their support, the political benefits of retaining formal Church-state ties
and expanding the Church's privileges were not obvious. In Brazil, near total Churchstate separation could have been retained by Vargas in the modernizing, state-centric
wake of the “Revolution” of 1930, but both the Constituent Assembly convened in 1933
and Vargas in his 1937 Constitution went to great lengths to re-establish a significant
network of Church-state ties. This is likely due in no small measure to the historical
contingency of the personal relationship that took shape between Archbishop Leme and
Vargas, an agnostic.
Also of note is the relative political clout of the Church in all three cases. All
three episcopacies, spurned by the liberal-led rollback of Church privileges, had spent at
least two decades pursuing efforts to better permeate society. In Argentina, this included
the provision of services for the waves of Southern European immigrants. In Chile, it
included the creation of Catholic worker organizations and, later, Catholic trade unions
and middle class organizations. In Brazil, middle class Catholic associations began to
grow in number and membership during the 1910s. While it is certainly true that all three
cases involve different degrees of successful Church presence in civil society, all three
Churches entered the critical juncture in the midst of efforts to increase their social
influence and organizational capacity irrespective of the future of Church-state ties.
Though in every case there was significant dissent, the most powerful segments of
each episcopacy reached different conclusions about the role of Church-state ties in
securing social influence and acted accordingly. In Chile, the Church moved to establish
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better connections with the working class after the 1880s, but relatively dense Churchstate ties remained intact by the early 1920s. However, through negotiation with the
Archbishop of Santiago and the pope, the hesitant Chilean bishops were instructed by the
Vatican to accept what the pontiff considered favorable terms of Church-state separation
in 1925. In Argentina the Church moved to establish connections with immigrant
populations and the middle class and increasingly sought to attach itself to Argentine
nationalism. This effort could have turned in a progressive direction, akin to Bishop
Andrea, that advocated for reform on behalf of working immigrant communities.
However, the episcopacy sought to avoid Church-state separation even after a protracted
dispute over the patronato with the Alvear government and after the neighboring Chilean
Church achieved successful separation in 1925. After the critical juncture, as we shall see
in the next chapter, bishops like Andrea lost sway to conservative nationalists. In Brazil,
after Church-state separation in 1891, Church leaders moved to increase Catholic
influence among the middle class and establish informal relationships with successive
heads of state. Bruneau (1973), Della Cava (1976), Mainwaring (1986), and Klaiber
(1998) all describe the ethos of this activity as the construction of a kind of "NeoChristendom" that was neither progressive nor particularly democratic. Despite the
prevalence of such ideas in the episcopacy and the presence of groups like the Catholic
Integralists, under the leadership of Archbishop Leme the episcopacy successfully sought
a return to collaborative Church-state ties rather than an Argentina-type, nationalist
Church-state union.
Church and state leaders chose different types of Church-state relationships
during periods of social and political upheaval between the 1910s and 1930s. New
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upending changes were yet to come. During the period between the 1950s and the 1980s,
the episcopacies in Chile, Argentina and Brazil all responded to major reform in the
international Church, the rise of repressive national security states and, in some cases,
competition for adherents from evangelical Protestants. Faced with similar challenges but
situated within different types of church-state relationships, each national-level
episcopacy would respond to these challenges differently. Episcopal responses were
shaped by the legacy of critical junctures that created lasting Church-state relationships in
each country. Mechanisms of reproduction, specific institutional inducements and
constraints rooted in Church-state ties, which would later structure the Church's response
to human rights abuse, are the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Mechanisms of Reproduction in
Argentina, Chile, and Brazil

From the conclusion of each critical juncture to the eve of political crises that
helped provoke military coups, a clearly discernible trajectory of Church-state relations
existed in Argentina, Chile and Brazil. The central claim of this chapter is that the
consensus on Church-state relations forged by actors during the critical juncture was
reinforced during this period by the formal and informal ties linking church and state.
These ties functioned as self-reinforcing mechanisms of reproduction that sustained the
core attributes of each trajectory in Church-state relations into at least the 1970s. In the
chapter that follows, I first discuss the concept of a mechanism of reproduction. I then
describe mechanisms of reproduction at work in Chile, during the period from 1925 to
the end of the 1960s; Argentina, during the period from 1934 to the early 1970s; and
Brazil, from 1934 to the early 1960s. I conclude with a brief comparison of the
mechanisms at work in each case. Chapter 6 will describe how these same mechanisms
guided the response of each episcopacy during pre-coup crises and post-coup waves of
human rights abuse.
Mechanisms of Reproduction in Path Dependence
Mechanisms of reproduction are the "ongoing political institutions and processes"
that perpetuate the "stability of core attributes" created during the critical juncture
(Collier and Collier 1991, 31). These stable attributes constitute the legacy of the choices
made during the critical juncture. Once in operation, these mechanisms are the key
theoretical explanation at work. This is because the mechanisms structure subsequent
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events in the absence of the conditions that originally gave rise to the mechanisms
themselves (35). The trajectory of Church-state relations in 20th century Latin America is
sustained by the type of mechanism of reproduction that Mahoney terms "self-reinforcing
sequences" (2000, 508-9).54 Such sequences are "characterized by the formation and
reproduction of a given institutional pattern" (508). The logic of self-reinforcing
sequences draws on insight from economic notions of increasing returns. In selfreinforcing sequences, mechanisms of reproduction are recurring sets of incentives and
disincentives that "lock-in" institutions which then become very difficult to terminate.
Once these mechanisms become routinized following the critical juncture, they establish
institutions that persist in the long term and these institutions structure events that play
out in the short term (512-7). However, in self-reinforcing sequences, increasing returns
may arise from non-economic modes of behavior, such as the pursuit of normative
returns or power-based returns (517-25). 55
As these mechanisms of reproduction operate, various other consequential
variables may have an impact on the course of events, particularly if they occur in selfreinforcing sequences that are triggered more slowly (Mahoney 2000, 515) or at a
moment in time that closely follows the critical juncture (Pierson 2004, 44). However,
once routinized the mechanisms of reproduction sustain a set of core attributes which
may amplify, mitigate or redirect the impact of new events or social forces. Thus,
54
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understanding the basic mechanisms that sustain a particular type of relationship between
two institutions is an essential prerequisite for assessing the impact of constant cause
variables. Be they historical constant cause variables that span decades or historically
"synchronic," short term constant cause variables, significant institutional differences
may systematically alter their impact on a given set of cases (Pierson 2004, 45-6).
In the case of Latin American Church-state relations, the type and extent of
Church-state ties in each case operate as self-reinforcing mechanisms of reproduction.
The most consequential of these ties are: involvement of the state in the selection of
bishops and the creation of dioceses; constitutional guarantees for the Church, such as
privileged status, guaranteed subsidization or other material support, and religious
requirements for office-holders; official government posts reserved for the Church or
direct clerical participation in policy-making (such as education or healthcare); routinized
(but not constitutionally-guaranteed) state funding for Church activity; routinized (but
not constitutionally-guaranteed) consultation with Church officials in the policy-making
process; and state restrictions on the activity of competing religious organizations. In
each case, the overall density of Church-state ties grew out of the dissimilar levels of
Church-state ties permitted by the outcome of critical junctures described in chapter 4.
These ties determined many of the costs and benefits associated with denouncing,
defending or ignoring state practices and policies. In addition, the operation of these
institutions over the course of several decades affected the ideological center of gravity
within each episcopacy as well as each episcopacy's willingness and organizational
capacity to denounce state practices it opposed. This occurred because struggles within
each episcopacy over the proper relationships between the Church, its religious

138

adherents, the state, and society in general, were filtered through different configurations
of church-state interaction privileging some actors, organizations, strategies, and
alliances, and weakening others.
The stable core attributes reinforced by these ties and dominant perspectives
within each episcopacy established and maintained the trajectory of Church-state
relations in each case. These trajectories are the modal basis of interaction between
Church and state, which the Church uses with greatest effect to defend and promote the
interests defined by the bishops. Such patterns of interaction may include reliance on
personal relationships to influence the state, the routinized political activity of lay
organizations or episcopal conferences, and alliances with political parties. These
trajectories may also establish whether these interactions tend to play out publicly or
privately. These mechanisms of reproduction and the core attributes they sustained
shaped the response of each national-level episcopacy to most major political
developments during the period between the 1930s and the transitions to democracy that
accelerated during the late 1980s, including the waves of human rights abuse during
military rule.
Self-reinforcing Mechanisms in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil
The self-reinforcing mechanisms and core attributes evident in Argentina, Chile
and Brazil are the levels of state control over the internal affairs of the Church and the
level of state support for Church activity. A third mechanism, which is an extension of
the first two but capable of producing its own self-reinforcing effect, is the relative
influence of conservative and progressive tendencies within each episcopal conference. A
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brief description follows of the configuration of those mechanisms, their
interrelationships and the set of core attributes they sustained in these three cases.
In Argentina, where substantial levels of Church-state ties were retained during
the critical juncture, self-reinforcing mechanisms included high levels of state control
over the internal affairs of the Church and high levels of state support for Church activity.
These mechanisms sustained a set of core attributes in which the Church attempted to
maintain close and noncontentious relationships with successive governments, several of
which were military regimes that came to power via the overthrow of civilian
governments. From the 1930s through the 1960s, extreme examples of military
governments promoting Church privileges came and went. However, Church-state union
allowed the state to prevent the appointment of many bishops regarded as ideologically
incompatible with each regime. With a quiescent episcopacy, Church-state union made
granting privileges or favors to the Church a reliable political tool available to
governments that sought to promote nationalist goals or bolster their own nationalist
credentials. Conversely, after the 1930s, to seriously attack Church-state union was to
attack Argentine nationalism at large.
As a result of these dynamics, the Argentine Church reaped significant social,
financial and organizational rewards. These rewards were not typically the result of any
confrontational public pronouncements or explicitly partisan political mobilization.
Instead, the Church's interests were best promoted when Church leaders defined and
articulated the institution's chief political interests in terms of what would benefit the
Church as an organization (as opposed to what would benefit segments of its adherents
such as the middle class, the poor, workers, etc.) and otherwise remained a voice for
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national unity in times of crisis. Thus, Church leaders protected their institution's
privileges and influence by protecting its position as a nationalist organization. In this
way, advancing Church interests came to rely on conciliation, and at times collaboration,
with nationalist forces. Chief among these nationalist forces was the nationalist tendency
within the Argentine military, which frequently initiated interventions in Argentine
political struggles or civilian government between the 1930s and the 1960s.56 The
Church's symbolically powerful but materially and organizationally dependent position
was evident in patterns of frequent nationalist appeals involving Catholicism during
periods of social and political upheaval; an increasingly close relationship between
powerful segments of the hierarchy and the military; the gradual accumulation of benefits
provided by the state to the Church, often by military governments; and the ideologicallycontingent nature of the episcopacy's relationship with clergy or laity attempting to
organize Catholic political mobilizations beyond the direct control of bishops.
In Chile, where Church-state ties were severed during the critical juncture, selfreinforcing mechanisms included low levels of state control over the internal affairs of
the Church and only moderate levels of state support for Church activities. These selfreinforcing mechanisms sustained a set of core attributes in which the Chilean episcopacy
was strongly influenced by the Vatican and heavily involved in partisan politics. Churchstate separation gave the Vatican a free hand in the appointment of bishops and the
Church complete control over its internal affairs and strategic alliances. Free to define its
interests as it saw fit, but cut off from guaranteed privileges, access to the policy-making
process, or state support, Chilean bishops used shifting, informal alliances with political
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Public confrontation with the state initiated by the Church only occurred when the entire institution of the
Church was threatened by the state during the final 18 months of Perón's regime.
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parties to defend and promote their interests in society. These informal alliances formed
between the dominant tendency within the episcopacy and the political party that best
matched its interests. When the dominant tendency shifted or the electoral viability of the
party changed, so too did the alliance. This pattern of interaction began with a strong
informal alliance with the Conservative Party after 1925, eventually gaining the Church
some state funding for private Catholic schools. Then during the 1950s, Papal Nuncio
Sebastiano Baggio and the Vatican used a rapid succession of bishop appointments to
bolster the progressive tendency within the Chilean episcopacy. Separation of Church and
state allowed this change to be accomplished rapidly because it could occur without state
interference or the risk of antagonizing policymakers who might withdraw financial
support from Church activities. As the electoral prospects of the Conservative Party
declined and the influence of progressive bishops increased, the episcopacy shifted to an
informal (and briefly, formal) alliance with the socially progressive Christian Democratic
Party (PDC). Once again, the PDC pursued major social reforms supported by the
Chilean episcopacy, rewarding the Church for its partisan activity. When the PDC began
to falter in the late 1960s, the episcopacy distanced itself from the party. Thus, between
1925 and 1970, lack of state control over the Church heightened the influence of the
Vatican, strengthened the position of progressive bishops and encouraged active
episcopal conference participation in party politics. The result was that Chile's
episcopacy became not only increasingly progressive, but also a full beneficiary of
Chilean democracy.
In Brazil, where intermediate Church-state ties were reinstated during the critical
juncture, self-reinforcing mechanisms included low levels of state control over the
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internal affairs of the Church and high levels of state support for Church activity.
Extensive financial ties combined with full autonomy in other respects bound Church and
state together more closely than in Chile, but less closely than in Argentina. Substantial
Vatican intervention unencumbered by state interference bolstered the progressive
tendency in the episcopacy. With this tendency helping to define the Church's interests
partially in terms of its social mission, the Church came to rely on state funds to support
its own social development programs. This configuration of self-reinforcing mechanisms
sustained a set of core attributes that included both generally cordial relationships with
successive governments and the forging of ties between the Church and multiple classes,
sectors and marginalized groups. In this sense, the Brazilian episcopacy's trajectory
mimics parts of the trajectories of both Argentine and Chilean Church-state relations.
Subsidies increased state leverage over the Church, but organizational autonomy allowed
the Church to define its interests with relative independence. As the grievances of some
of the groups with which it had forged ties became politicized during the 1950s, the
Church became politicized too. Reformists in the Church partnered with like-minded
political figures. Unlike the Chilean episcopacy's partisan alliances, cooperation with
successive governments on the provision of social services continued for decades through
private negotiation and lobbying. But, whereas the Argentine episcopacy cooperated with
multiple seizures of power by the military, the Brazilian Church collaborated on the
creation or extension of social services with a series of conservative (e.g. Dutra),
reformist (e.g. Kubitschek) and populist (e.g. Goulart) governments. The result was a
divided episcopacy with conflicting interests. One set of interests included providing
assistance to groups subject to repression after the 1964 coup, while the other needed to
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retain a publicly congenial relationship with the state that permitted and funded the
Church's social missions in the first place.
In the section that follows, these self-reinforcing mechanisms and the core
attributes they created and sustained are described in greater detail.
Argentina
Argentina's antecedent conditions and critical juncture (described in chapter 4) set
up three self-reinforcing mechanisms in that country's Church-state relations. During the
mid-19th century, Church and state became closely bound by a dense network of
institutional ties first laid out in the constitution of 1853. These ties were challenged and,
in some instances, rolled back in subsequent decades. Then, during the critical juncture
(the first years of the Justo government, 1932-1934), ties were increased and solidified by
a military government after an extended period of uncertainty for the Church. This period
of uncertainty included an extended period of liberal party governance, the appearance of
an electorally competitive socialist party, and a military coup the employed substantial
pro-Church rhetoric.
These strengthened ties established two self-reinforcing mechanisms: high levels
of state control over the internal affairs of the Church and high levels of state support for
Church activities. Both mechanisms afforded successive nationalist governments with
leverage over the Church's socio-political role in Argentine society. In addition to these
ties, during the late 19th century, the Church played a significant role in fostering cultural
assimilation among waves of southern European immigrants. This work helped revive the
association between Argentina's Catholic Church and Argentine nationalism. In the midst
of the critical juncture, this association solidified a third self-reinforcing mechanism: the
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sustained influence of bishops who subscribed to a conservative political theology
involving Catholic nationalism. This tendency within the episcopal conference was a
particular strain of Argentine nationalist thought which conflated Catholic values with
"Argentine values," used the prophetic voice of the Church to call for conciliation,
stability, and national unity in moments of crisis (rather than reform), and sought to
protect and advance the privileges afforded the Church by the state.57
These mechanisms produced enduring dynamics because Catholic nationalism
and the dense network of official Church-state ties interacted, reinforcing each other. The
association between nationalism and the Church made the provision of new benefits or
privileges to the Church a potent nationalist gesture available to political figures who
were not otherwise anticlerical. Conversely, constitutionally mandated state support for
Catholicism provided the Church with subsidies for basic operations and privileges that
bolstered its social influence so long as the institution remained in good standing with
nationalist social forces such as the military. Furthermore, the state held veto power over
the appointment of new bishops and the creation of new dioceses. Meanwhile, avowedly
nationalist bishops were best able to secure the expansion of Church privileges, inflating
such bishops' influence within the Argentine episcopacy. This interaction sustained a
decades-long trajectory of collaborative, nonpartisan Church-state relations in Argentina.
Even a brief period of Church-state conflict prior to Juan Perón's overthrow points to the
constraints associated with altering this trajectory of Church-state relations.
Catholic nationalism and Church-state ties
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Argentine Catholic nationalism features prominently in the literature on Argentine Catholic politics. See
the ideology's centrality in the analyses of Kennedy (1958); Mendez (1985); Burdick (1995); Ivereigh
(1995); and Klaiber (1998, 66-91), among others.
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Over the decades that followed the Justo government, the exercise of state power
in Argentina was often accompanied by: conservative civilian governments that left
Church privileges as they were, appeals to Catholic nationalism to legitimate the
overthrow of civilian governments or related actions, and the expansion of Church
benefits or privileges by military governments. The conservative civilian governments of
Roberto Ortiz and Ramon Castillo that followed Justo left Church privileges unaltered
and the conservative, integralist, episcopacy-dominated Argentine Catholic Action
(ACA) continued to grow. However, in 1943, Castillo was overthrown in a military coup
by General Arturo Rawson, who was quickly replaced by General Pedro Ramírez due to
factional struggles within the military (Burdick 1995, 36-7).
The Ramírez military dictatorship (1943-44) strengthened Church-state ties in an
echo of the Justo period. Ramírez began with the appointment of several prominent
Catholics and Catholic nationalists to provincial, cultural and diplomatic posts in the
government (Ivereigh 1995, 139). Of greatest importance to the Church, however, was
the reinstatement by decree of clerical religious education in public schools in 1943. This
change satisfied a high-priority, integralist, political goal held by the episcopacy since the
1880s (Leonard 1980, 34-5, fn 3). The decree was accompanied by the appointment of
Catholic nationalist Martinez Zuviria to the Ministry of Education and Justice. 58
The reintegration of Catholic education into public schools garnered support for
the military government from the Catholic episcopacy and even resulted in a personal
note of thanks from Pope Pius XIII (Burdick 1995, 24, 37; Leonard 1980, 35). After
General Ramirez's 1943 decree, the leadership of ACA issued a directive to all members
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stating, "If members criticize the policies of the government they will be expelled from
the organization" (Dunne 1945, 414; Burdick 1995, 37). Then, a pastoral letter issued by
the bishops just prior to the November 1945 elections once again ruled out Catholic
support for any party or candidate advocating divorce, laicized education and/or Churchstate separation.59 In doing so, the episcopacy lent indirect support to presidential
candidate Juan Perón (Leonard 1980, 35; Burdick 1995, 33, 37-8), which some observers
interpret as having a crucial impact on the outcome of the election (Ivereigh 1995, 113).60
Juan Perón's bid for the Argentine presidency in 1945 was successful. Consistent
with existing self-reinforcing patterns in Church-state relations, Perón’s intensively
nationalist public campaign and early years in power involved a very deliberate public
effort to elicit the support of Catholics, and the approval of the episcopacy. Perón had
risen to power within the Argentine military during the 1930s and early 1940s, in part by
aligning himself with anti-communist, nationalist tendencies. Thus, from early in his
political ascent, Perón's political allegiances were compatible with those of the Argentine
episcopacy. When General Ramirez overthrew the Castillo government in 1943, Perón
was appointed to head the Labor Department and later the Ministry of War. These
positions made it possible to build significant support within both the military and the
working class. By June of 1944, Perón was named the minister of war, in July vice
president, and in August president of the National Council on the Postwar Era, gathering
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The 1945 pastoral letter essentially restated the main tenets of a previous pastoral letter issued prior to
elections in 1931, near the end of Uriburu's regime.
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Kennedy (1958, 184-5) expresses reservations about the assumption that the bishops were attempting to
control or shift a bloc of voters. He argues instead that they were issuing instructions defending the longterm interests of the Church as an institution and probably changed the party preferences of very few
voters. However, bishops did have direct authority over Catholic Action, an organized bloc of voters at its
height in the mid-1940s. Moreover, that the episcopacy was pursuing its long term institutional interests
does not make efforts to delegitimize some parties and sanction others less partisan.
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additional support from segments of the military, political class and elites along the way
(Collier and Collier 1991, 332-3; Burdick 1995, 48).
Once in power, Perón sought opportunities to link his nationalist government with
the Church, which often involved elevating the Church's status and providing it with new
privileges. Perón frequently asserted that his social policy was “inspired by the Papal
encyclicals” (Burdick 1995, 51; Mecham 1966, 248).61 Perón also personally
administered the oaths of office at the installation ceremonies of some bishops and issued
decrees recognizing religious holidays and Catholic saints (Burdick 1995, 53).
Furthermore, Perón successfully converted into law the 1943 decree restoring religious
education in public schools. This effort met with sharp criticism within the Peronist party
and provoked serious debate in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate despite both
bodies having Peronist majorities. However, when Law 12.987 eventually passed, it
earned Perón praise from the Argentine episcopacy and the pope. Perón helped engineer
the revision of the Argentine constitution in 1949, but status quo Church-state ties
remained completely intact (Burdick 1995, 53). State subsidization of the Church
remained in full force during this period as well. In addition to long-standing
subsidization of various operating costs of existing Catholic churches, schools and
seminaries (Mignone 1986, 78-9, 87-9) the federal and provincial governments paid for
the construction of several new Churches and seminaries, including many new churches
in the Archdiocese of Buenos Aires designed to meet the uniform architectural
specifications of the Archbishop, Cardinal Santiago Luis Copello (Leonard 1980, 35).
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Perón was appealing to many Catholics in ideological terms as well. Perón’s
populism demonstrated social concern by building support among working class sectors,
establishing a welfare state, nationalizing some foreign-owned property and engaging in
distributive justice. However, through the construction and pursuit of official Peronist
doctrine, Justicialismo, Perón was demonstrably neither a socialist nor a liberal. From the
perspective of Catholics who trusted neither, Perón seemed to offer a legitimate third way
(Ivereigh 1995, 151-2; Klaiber 1998, 70-1). During the 1951 election, the bishops issued
another pastoral letter discouraging Catholic voters from supporting any candidate
supportive of laicized education or divorce which at that time essentially provided
continued support for Perón's government (Leonard 1980, 35).
During Perón’s second administration, particularly between 1954-55, Perón’s
position with respect to the Church changed dramatically. By 1954, the Church was one
of the very few remaining social institutions not controlled by the Peronist corporatist
structure. In the midst of economic decline, Perón saw Church influence as a threat
capable of legitimating grievances among segments of workers, students and the military
(Burdick 1995, 59) or of aligning with liberals and conservatives opposed to the Peronist
program (Ivereigh 1995, 152-3).
In an effort to counter Church influence, Perón began to attack the Church’s legal
and administrative privileges. This episode reveals the tremendous obstacles associated
with altering a path dependent Church-state relationship once it was established.
Throughout the conflict, Perón held to the position that his moves were to counteract the
influence of disloyal individual priests and bishops, not to attack Catholicism.
Meanwhile, clinging to its position as a nationalist institution interested primarily in
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national unity, episcopal statements responded by defending the Church as an apolitical
institution, not subject to Perón’s political authority. Thus, the conflict pitted Perón’s
strategy of politicizing the Church as an organization against the episcopacy's strategy of
defending the Church as a nationalist institution that was above politics. Indicative of the
strength of Argentina's Church-state trajectory, the Church won out.
In May of 1954, Perón used state funds to sponsor a meeting of Pentecostal
Pastors, prompting public complaints from the bishops.62 Afterwards, Cardinal Caggiano
reported to Pope Pius XII on the deterioration of the Argentine Church's relationship with
Perón (Burdick 1995, 60). In September 1954, after a confrontation between the Peronist
Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios and a Catholic student youth group in Córdoba,
Perón's preoccupation with what he feared was a Church "plan of agitation" intensified
(Burdick 1995, 61; see also Ivereigh 1995, 171-2). Afterwards, Perón began delivering
speeches to unions calling for religion to stay out of union affairs just as unions did not
interfere with religious affairs. The tenor of those speeches grew harsher, with Perón later
accusing some priests and bishops of taking part in a communist conspiracy to overthrow
his government. In November, Perón delivered a series of public speeches attacking
Church figures, including the lay leaders of ACA (Burdick 1995, 61-2). One such speech,
delivered November 10, named specific bishops and clergy as enemies of his
government.63 In December, Congressional legislation officially terminated all religious
education in public schools (Burdick 1995, 63). During the peak of the crisis in May of
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1955, Perón suspended the religious portions of the oath of office, suspended state
subsidies for Catholic schools, revoked the Church’s tax-exempt status and proposed a
constitutional amendment to formally separate Church and state (Burdick 195, 66-68).
Catholic responses to these attacks on Church privileges varied, but in general,
Argentina's bishops exercised enormous public restraint. Burdick characterizes the
response of the bishops as "cautionary" and "retaining decorum" as they continued to
meet with Perón periodically, respond to attacks with public letters to his office that
avoided demands for specific conciliatory action by Perón, and defend Church privileges
and social status in pastorals (1995, 57, 62-71).64 The bishops' response, even when faced
with Peron's rapid and aggressive turn, was consistent with a strategy of defending the
Church's nationalist and supposedly apolitical role in Argentine society. The bishops'
reaction contrasts sharply with reactions emanating from other sectors of the Church.
Clergy and organized lay Catholics responded to attacks on Church privileges in a
number of ways, including criticism of Perón in Catholic periodicals (Burdick 1995, 656), a widespread pamphlet campaign (Burdick 1995, 63-5; Ivereigh 1995, 177-8), and the
formation of small, armed groups that attempted to protect clergy and Church property
(Ivereigh 1995, 178). Meanwhile, between December 1954 and September 1955, there
were 12 major Catholic demonstrations in Buenos Aires and many more spontaneous
protests after Sunday masses (Burdick 1995, 66). At the height of the crisis, Perón was
excommunicated by Rome (Ivereigh 1995, 179).
On June 16, 1955 in the midst of a Peronist rally, an unsuccessful coup attempt
took place involving an air force bombing of La Casa Rosada, Argentina's presidential

64

Ivereigh's characterization of the bishops' response is similar (1995, 178).

151

palace. Hundreds of civilians were killed and loyalist troops quickly restored order in the
capital. However, that night while loyalist troops patrolled the city and enforced martial
law, mobs successfully ransacked and set fire to 18 major Catholic Churches in Buenos
Aires (Burdick 1995, 69; Ivereigh 1995, 179).65 Perón remained in power, but was
weakened by the coup attempt. Conciliatory gestures toward the Church followed in the
form of new appointments in the Ministry of Education, the release of imprisoned clergy
and lay activists and offers to rebuild burned Churches with state funds (Ivereigh 1995,
181). In July, Perón announced the end of the Peronist revolution and called for national
pacification, including the easing of some press censorship and government repression.
The bishops responded with a pastoral letter titled, "Our Contribution to the Peace of the
Fatherland" (Burdick 1995, 69). The letter was consistent with decades of episcopal
political behavior rooted in self-reinforcing patterns of Church-state relations. The
episcopacy assumed a nationalist position that urged a return to normalcy and Argentine
values in the midst of crisis, but linked calls for the return to those values with calls to
restore state support for the Church. According to Burdick, the letter supported Perón's
call for national pacification, reasserted the Church's role as fundamentally nonpolitical,
listed the attacks on the Church, and called for restoration of Church privileges as well as
basic civil liberties. In contrast, the pamphlet campaign, which had waxed and waned
since June, redirected its attention to the military, urging it to overthrow Perón (Burdick
1995, 70).
The situation remained tense throughout August, and on September 16, 1955, in
the midst of renewed social violence, the military revolted, staging a coup and ousting
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Perón from power and forcing him into exile. The coup’s causes were complex and
involved the untenable nature of the coalition Perón had built combined with his
intensifying efforts to retain significant top-down authority over that coalition while
meeting opponents with confrontation (Collier and Collier 1991, 348). The Church-state
conflict was but one expression of that effort, but some cite the symbolic importance of
Perón’s attacks on the Church as helping to consolidate middle class opposition to his
government, stoking disorder and hastening the military coup (Burdick 1995, 57).66
The overt nature of Church-state conflict during the 1954-55 episode is
symptomatic of Perón's larger miscalculations about how to consolidate power over a
raucous coalition of support. The reaction of the Argentine episcopacy and the symbolic
importance of Perón's attacks on the Church are entirely consistent with broader patterns
of Church-state relations. Displaying a pattern of Church-state interaction traceable to
the Justo era, episcopal reaction to a contentious political environment did not push the
Argentine episcopacy into alliance with a rival political party or rapid and forceful
denunciations of Perón. Rather, when criticism of Perón surfaced after sustained forceful
attacks on Church privileges and property, denunciations of Perón’s authoritarian
tendencies remained restrained, especially compared to reactions emanating from
Catholic laity, clergy and Rome. When criticism did become pointed, such as in "Our
Contribution to Peace and the Fatherland," the episcopacy cited Perón’s attacks on the
special institutional status of the Church as evidence of his anti-democratic policies
(Burdick 1995, 72, 74). To the episcopacy, attacks on the Church constituted attacks on
the Argentine nation, rather than one of several important social institutions. Defense and
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restoration of Church privileges were the paramount public rallying point for an
episcopacy that derived its political power from claims that the Church was a nonpolitical
institution seeking national conciliation.
In addition, Perón’s position in the conflict was relatively weak. Because of the
Church's special and protected status and strong ties to conservative social forces, Perón
was forced to confront the Church's organization and its political allies over issues related
to altering Argentina's constitution. In this sense, the Church's state-provided privileges
raised the stakes of the conflict, forcing Perón to justify his consolidation of political
power in new ways. Ultimately, the obstacles associated with doing so proved too
resistant.
Church-state Ties and Catholic Nationalism after Perón
General Eduardo Lonardi assumed power in the immediate aftermath of Perón's
overthrow and set to repairing Church-state relations. Lonardi's government was
avowedly Catholic nationalist, contrasting sharply with the final 18 months of Perón's
regime. Lonardi appointed several Catholic nationalist officials to government positions
and several Peronist officials who had resigned their government posts in response to
Perón's persecution of the Church (Burdick 1995, 86; Ivereigh 1995, 185). Dismantling
the Peronist Party and its influence in society was a priority for the new regime, but
Lonardi also sought reconciliation between Peronists, the working class, nationalists and
liberals. Unable to accomplish such reconciliation, in less than a year, Lonardi was
deposed by the liberal tendency within the military and replaced by General Pedro
Aramburu (1955-58). Aramburu turned more harshly against the Peronists, but also
removed high-ranking Catholic nationalist appointees from the government and
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maintained a cooler relationship with the Church than had Lonardi. Despite this,
Aramburu exercised more power than Lonardi; under his rule, almost all Church
privileges lost during 1955 were reinstated and the Peronist-era legalizations of divorce
and prostitution were annulled. The only Church privilege Aramburu did not restore was
Catholic education in public schools (Burdick 1995, 97).
Though the episcopacy viewed this failure as a setback, further reforms provided
new benefits to the Church. The Aramburu government issued a decree allowing the
creation of private universities, which permitted the founding of two Catholic universities
by 1959, with more to follow. Meanwhile in 1957, under the patronato, Aramburu
allowed a new expansion of the Argentine episcopacy. The Argentine Church added two
new provinces and twelve new dioceses and increased the number of bishops appointed
to serve each diocese. Restructuring also created a military chaplaincy, which effectively
created a diocese with its own bishop serving only the military, rather than each military
installation falling under the auspices of the local diocese (Burdick 1995, 96). In granting
the expansion, the Aramburu government acknowledged in a public statement that
advancing the interests of the Church in this instance contributed to the "strengthening of
the moral base that will always contribute to the political organization and progress of the
country" (press release quoted in Burdick 1995, 96-7).
Reforms benefiting the Church continued after the transition to civilian
government in 1958. In addition to calling on the Church to provide leadership in
restoring tranquility to the country during his campaign, the Frondizi government (195862) granted private primary and secondary schools, including Catholic schools, greater
autonomy over issues such as curriculum and the hiring and firing of faculty. In addition,
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the Frondizi government entered into negotiations with the Vatican to achieve a
Concordat that would retain Church privileges while granting it greater autonomy
(Burdick 1995, 95-8).67
However, weak civilian government in Argentina was once again subject to
military intervention only a few years later when in 1966 the military overthrew President
Arturo Illia. Once again, the new military regime, this time led by General Juan Carlos
Onganía, strengthened Church privileges in the wake of the coup seeking Church
approval for its nationalist intervention. Once in power, Onganía set about creating a
'Catholic corporatist' regime, which was intended to remain in power indefinitely rather
than return power to a reconstituted civilian government. Onganía went to great lengths
to tie his Revolución Argentina to the Church (Burdick 1995, 174). Onganía himself was
a devout, ascetic Catholic who participated in the Cursillo de Cristiandad movement
along with four of his cabinet ministers and other high-ranking political appointees
(Burdick 1995, 158, fn 56). Cursillistas were a messianic group with a theological vision
that sought the construction of a new Christendom. Consequently, intertwined with
Onganía's obsessively anti-communist ideological commitments and military
professionalism was a pre-Vatican II theology that sought an integral institutional
relationship between Church and state (Burdick 1995, 128-9).
Beyond Onganía's personal ties to the cursillista movement, his government made
several public gestures that benefited the Church. Onganía began by appointing several
alumni of ACA to top government positions. Among the most public manifestations of
the regime's integralist political theology was its relationship with Cardinal Primate
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Antonio Caggiano, who was both Archbishop of Buenos Aires and Bishop of the
Argentine Military from 1959 to 1975. Caggiano was a fervent supporter of Onganía and
played a high profile role in the regime. Caggiano was invited to sign the documents
establishing the new government, a first in Argentine history (Burdick 1995, 128). Later
in 1966, Onganía signed the Concordat negotiated with the Vatican over the previous
decade, which retained state support for the Church while bringing to an end several
levers of state control over the Church, including the patronato (Ivereigh 1995, 200).
Dame (1968) describes the decision to sign this Concordat as an opportunity for the
regime to enter into a new negotiated and legally binding international agreement that
demonstrated friendly relations with the international Church. As such, the concordat was
one of several post-coup foreign policy moves intended to demonstrate the regime's
anticommunism and responsibility to Western powers and international investors (Dame
1968, 107-8). In 1969, Onganía consecrated the nation to the 'Immaculate Heart of Mary,'
with Caggiano presiding over the ceremony (Burdick 1995, 148; Klaiber 1998, 71-2).
Unable to appeal to the working class or students during a period of increased
militancy, Onganía was overthrown in 1970 in the mist of new waves of social unrest.
Onganía's successor, General Roberto Levingston, maintained a mildly uneasy
relationship with the episcopacy as his government appeared more skeptical of the postVatican II Church in its public comments (Burdick 1995, 174). By contrast, Levingston's
successor, General Alejandro Lanusse, was an ardent cursillista like Onganía, and under
his administration greater trust existed between the military government and the
episcopacy (Burdick 1995, 174, 182). Despite these machinations, no significant changes
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to Church-state ties occurred during the Levingston or Lanusse governments (1995, 1703).
From 1966 to 1973, the Onganía, Levingston and Lanusse governments struggled
to maintain order in the midst of a deteriorating economic situation and increasing social
unrest and violence. Finally, in a bid to restore order, the Lanusse government arranged a
return to civilian government and national elections in which the Peronist party was
allowed to participate. Peronists won national elections and, after a short caretaker
Peronist government, in 1973 Juan Perón returned to Argentina and assumed power in a
national referendum. The following three years produced a series of economic, social and
political crises culminating in a military coup and seven years of violent, repressive
military government.
Argentina's self-reinforcing mechanisms included high levels of state control over
internal Church affairs, high levels of state support for Church activities and a generally
conservative, nationalist political theology within the episcopal conference. Between
1932 and the late 1960s, these mechanisms interacted with successive military
governments that overthrew civilian governments during moments of national crisis. The
cumulative effect of this interaction, structured by these mechanisms, was that the
Argentine Church accrued substantial benefits during periods of military rule. One
indicator of this pattern is the expansion of dioceses, which required state approval,
necessitated state involvement in the selection of a bishop for all new dioceses and
involved substantial state funding for the endeavor. Between 1916 and 1999, 57 new
dioceses were created in Argentina. Of those, 39 (68%) were created under military
governments (Esquivel 2000, 23). The steady accrual of state-provided privileges is
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summarized in Table 5.1. This relationship helped construct and condition the Argentine
episcopacy to respond to large-scale crises by playing the role of the conciliator, which if
necessary would made prophetic calls for a return to nationalist values, stability and
support for the Church. In ideological terms, Richard (1987) notes that through the
social, economic and political turmoil between 1955 and 1976, the Argentine Church
became more and more "polarized around two antagonistic positions: one position sought
a solution to the crisis in a military regime tied to the dominant classes, and the other
looked for a socialist type of solution, tied to the popular classes." Despite this, "Between
these two clearly defined positions was to be found a hesitant majority" (Richard 1987,
102, original emphasis).
Chile
Though Church state relations were remarkably close in Chile through the 19th
century, in 1925 a new constitution severed all church-state ties through an arrangement
that key players in the Chilean episcopacy, Vatican and Chilean state found acceptable
(Smith 1979, 76-8; Scully 1992, 114). This separated institutional relationship created
three self-reinforcing mechanisms of reproduction in Chile: very low levels of state
control over the internal affairs of the Church, limited state support for Church activities,
and an ideologically moderate episcopal conference heavily influenced by a vocal
progressive tendency.
This institutional environment contrasted sharply with that of Argentina and
forged a different path for 20th century Church-state relations. Organizational autonomy
from the state in its internal affairs leant Chile's papal nuncios and the Vatican greater
influence over the ideological evolution and political activities of the Chilean episcopacy.
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Table 5.1: Expansion and Withdrawal of Church Privileges in
Argentina, 1930-1970
Head of
Government

Tenure
in
Office68

Significant Expansion of Some
Privilege for
Catholic Church69

Jose Felix
Uriburu*†
Agustin Justo

1930-32



Catholic nationalist appointees

1932-38



Diocesan/ Episcopacy Expansion
Allowed
Support for International
Eucharistic Conference


Roberto Ortiz

1938-40

Ramon
Castillo
Arturo
Rawson*
Pedro
Ramirez*

1940-43

Edelmiro
Farrell*
Juan Peron

1944-46

1943
1943-44

1946-55




Catholic nationalist appointees
Educational decree (religious
instruction in public schools)



Education Reform (Law 12.987
religious instruction in public
schools becomes official law)
Recognition of religious holidays
Extensive participation in civilreligious ceremonies
Catholic nationalist appointees



Eduardo
Lonardi*†
Pedro E.
Aramburu*

Withdrawal of Significant
Church Privilege

1955



1955-58





Arturo
Frondizi

1958-62

Jose Maria
Guido
Arturo Illia

1962-63








Withdrawal of nearly all
Church privileges
Divorce and prostitution
legalized

Restored privileges/prohibitions
lost under Peron
Private universities allowed
Diocesan/Episcopacy expansion
allowed
Creation of Military Episcopate
Granted autonomy to private
schools
Initiated concordat negotiations

1963-66

Juan Carlos
1966-70
 Catholic nationalist appointees
Ongania*†
 Concordat signed with Vatican
*Denotes Military Government
†Denotes Catholic Nationalist Regime (Burdick 1995)

68

Source: Collier and Collier (1991, 775).
Information on privileges and their withdrawal compiled from Mendez (1985); Burdick (1995); Ivereigh
(1995).
69
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This increase in Vatican influence coincided with a period of reform in the international
Church, including heightened engagement with modernity encouraged by Rome. This
ideological evolution led the Chilean episcopacy to define and pursue its interests in ways
that differed substantially from the Argentine Church. To defend and pursue its interests,
which involved engaging with the middle and working classes and attempting to speak on
their behalf, the Chilean episcopacy maintained informal, shifting ties to political parties.
The strategy proved beneficial to the Church in securing state funding for Catholic
education in the 1950s and state-led pursuit of Church-endorsed social reforms in the
1960s. As Chile entered the crisis years following the election of Allende in 1970, these
self-reinforcing mechanisms had constructed and conditioned an episcopacy that was a
politically relevant member of civil society. Chile's episcopal conference was an
independent supporter of state practices and policies it endorsed and an independent critic
of practices and policies to which it objected.
Church-State Autonomy and Church-Party Alliances
As the 1925 constitution was promulgated and the separation of Church and state
took place, Chilean politics were also experiencing a period of upheaval resulting from
changing class dynamics. Between 1900 and 1925, a dramatic rise in the number of
organized urban sector workers took place. Between 1925 and 1932, these workers were
incorporated into the party system, fundamentally altering the realities of political
competition in Chile (Collier and Collier 1991; Scully 1992). Older parties, including the
Conservatives, Liberals and Radicals, persisted in their reliance on the clericalanticlerical cleavage to mobilize supporters, but with declining results. Gradually, this
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cleavage was replaced by the division between owners and workers, and parties wishing
to remain electorally relevant were forced to deal with social questions (Scully 1992, 62).
Cut off from the state, the episcopacy’s strategy for maintaining political
influence adapted to this new environment. After the 1925 separation of Church and
state, the Conservative Party remained the only party espousing clerical ideology and the
party's leaders actively sought Catholic support (Smith 1982, 78, 82).70 Meanwhile, the
episcopacy viewed ascendant leftwing parties with suspicion, due in part to the left’s
anticlerical positions. Bishop Errázuriz, who had advocated some socially progressive
positions, such as support for some of Alessandri’s labor reforms in the early 1920s,
remained a vocal opponent of forming any partisan alliances.71 However, Errázuriz died
in 1931 and most Chilean bishops named after 1925 were conservative, including
Errázuriz’ successor as Archbishop of Santiago, José Horacio Campillo (Fleet and Smith
1997, 38). In November of 1933 the bishops voted to announce public support for the
Conservatives in a public letter (Smith 1982, 79).
Nonetheless, freed from state interference in the Church’s internal affairs, the
Vatican quickly became involved. Chile’s papal nuncio, Bishop Hector Felice, urged the
bishops to delay publishing the letter until they shared its content with the Vatican. The
Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Pacelli (who would become Pope Pius XII in 1939),
replied in June of 1934, insisting the Chilean bishops not publish the letter and avoid
formal alliances between the institutional Church and any one party. Instead, Pacelli
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As late as 1961, Conservative Party declarations continued to make specific reference to the party's
support for the Church and its doctrine (Smith 1982:95). See also Valenzuela and Valenzuela (2000).
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Errázuriz issued a strongly worded pastoral letter instructing priests to avoid such commitments in 1922
(Smith 1982, 73).
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urged Chile's bishops to concentrate their efforts on building a Catholic Action lay
movement (Smith 1982, 78-9). In accordance with Pacelli’s message, the bishops issued
a pastoral letter acknowledging that Chilean Catholics had the right to associate with
different political parties. Thus, formal alliance with the Conservatives was abandoned
and generally peaceful relationships persisted between the episcopacy and successive
governments from 1938 to 1952 (Smith 1982, 94). Informally, however, much of the
episcopacy retained ties to the Conservative Party until the 1950s (Fleet and Smith 1997,
39-40) and most practicing Catholics continued to vote for Conservative Party candidates
through the 1950s (Smith 1982, 89; Scully 1992, 115).
The same self-reinforcing mechanisms that shaped the contours of this
relationship with Conservatives eventually led to the decline of the informal ChurchConservative Party alliance. This decline was already underway by the mid-1930s. First,
the influence of the Vatican (made possible by a lack of state controls over the Church)
led to a slow accumulation of moderate and progressive bishops appointed by Rome
between the 1930s and 1940s. This trend accelerated in the 1950s. Second, the lack of
state support for Church activities encouraged the Church to seek out its policy
preferences via continued engagement with civil society and partisan politics. The
Church's progressive tendency was presented with an alternative to Conservative policies
with the founding and ascent of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which retained
close relations with various influential moderates and progressives in the episcopacy.
Episcopal appointments combined with the PDC's gradual electoral gains facilitated
changes to the Church's relationship with conservative partisans and the state, influencing
the outcome of intra-ecclesial struggles over the Church's social doctrines.
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The earliest significant progressive Vatican appointment of this period came in
1938 in the aftermath of the election of a center-left, Popular Front coalition government.
As Communists joined other elements of the left in forming the governing coalition,
rumors of an impending coup spread and conservative Archbishop Campillo refused to
maintain relations with the government. Campillo resigned shortly thereafter and was
replaced by the Vatican with Bishop José María Caro, bishop of La Serena. Weeks before
his appointment, Caro issued a letter acknowledging the Popular Front’s legitimacy,
promising Church cooperation and suggesting that Chileans were duty bound to obey
duly elected governments (Fleet and Smith 1997, 43-4). Caro remained Archbishop of
Santiago from 1939 until his death in 1958.
Another important early episcopal appointment was that of Manuel Larraín,
bishop of Talca (1939-1966). As bishop, Larraín was a frequent advocate on behalf of
workers and Catholic Action. Larraín went to great lengths to implement the social
encyclicals in his diocese and was the first bishop to transfer the Church’s land holdings
in his diocese to their tenants (Mecham 1966, 224). Larraín was also one of the most
outspoken progressive voices from Latin America during Vatican II, and Pope Paul VI
asked him to lead preparations for the 1968 CELAM conference in Medellín (Klaiber
1998, 45; Smith 1982, 110).72
By the final years of Caro’s tenure, Vatican appointments had shifted the political
center of gravity in the Chilean episcopacy. This was due in part to the work of papal
nuncio Msgr. Sebastiano Baggio (1953-59). Foreshadowing Vatican II-era reforms,
Baggio believed that the Church needed to confront communism via socially progressive
72

Bishop Larraín died in a car accident in 1966 during what was arguably the height of his influence in
Chile.
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ideas and organizations. In 1953, of the 21 bishops in Chile, 5 were considered
conservative, two social Christian (or generally progressive on social issues), and 14
neutral. Between 1955 and 1959, ten bishops were appointed to fill vacancies. Selections
made with Baggio’s support included six social Christians, two conservatives and two
ideologically neutral bishops. Consequently, by 1959, the number of socially progressive
bishops grew to 7 while the number of conservative bishops remained at 5, with the
remaining 9 being ideologically neutral (Fleet and Smith 1997, 47).
Finally, Bishop Raúl Silva Henríquez, who had been director of Caritas Chile and
earned a reputation for great concern for the poor, was appointed bishop of Valparaíso in
1959, then appointed Archbishop of Santiago and elected president of the Chilean
Episcopal Conference in 1961 and elevated to Cardinal in 1962 (Aguilar 2003, 716-7).
Between 1958 and 1966, both Silva and Larraín played the most prominent leadership
roles in the Chilean episcopacy (Aguilar 2003, 717; Smith 1982, 112).
As the size and influence of the progressive segment of the Chilean episcopacy
increased, a pro-Church alternative to the Conservative Party emerged in the form of the
Christian Democratic Party (PDC). In 1935, a core group of young Catholic intellectuals,
who would eventually go on to found the PDC, joined the Conservative Party as an
organized and devoutly Catholic youth movement. This group, known first as the
National Movement of Conservative Youth and later the National Falange, included
several of the most prominent future leaders of the PDC, including Eduardo Frei, Manuel
Garretón and Radomiro Tómic (Fleet 1985, 44). The members were heavily influenced
by currents of European social Catholicism, which many of them studied under clergy in
Catholic high schools, early Catholic Action groups, and, especially, the Asociación
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Nacional de Estudiantes Católicos (ANEC) and the Catholic University of Santiago
(Huneeus 2003, 128; Scully 1992, 115; Fleet 1985, 44). Chilean Catholic Action, which
was first established in October of 1931, was particularly adept at attracting young,
middle class members, growing from 30,000 members during its first few months to
47,000 members by 1936. This early core membership formed the organizational base of
social Catholicism in Chile, which would flourish in the 1950s (Fleet and Smith 1997,
41). Chief among the clerics who inspired this group was Fr. Manuel Larraín, then vicerector of the Catholic University of Santiago. At the university, Larraín taught students
who went on to found the Falange, including Eduardo Frei (Mecham 1966, 223-4). In
addition to Larraín, Fr. Alberto Hurtado had a significant impact on the PDC's founding
members. A well-known progressive priest, Hurtado worked as the national director of
Chilean Catholic Action, which counted many PDC founders as members.73
In programmatic terms, the Falange's members were most committed to
advancing the social doctrines of the Church as articulated in papal social encyclicals.
However, they joined the Conservative party because of its default status as the Catholic
party. Interested in social reforms, the Falange was continually at odds with a majority of
Conservatives. After an intense dispute over the Conservative Party's candidate for the
1938 presidential election, the Falange broke away from the Conservatives and founded
its own political party (Huneeus 2003, 128-9; Scully 1992, 115-6).74
The fledgling National Falange Party articulated a new programmatic option in
the Chilean party system that was opposed to liberal anticlericalism and communism but
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Hurtado later founded a Catholic workers’ union in 1948 and Mensaje, an important progressive Catholic
magazine in 1951 (Klaiber 1998, 45). Additional clergy influential among the PDC's early membership
included Fathers Francisco Vives and Jorge Fernández Pradel (Fleet 1985, 44).
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The National Falange was renamed the Christian Democratic Party of Chile in 1957.
166

also rallied around social justice issues. However, during its first two decades, the party
never achieved electoral support from more than 4 percent of the electorate, winning only
three seats in congressional elections between 1941 and 1953 (Huneeus 2003, 129; Fleet
1985, 48).
Despite the growth of progressivism in the episcopacy, from its creation in the
late 1930s through the early 1950s the National Falange remained somewhat distant from
most members of the episcopacy and sometimes clashed with individual bishops. This
stemmed, in part, from confrontations between the party and the conservative tendency
within the episcopacy. According to Fleet and Smith's (1997) account, the most
prominent of these conflicts erupted in 1947, when auxiliary bishop Augusto Salinas
openly criticized the Falange for a number of left-leaning positions and tactical decisions,
including calling for diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, forming electoral
alliances with communists and encouraging Catholics to join Marxist-dominated unions.
The Falange responded with harsh criticism of bishop Salinas, including a call for the
Church to leave political matters to the discretion of lay Catholics so that the episcopacy
could focus on religious matters. Most of the Chilean episcopacy, including Archbishop
Caro, rallied around Salinas’ right to espouse his views. Falange leaders then asked the
episcopacy if they wished the party to dissolve, and after the intervention of progressive
bishops Larraín and Berrios (of San Felipe) and later Caro, no action was taken against
the party (Fleet and Smith 1997, 44-5). The following year, some conservative bishops
attempted to remove the Falange from the list of parties Chilean Catholics were permitted
to support because the party joined a coalition that called for the Communist Party to be
allowed to participate in elections. This effort by conservative bishops prompted
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intervention from the Vatican, which reiterated that Catholics were "free to support any
candidates who respected 'religion and the doctrine and rights of the Church'" (Fleet and
Smith 1997, 46).
While the relationship between the Falange and the episcopacy remained tenuous,
the Conservative-dominated congress of the early 1950s secured the only substantial
change to Church-state ties in Chile between 1925 and 1973, which concerned education.
By the early 1950s Catholic education in Chile was struggling financially. A
longstanding pattern of insufficient financial contributions from its members and rising
inflation contributed to the problem. Then dominated by the Conservative Party, the state
offered its assistance. Through legislation passed in 1951, 1952, 1957 and 1958, the state
began to substantially subsidize private education. In private schools that did not charge
fixed tuition, the state began subsidization on a per pupil basis equal to 50% of the cost of
educating each student in a public school. Private schools that did charge regular tuition
received subsidies according to a similar scheme, but at a rate of 25% (Smith 1982, 103,
fn 32).75
Unprecedented as it was, the Conservative Party's gesture did not forestall a shift
in the Church's informal partisan alliance shortly thereafter. Between 1958 and 1964, the
bulk of the episcopacy and Catholic voters abandoned the Conservatives in favor of the
PDC. Despite its strained relationship with the episcopacy during the 1940s when it was
still known as the National Falange, by the late 1950s the PDC had managed to retain its
programmatic interest in social Catholicism while the episcopacy grew more progressive.
As this took place, changes in the Chilean electorate substantially reconfigured Chilean
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politics. Discontent with Conservative economic policies under Alessandri and rising
inflation led to a dramatic decline in the Conservative Party's share of the electorate while
the PDC and leftwing coalition made up of the Communist and Socialist parties, Frente
de Acción Popular (FRAP), increased their vote shares in congressional and municipal
elections. Between 1957 and 1963, FRAP's share of the electorate increased from 10.7
percent to 23.5 percent. Over the same period, the PDC's share of the electorate increased
from 9.4 percent to 22 percent, becoming the largest single party in Chile (Stallings 1978,
80-90). Part of this shift was a dramatic migration from the Conservative Party to the
PDC among voters who were practicing Catholics (Smith 1982, 107-9) and the
emergence of Eduardo Frei as a visible party leader with mass appeal after his election to
the Senate in 1957 (Hunees 2003, 130-1).
The slow but steady operation of Chile's self-reinforcing mechanisms helped
generate a profound political opportunity at the beginning of the 1960s. Just as the
electoral viability of the PDC improved dramatically, the Chilean episcopacy began
issuing calls for structural reform and establishing related social programs, bringing the
two groups into political and programmatic alignment. In 1961, under the leadership of
Archbishop Silva Henríquez, the bishops announced that 13,200 acres of Church-owned
land would be divided and sold to families. The Church created the Institute for
Agricultural Development to coordinate this transfer and provide assistance to recipients
(Aguilar 2003, 717; Mecham 1966, 224). Then, in 1962 the bishops issued two highly
publicized pastoral letters calling for agrarian reform on behalf of peasants and industrial
reform on behalf of urban workers, respectively.76 These two pastoral letters denounced
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poverty and the maldistribution of wealth as an “anti-Christian reality,” arguing, “It is
essential to promote in every way possible the study of social problems in light of the
doctrine of the Church, because it forms an integral part of the Christian concept of life”
(quoted in Mecham 1966, 224).
The two pastoral letters never mention or endorse the PDC by name, but their
high degrees of policy specificity make the letters an overt and unmistakable political
statement with partisan implications. The bishops called for measures such as increasing
taxes on land to fund credit and training for peasants, the regulation of farm commodity
prices, emphasizing the production of consumer goods rather than luxury goods and
guarding against capital flight (Fleet and Smith 1997, 303-4, fn29-30). The letters
categorically denounced Marxism at length, an addition necessary to secure the support
of more conservative members of the episcopacy, such as Bishop Alfredo Silva Santiago
and Archbishop Alfredo Cifuentes of La Serena (Smith 1982, 111 fn 10).
Meanwhile, in the wake of the Cuban Revolution, Pope John XXIII called for a
substantial redirection of personnel and an increase in financial aid to Latin America
from elsewhere in the international Church. As the Chilean Church received its share of
this aid, the Church began establishing new or strengthening existing social programs that
targeted marginalized groups. Programs included education and training initiatives as
well as the creation of neighborhood and trade union organizations. Groups receiving
such assistance from the Church included peasants, slum residents and some trade unions
(Fleet and Smith 1997, 51; Smith 1982, 122-3).
During the 1964 presidential campaign, the congruence between the episcopacy
and the leadership of the PDC was made even clearer. The same experts who advised the
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bishops on their 1962 pastoral letters helped draft the PDC’s platform for the 1964
elections. It is not surprising, therefore, that though the pastoral letters preceded the
release of the PDC’s platform, they were remarkably similar in terms of “analysis, tone
and policy recommendations” (Fleet and Smith 1997, 51). Moreover, 7 of the 14 bishops
appointed between 1955 and 1964 had been educated during the 1930s and 1940s at the
same schools and universities that gave rise to the PDC and its early leadership.
Afterwards they served as chaplains of Catholic Action groups which were also closely
tied to PDC's origins (Smith 1982, 112).
When PDC candidate Eduardo Frei was elected president in 1964, his government
launched major reform programs expanding tax collection, agrarian reform, unionization,
and social services, including education, housing and healthcare initiatives. In effect,
many social development priorities of the Chilean bishops conference were realized
through the PDC's "Third way" and "Revolution in Liberty" public policy. Among these
were the PDC's large-scale literacy programs which specifically aimed to increase
literacy among Chilean peasants. Designed by Paulo Freire, the pedagogical approach of
these programs was heavily influenced by early stirrings of liberation theology, and
sought to raise political consciousness and a sense of empowerment among the adults it
enrolled. Literacy class "facilitators" led small groups of adults in discussion sessions
around topics and themes from peasants' day-to-day lives in a method meant to stress that
peasants were the subject rather than the object of history (Kirkendall 2004, 691-9). As
with the PDC's simultaneous unionization drives and agrarian reforms, these Catholic
social teaching-inspired programs were meant to vigorously pursue reforms and activate
expanded sources of political support for the PDC (Kirkendall 2004, 700-10).
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However, the pace of reform failed to slow mounting political polarization in
Chilean society. Reforms moved too quickly for those on the right, many of whom had
supported the PDC in 1964 to prevent a Communist Party victory. Reforms moved too
slowly for many on the left, some of whom had been supportive of the PDC’s clearly
reformist campaign rhetoric. These divides played out within the Chilean Church as well.
Conservative Church organizations such as Tradición, Familia y Propiedad (TFP) and
Opus Dei attracted the support of wealthy Catholics who believed the PDC and the
pronouncements of the Chilean episcopacy went too far. Many priests, sisters and lay
people living and working in impoverished areas called for a quicker pace of reform,
joining left-leaning intellectuals, peasant activists and some tendencies within organized
labor. Criticism from these groups increased in 1967, when declining economic
conditions resulted in cuts by the PDC government to social spending (Fleet and Smith
1997, 52-3).
Recognizing declining support for the PDC, and one year after the death of
progressive leader Bishop Larraín, in late 1967 the Chilean episcopacy began to step back
from overt alliance with the PDC and its reform program (which was, by then, already
being implemented) and to focus instead on addressing political polarization. Statements
from the episcopal conference ceased discussion of reforms like that of the 1962
pastorals, and instead began to emphasize social solidarity, dialogue, reconciliation and
cooperation (Smith 1982, 134). In an October 1969 pastoral issued after a public show of
force by the military related to salaries and social unrest, the bishops condemned the
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prospect of a military coup, warning that such a course would inevitably lead to violence
and injustice (Smith 1982, 135).77
The bishops also began to criticize the PDC for an overemphasis on technocratic
details rather than broader humanistic values, which bishops observed in policies
promoting economic growth at the expense of social assistance. During the tense 1970
presidential election, the episcopal conference did not denounce Socialist candidate
Salvador Allende, or any other candidate or party, by name. Public statements by the
episcopacy and Cardinal Silva explicitly stated that the Church favored no party or
candidate and forbade priests and deacons from becoming activists for any party or
ideology (Smith 1982, 135). However, episcopal statements during the election did warn
against ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’ extremes, which to some implied episcopal support for the
centrist PDC facing competition from the Conservative Party on the right and the Unidad
Popular (UP) on the left (Fleet and Smith 1997, 53). In a pattern resembling the decline
of the informal episcopacy-Conservative Party alliance, which came on the heels of the
restoration of state funding for Catholic education, by the end of the 1960s the Chilean
episcopacy was once again backing away from a partisan attachment. When the PDC's
prospects began to decline, its policies began to moderate and political tension continued
to mount, the episcopacy distanced itself from a party that pursued major reforms first
proposed in episcopal statements only a few years before.
Between 1925 and 1970, the Chilean episcopacy's political orientation and
strategies stood in stark contrast to those in Argentina. Chile's self-reinforcing
mechanisms of low levels of state control (and, thus, heightened Vatican influence),
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limited levels of state support for Church activities (and, thus, minimal dependence on
collaborative relationships with the state), and a relatively progressive episcopal
conference (that defined some Church interests in terms of broad structural reforms in
Chilean society) combined to motivate and facilitate the Chilean episcopacy's social
concerns and overt, partisan involvement in politics. A timeline of major developments in
Church-party alliances is presented in Figure 5.1. Influenced by Vatican appointments,
successful and shifting participation in partisan politics, and intensive, independent
implementation of its own social development programs, the Chilean episcopacy was an
autonomous political actor that valued democracy and relied on it to pursue its interests.
As the deepening conflict of the Allende period loomed, the Chilean episcopacy was an
active and independent voice that spoke frequently about social problems and injustice.
Brazil
During the 28-year period between the 1937 foundation of Getúlio Vargas' Estado
Novo and the 1964 military coup, the Brazilian Church was less bound to the state than
the Argentine Church, but more closely tied to the state than the Chilean Church.
Through the leadership and influence of Dom Sebastião Leme, archbishop of Rio de
Janeiro and close personal friend of Vargas, the new constitutions of 1934 and 1937
secured the renewal of several privileges lost by the Church in the 1891 disestablishment.
The result was a critical juncture in Brazilian Church-state relations.
The long term impact of this critical juncture was sustained by three selfreinforcing mechanisms of reproduction: low levels of state control over the Church's
internal affairs, high levels of state support for Church activities, and the sustained
influence of a progressive sector within the episcopacy. After 1937, the internal affairs of
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the Church, such as the appointment of bishops or administrative personnel and the
restructuring of dioceses and social work programs, remained under the control of the
episcopacy and the Vatican, not the state. During the same time, significant levels of
state financial support for the Church were restored, religious education was once again
permitted during school hours, state subsidies for Catholic schools were restored,
members of religious orders regained the right to vote, religious marriage was once again
recognized by the state, and divorce was prohibited. The state's lack of control over the
Church's internal affairs facilitated significant Vatican influence over the development of
the Brazilian episcopacy during the period of reform in the international Church.
Meanwhile, state financing of Church social work encouraged the development of
substantial Church programs that reached deeply into popular and marginalized sectors.
In combination, these institutional relationships fostered the emergence of a vocal and
well-organized progressive sector in the Brazilian episcopacy beginning in the early
1950s.
The self-reinforcing nature of these relationships centers on the specific
configuration of the intermediate level of Church-state ties. Church privileges came to be
sustained as part of a so-called "moral concordat" through which "Church and state
established an informal pact of cooperation" (Serbin 2000, 25). Under this pact, state
financing effectively allowed the Church to become the social arm of the state (Serbin
1995). As Bruneau observes, the significance of this arrangement "was that religious
influence was guaranteed through political power" (1982, 19). State funding was
maintained, at times, through the cultivation of personal relationships and private
lobbying at elite levels, while gradually deepening the Church's financial dependence on
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the state (Serbin 2000, 25). Consequently, by 1964 the Church had spent three decades in
pursuit of both congenial relationships with successive governments and closer
engagement with popular and marginalized sectors of society. When human rights abuses
worsened in the late 1960s and socially progressive activists, organizations and parties
became targets of state repression, the most advantageous position for the institutional
Church to take with respect to the state was a less clear-cut choice in Brazil than it had
been in Argentina and Chile.
Between Autonomy and Dependence
After 1934, the Brazilian constitution allowed financial assistance from the state
to be directed to the Church in the pursuit of their "collective interest" (quoted in Bruneau
1982, 19). The paramount interest shared by the Brazilian state and the Church was the
creation and implementation of strategies to prevent the spread of communism
(Mainwairing 1986, 33, 41; Serbin 1992, 24). In doing so, both institutions attempted to
extend their reach into areas where they lacked a strong presence, such as the Amazon,
the Northeast and urban locales with dense immigrant populations (Serbin 1992, 13, 22).
A key means through which the state pursued this goal was bankrolling aid administered
through private charities. Between 1931 and 1942, the total amount of state subsidies to
private charitable organizations increased from 1,000 to 21,000 contos (Serbin 1992, 8).
Meanwhile, the number of institutions receiving such aid increased from 458 in 1930 to
1,731 in 1943 (Serbin 1992, 6).78 The Church, which was the most expansive and wellorganized private institution interested in charitable aid, quickly became the largest
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recipient of these monies (Serbin 1992, 8, 29 fn 1). Beyond this basis for collaboration,
defining the contours of this Church-state collective interest was a task left to elite-level
interaction between Church leaders and high-ranking government officials. The
expansion of subsidization for Church activity continued from 1934 through the mid1960s despite significant changes in the electorate, the ideological disposition of
successive governments and regime type. The specifics of Church-state cooperation
evolved between 1934 and 1964, but generally joint action involved attempts by the
Church to accommodate itself to the state whenever possible (Mainwaring 1986, 40).
In 1931, during Vargas' provisional government, state subsidization of charitable
works was centralized in an executive body known as the Caixa de Subvenções (Subsidy
Fund). The purpose of the Caixa was to rationalize the distribution of subsidies to
charitable organizations, in part by wresting this power from the National Congress
(Serbin 1992, 6). The decree creating the Caixa explicitly recognized the moral duty of
the state to provide such assistance, though subsidization of the Church was not yet
constitutional. After 1932, the Caixa was placed under the authority of the Ministry of
Education and Health (MEH), which granted effective control over subsidization requests
to then Minister Francisco Campos and his successor Gustavo Capanema, both of whom
were advocates of closer Church-state collaboration generally (Serbin 1992, 7).79 With
the promulgation of the 1934 constitution, the Caixa was the first body to oversee the
expansion of subsidies to Catholic social works. From its earliest period, subsidization
was heavily directed to Church asylums, schools, hospitals, charity health centers,
orphanages, men's and women's groups, and seminaries (Serbin 1992, 8).
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Then, in 1937, Vargas consolidated and expanded executive power, promulgating
a new constitution with the support of the military, ruling through emergency powers and
decree, and suspending the National Congress. These measures culminated in the creation
of the Estado Novo.80 Through the use of decree powers, in 1938 Vargas replaced the
Caixa with the Conselho Nacional de Serviço Social (National Social Service Council,
CNSS). The CNSS further centralized executive authority in the dispersal of subsidies
because the main responsibility of the CNSS was to collect and investigate subsidy
requests and then make recommendations to Vargas himself before he granted final
approval (Serbin 1992, 9).
In addition to assessing subsidy requests, the CNSS was also responsible for
conducting studies determining the needs of the poor, determining the eligibility of
organizations requesting funding, and organizing social services more generally (Serbin
1992, 9). Through the duration of the Vargas government, Capanema remained Minister
of MEH and retained a key vote in all matters decided by the CNSS. In addition to his
support for Church-state cooperation, Capanema relied on Archbishop Alceu Amoroso
Lima as a close advisor. Together with Vargas, Capanema and Lima selected several
additional members of the CNSS who were supportive of Catholic social works (Serbin
1992, 11).
Under the auspices of the CNSS, the state expanded subsidization to a wide
variety of different Catholic social programs. Funding continued to go to Catholic
schools, hospitals, asylums, orphanages and St. Vincent de Paul Societies, which were
groups of local Catholic laity that created and managed various charitable organizations
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serving the poor. Subsidization was also directed to Catholic organizations, including
Catholic workers' circles (forerunners to class-conciliatory Catholic unions), youth and
student organizations, fraternities and women's groups. Subsidies were also directed to
Catholic evangelization activities, such as missions established in the Amazon and
celebrations held by parishes and dioceses. Finally, many subsidies assisted the Church
with its own organizational development, including funding for seminaries (Serbin 1992,
8, 21-6). Under the CNSS, the Church remained the primary organizational recipient of
social service-oriented state subsidies during the first Vargas government and among the
largest thereafter (Serbin 1992, 8, 29 fn 1).
Vargas' regime fell in 1945 and a gradual re-democratization of Brazilian politics
followed. This included the re-opening of the National Congress and a new constitution
in 1946, which once again permitted state support for the Church. Despite Capanema's
departure as head of the MEH, the centralized system for distributing subsidies to aid
organizations as well as significant subsidization of Catholic institutions continued during
the Dutra government (1946-1950).81
Mainwaring characterizes the period between 1945 and 1964 as one in which
democratic governments continued to attempt to trade "favors" for support but that the
relationship was less "favorable" and "stable" than under Vargas (Mainwaring 1986, 39).
In 1951, congressional legislation revoked the discretion over subsidies exercised by the
CNSS, returning this power to the National Congress (Serbin 1992, 17-8). Subsequently,
the Church faced more competition for public monies. Despite this, the Church continued
to win major funding for a variety of high-profile projects. Large grants and subsidies for
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Catholic universities, seminaries and various diocesan festivals were approved during the
1950s and 60s. In 1954, Congress allocated 5 million cruzeiros for the construction of the
national basilica (Serbin 1996, 15). In the same year, Congress created the National Fund
for Secondary Education, increasing scholarships and financial aid to Brazil's secondary
schools including Catholic schools (Serbin 1992, 19-21). Finally, the state collaborated
closely with the Church in the planning and execution of the 1955 International
Eucharistic Conference (IEC) held in Rio de Janiero. The conference attracted 1.5 million
participants and was of enormous benefit to the promotion of tourism in Brazil. In
preparation for the IEC, substantial assistance in terms of planning, financing and
infrastructure improvements were provided by Presidents Vargas (during his elected
return to power from 1951 to 1954) and Kubitschek. Government financing alone
constituted 29 percent of the conference's budget (Serbin 1996, 24, 28). Thus, some
sectors of the Church may have benefited from the return of discretion over subsidy
dispersal to the congress by allying with a broader set of social forces that shared the
Church's interests.
Additional subsidization of Church activity remained extremely strong through
the administrations of Dutra, Vargas's return to the presidency, Kubitschek, Quadros and
Goulart (Serbin 1996, 13). However, this financial relationship took the form of
clientelism between various tendencies, regions and ecclesiastical units of the Church and
various parties and political figures in congress. Serbin presents private correspondence
among party leaders who affirm the electoral value of awarding funding to Catholicaffiliated projects in parishes or dioceses where specific Church figures were influential
among voters. Meanwhile, personal correspondence between representatives of Church-
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affiliated organizations and political figures requesting funds reach the highest-ranking
Brazilian political figures of the time, including Quadros, during his presidency, and
Goulart, while leader of the PTB (1992, 19-20).82
During this period, it should be noted that Brazil had its own Christian
Democracy Party (PDC). However, unlike its counterpart in Chile, the Brazilian PDC
was not an important ally or voice for the Brazilian Church or the episcopacy. This is
likely due to the confluence of a number of different factors that minimized its political
importance. Brazil's party system during the period between 1945 and 1964 remained
notoriously weak (Mainwaring 1995), with numerous parties of varying size that
experienced substantial intra-party divisions and ineffectual programmatic trans-party
alliances (Johnson 2001, 88-101). As a result, three parties dominated Brazilian politics
(PTB, PSD, and the UDN) and meaningful alliances with the PDC ebbed and flowed with
the electoral fortunes of the PDC (Johnson 2001, 39). As a result, the Brazilian PDC was
of minimal political importance because it rarely achieved much electoral success, never
gaining more than 5 percent representation in the Federal Chamber of Deputies during
the early 1960s (de Kadt 1970, 43). According to de Kadt, even more important to
understanding the PDC's unimportant role was its total lack of ideological cohesion.
While the party was nominally united across regions, the PDC's leadership and
membership ranged from hardline conservatives in Rio Grande do Sul to leftwing
radicals in São Paulo to emphasis on moralizing in Rio de Janeiro (1970, 43-4).
In the 1950s, Brazil's self-reinforcing mechanisms converged, activating a
progressive sector within the Church. During this decade, an early core group of
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reformist clergy and bishops emerged in the most underdeveloped locales, particularly
Brazil's impoverished Northeast (Mainwaring 1986, 41). This political awakening
coincided with the politicization of peasant and worker grievances in Brazil (Collier and
Collier 1991, 380-3, 386-9) and new currents of reform circulating in the international
Church (Cleary 1985, 12-29).83 Mainwaring convincingly argues that the confluence of
these factors helped trigger the political awakening of those segments of the Brazilian
Church most closely tied to recently politicized sectors (Mainwaring 1986, 41, 45).
However, two additional factors must be emphasized to fully account for the
activation of the progressive sector of the Brazilian Church. First, as described above,
state funding for many Church activities made it possible for the Church to extend its
reach over the preceding decades and engage in a sustained way with these sectors in the
first place. Since 1934, state funding for Church activity generated important
collaborative ties between Church and state, but by the early 1950s state funding was
supporting a very large and growing network of Catholic social institutions. Through this
state-funded network, clergy at all levels came into close contact with workers, peasants,
students and residents of urban slums. Second, the lack of state control over the
appointment of bishops and the creation of new dioceses made it possible for the Vatican
to exert far more influence over the Brazilian episcopacy than was possible in a case like
Argentina. As a consequence of these factors, a small core of reformist clergy and
bishops grew into a prominent faction within the Church by the late 1950s. Catholic
reformists were interested in social justice, political involvement and anti-communism
via the promotion of social and economic development.
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This incipient progressive tendency in the Brazilian Church received support and
encouragement from the Vatican. This occurred through two forms of intervention from
Rome, the approval and promotion of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops
(CNBB) and the appointment of new moderate and progressive bishops between 1954
and 1964.
Dom Helder Camara first proposed the creation of the CNBB to the Brazilian
Papal Nunico in 1950. At the time, the Brazilian Church had over 110 ecclesiastical units
and no clear leader since the death of Archbishop Leme in 1942. The conference was to
be a permanent organizational structure that facilitated communication between bishops
about how to overcome common administrative problems. Though its charge appears
mundane on the surface, when it was approved by the Vatican in 1952 the CNBB was the
first organization of its kind in the entire international Church (Della Cava 1976, 32). Due
to the organization's focus on diocesan development, early participation in the
organization was dominated by peripheral dioceses, especially those from the Northeast.
Because the Northeast was one of the areas where the progressive tendency was taking
root, in its early years the CNBB consisted of several progressive bishops. In this sense,
the CNBB's participating membership made it a reformist organization within the
Brazilian episcopacy that helped coordinate and unite this tendency alone.
Unsurprisingly, this group elected progressive bishop Helder Camara as its first general
secretary.84 In support of the CNBB, the Vatican dispatched a new papal nuncio, Dom
Armando Lombardi, in 1954. Lombardi played an active role legitimating the body's
authority to speak on behalf of the Church in Brazil and making Bishop Camara the de
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facto successor to Cardinal Leme (Della Cava 1976, 33, see also Mainwaring 1986, 48;
Bruneau 1982, 53). Due to this support from the Vatican and the organization's novelty in
the international Church, during the early years of the CNBB, conservative bishops were
outmaneuvered by statements that remained strongly reformist in content and claimed to
speak on behalf of the entire Brazilian episcopacy (Bruneau 1982, 51-2).
Della Cava indicates the significance of the Vatican's role in reshaping the future
of the Brazilian Church, noting that, "in no country of Latin America had the Vatican
chosen, until then, to play such a direct role in the internal affairs of a 'national' Church"
(1976, 32-3). Over the next decade, the result of the Vatican's intervention would
become even clearer. Through the CNBB, progressives in the episcopacy gained
influence because the organization "served as an entity which on the one hand established
new links with Rome and its more progressive teachings on social matters, and on the
other hand joined progressive elements in the government" (Bruneau 1973, 40).
In addition to his role legitimating the authority of the progressive CNBB, Papal
Nuncio Lombardi also played an active role in the expansion of Brazil's organizational
structure and the appointment of dozens of bishops. Lombardi's influence spanned a
decade from his appointment in 1954 to his death in 1964. During that time Lombardi
oversaw a wave of reform. Between 1950 and 1964, the number of ecclesiastical
jurisdictions in the Brazilian Church was increased from 116 to 178. As papal nuncio for
most of that period, Lombardi was directly involved in the creation of 38 new bishoprics,
11 new archbishoprics, and 16 prelatures (Della Cava 1976, 37). This expansion,
combined with his ten-year tenure allowed Lombardi to play an influential role in
shaping the ideological direction of the Brazilian episcopacy. According to Bruneau,
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Lombardi was directly involved in the nomination of 109 candidates for bishop and 24
candidates for archbishop, many of whom were progressives (1974, 117). Della Cava is
more cautious in his assessment of the ideological bent of Lombardi's appointments, but
he concedes that Lombardi's appointments were at least part of a concerted campaign to
marginalize Brazil's conservative tendency (1976, 38).
.

In addition to Vatican influence, pre-existing Church-state collaboration also

helped facilitate the rise to prominence of the progressive tendency within the Brazilian
episcopacy. A series of reformist, populist governments (from 1950-1964) advanced the
interests of reformist bishops and clergy through the pursuit of collaborative social
welfare programs, focused on development rather than charity. Two programs exemplify
this Church-state collaboration. The first was the Superintendência do Desenvolvimento
do Nordeste (Superintendecy for the Development of the Northeast, SUDENE).
SUDENE, a new federal administrative agency created to guide and encourage economic
development in the Northeast, was designed in part by the Church-organized Natal
Conference in 1959. The proposal sought greater government involvement and
coordination in regional development efforts. After successful lobbying efforts led by
segments of the Church, the Kubitscheck administration created the agency (de Kadt
1970, 74-5; Pang 1974, 365; Mainwaring 1986, 58; Bruneau 1973, 41).
A second example of collaboration between reformist governments and reformists
in the Church was the Church's Movement for Grass-roots Education (MEB), which was
funded by the state through an agreement reached with President Quadros in 1961. State
funding was planned to run from 1961 until at least 1965, and in its first year alone, the
Quadros government promised the MEB a total of 400 million cruzeiros for the creation
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of 15,000 radio schools (de Kadt 1970, 124). MEB developed popular education
strategies in the country's most underdeveloped regions, the Northeast and the Amazon.
The program was staffed by members of Brazilian Catholic Action, many of whom
viewed the work as a form of political activity (de Kadt 1970, 138-43). Sessions were
conducted mostly via radio schools. However, as in Chilean literacy programs under the
PDC, the programs were heavily influenced by Paulo Freire and emphasized "that people
must be the agent of their own history" rather than relying on other forces to produce
social change (Mainwaring 1986, 67; Mainwaring 1984, 100-1). In 1962 MEB publicly
declared its support for radical social transformation and began to describe popular
education as a mechanism for bringing about that change. Between 1962 and the 1964
coup, the MEB became a high-profile organization within the Catholic left, influencing
other Catholic left movements like the Catholic University Youth (JUC) (Mainwaring
1986, 58, 66-75). In return for these and other collaborative efforts, between 1956 and
1963, the CNBB supported reformist governments on most social issues (Mainwaring
1986, 58).85
By the late 1950s and early 1960s several progressive voices within the
episcopacy began publically calling for reforms extending beyond existing state
commitments, a strategy distinct from decades of collaboration with the state on social
works. The earliest such calls pertained to agrarian reform and took shape in the early
1950s, though these were limited to a handful of reformist bishops in the Northeast
(Mainwaring 1986, 54). However, calls for serious reform to unjust social structures in
the countryside and cities became the subject of several CNBB statements issued between
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1958 and 1963 (de Kadt 1970, 72-7). Even as the reformist tendency within the
episcopacy gained strength, relations between the episcopacy and reformist governments
were generally cordial until the months immediately preceding the 1964 coup
(Mainwaring 1986, 56-8).
By the mid-1960s, the Brazilian episcopacy was pushed in a reformist direction
by the influence of its papal nuncio, long-term state funding, and collaboration with
recent reformist and populist governments. The result was a strong faction of bishops
who adopted a social justice-oriented political theology but had little incentive to begin
pursuing their priorities via partisan politics. During the turmoil of 1964, these forces
would divide and begin pulling the episcopacy in two directions. Ascendant reformist
political theology would continue to demand political involvement and public calls for
justice, democracy and equitable distribution of resources. State financing of Church
activity, now controlled by a bureaucratized military regime, would discourage criticism
of the state.
Mechanisms of Reproduction in Authoritarian Cases
Between roughly the 1930s and the 1970s, different configurations of Churchstate ties in Argentina, Chile and Brazil operated as self-reinforcing mechanisms of
reproduction that sustained distinct, identifiable trajectories in Church-state relations.
State controls over the Church, state support for Church activities, and the relative
influence of conservative and progressive tendencies within each episcopacy sustained a
stable set of core attributes in Church-state relations.
State controls over the Church
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In Argentina, Church and state remained bound together through a dense network
of formal ties. The state controlled extremely important internal affairs of the Church
such as the creation of new dioceses and the appointment of bishops. Consequently, the
Argentine episcopacy was assembled according to a system that granted the state
considerable leverage. Moreover, as Argentine bishops attempted to plan for the future of
the Argentine Church, anticipating the state's actions was at least as important, if not
more so, than any direct influence of the Vatican, clergy, or the laity. Nonetheless, the
Argentine Church's association with Argentine nationalism, which was buttressed by
these formal Church-state ties, gave the episcopacy considerable leverage in defending its
privileges when they were threatened. As a result, even the most serious such threat,
made by Perón between 1954 and 1955, was ultimately unsuccessful. In sharp contrast,
Church and state in Chile and Brazil were both thoroughly separate from the state in
terms of formal state authority over internal Church affairs. In both Chile and Brazil, the
Vatican had a free hand to direct the ideological makeup of the episcopacy. During the
era of Church reform during the 1950s and the 1960s, the Vatican approved the
appointment of progressive or moderate (but far fewer conservative) bishops in these two
episcopal conferences. For decades, the bishops who defined and prioritized the Church's
interests in these three countries were chosen according to different criteria and, once
selected, influenced by the anticipation of a different set of political and institutional
circumstances.
State support for Church activities
In Argentina and Brazil, the state was a major financer of Church activities, which
was legal under the Brazilian constitution and mandated by the Argentine Constitution.
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Thus the Church was financially dependent on the state in both cases. This relationship
discouraged bishops' public criticism of the state. However, the priorities of these two
episcopacies differed, and, to a lesser extent, so too did the ideologies of the regimes
providing them. As a result, the types of Church activity funded by the state were
different. In Argentina, state funds paid some clerical salaries and helped establish new
dioceses. In Brazil, in addition to subsidization of some Church infrastructure projects,
state funds supported the extension of programs associated with the Church's increasingly
reformist social mission. Often these programs served popular sectors, including the
creation of popular education programs, rural development offices and Catholic unions.
In this way, state subsidization facilitated the Brazilian Church's deepening ties with
marginalized sectors of society as they became increasingly politically active after the
1930s. In contrast, in Chile there was no significant state financing of Church activities
until the 1950s. After the 1950s, state subsidization increased substantially, but only in
the area of private Catholic education. Consequently, the Chilean episcopacy was less
dependent on state support than was the case in Brazil and Argentina. Despite the lack of
state subsidization in other areas, the Chilean episcopacy pursued programs comparable
to those of the Brazilian Church, including the redistribution of Church-owned land and
promotion of broader agrarian reform and popular education programs.
Episcopal ideological tendencies
All three Churches were composed of conservative, moderate and progressive
tendencies. Moreover, in all three cases the moderate tendency was the largest. However,
Vatican appointments and intervention marginalized conservatives and strengthened the
influence of progressives in Chile and Brazil, especially during the 1950s and early
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1960s. This heightened influence was evident in the social programs and episcopal
statements issued by both episcopal conferences. These public activities focused on major
social and economic programs and reforms directed at the poor. In contrast, Argentina's
episcopacy developed a stronger conservative tendency that effectively marginalized
progressive bishops. Conservative bishops worked to defend and promote Church
interests defined in terms of nationalism, which was tied to the Church's privileged status
and state-provided support, and calls for national unity in the face of crises. This set of
interests, the Church's constitutional position with respect to the state, and the strategies
they induced overrode any effort to prioritize serious political activity targeting the
specific problems of more narrowly defined groups (such as non-unionized workers,
peasants, and residents of urban slums) excluded from political influence. These
mechanisms are summarized in Figure 5.2.
Stability of core attributes
The result of decades of these mechanisms of reproduction in operation was a
stability of core attributes in the Church-state relations of each case. In Argentina, high
levels of state control over Church affairs, high levels of state support for Church activity
and a powerful conservative tendency in the episcopal conference reinforced a preconciliar political theology. This political theology defined the Church's chief political
interests in terms of the maintenance of special status and privileges guaranteed by the
state. To protect and advance these interests, the Argentine episcopacy cultivated a close
association with Argentine nationalism and continually sought close and congenial
relationships with successive governments, regardless of regime type, ideology,
constituency or program. Though this discouraged the Argentine episcopacy from
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advocating on behalf of specific groups, this position proved remarkably resilient in
defending Church privileges from attack in the final years prior to Perón’s overthrow.

Figure 5.2: Mechanisms of Reproduction
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192

In Brazil, low levels of state control over Church affairs, high levels of state support for
Church activity and, eventually, a powerful progressive tendency in the episcopal
conference reinforced the Brazilian Church's social mission while retaining a large
measure of dependence on the state. The result was an episcopacy that, encouraged by the
Vatican, came to define its interests with greater attention to alleviating social problems
affecting particular groups of its adherents than was the case in Argentina. To pursue
those interests the Brazilian episcopacy took advantage of available state support and
tended to protect and expand this support via lobbying and private negotiation rather than
partisan alliances or public confrontation. In Chile, low levels of state control over
Church affairs, moderate levels of state support for Church activity and, eventually, a
powerful progressive tendency in the episcopal conference reinforced the Chilean
Church's social mission and autonomy from the state. Without the realistic possibility of
a return to sweeping state support for the Church, the episcopacy worked to achieve its
goals via participation in partisan politics. By the early 1960s, the Chilean episcopacy
was an outspoken proponent of social reforms intended to benefit the poor and an
outspoken supporter of the Christian Democratic Party.
Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, these Church-state trajectories
collided with profound social, economic and political crises. These crises provoked
military coups and subsequent waves of repression. Each episcopacy reacted differently
to these events based on pre-existing core attributes of each Church-state trajectory and
the mechanisms of reproduction that continued to operate during this period. The
dynamics of this interaction are the subject of chapter six.
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Chapter 6: Catholic Bishops' Responses to Human Rights Abuses
in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil
As democracies grew unstable through much of Latin America in the late 1960s
and 1970s, a diverse array of voices within the Catholic Church responded with
expressions of concern about the dangers of civil unrest, political polarization and the
influence of communism. But when the armed forces seized power aiming to eradicate
the basis of these concerns by means of violent repression and the closure of democratic
institutions, Catholic bishops' conferences varied considerably in their responses. This
chapter argues that these responses were consistent with long-established modes of
interaction with the state that ignited or suppressed public confrontation with the state
when the Church came under attack.
In 1964, the Brazilian military deposed the democratically elected, left-leaning
Goulart government in the midst of growing economic constraints, and rising social and
political turmoil. This event marked the beginning of a new wave of authoritarian
government that, in the wake of the Cuban Revolution and unrest of the 1960s, would
consume much of the region in the two decades that followed. In 1966, the Argentine
military staged a coup, inaugurating a military government that would last until 1972.
After a brief return to democracy, the Argentine military seized control of the state again
in 1976, deposing the government of Isabel Perón during a period of economic crisis and
political polarization. In 1973, the Chilean military seized control of the state, three

194

tumultuous years into the democratically elected government of socialist Salvador
Allende.86
In all three countries, the Catholic episcopacy reacted to coups with cautious
relief given the difficult circumstances that contributed to the breakdown of democracy.
However, as it became clear that the new military governments' intention was to retain
power in each country indefinitely and waves of state-sanctioned human rights abuse
peaked, each episcopacy responded differently. In Argentina, a vibrant progressive sector
of clergy existed at the Church's grassroots. Military repression targeted some segments
of the Church, including a small group of bishops who denounced the violence of the new
regime. Despite this, all collective statements issued by the Argentine episcopacy
mention political repression but cast no blame on the military or the state for causing it or
carrying it out. Meanwhile, a small group of high-profile bishops publicly defended the
regime and its actions. Like Argentina, the Chilean Church also included an active
progressive sector of the clergy that was a target of government repression. However, in
stark contrast to Argentina, within two years of the 1973 coup, collective statements of
Chilean bishops began to unequivocally denounce the state for its human rights abuses.
Meanwhile, the highest profile bishop in the episcopacy founded a Church organization
that documented reports and evidence of human rights abuse across the country and
helped organize an international human rights conference. In the large Brazilian Church,
yet another vocal sector of progressive clergy and bishops existed and were subject to
state repression. However, in Brazil the episcopacy at large remained publicly silent
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during the early years of the military government, even as small groups of bishops spoke
out about the repression and many more expressed concerns in private. As repression
escalated the episcopacy initiated a 4-year series of secret negotiations with the military
to curb rights abuses. Achieving little, these negotiations were followed by public and
unambiguous denunciations of the military regime and its human rights abuses.
Straight-forward responses to long-term constant causes or short-term proximate
causes proposed elsewhere in the literature, such as alternative configurations of
grassroots-hierarchy relationships and varying patterns of repression, played a role in the
response of each episcopal conference. However, these divergent reactions and the
immediate circumstances that surrounded them were largely extensions of the broader
historical trajectory of Church-state interaction in each country. These trajectories were
established during critical junctures earlier in the century (chapter 4) and sustained by
mechanisms of reproduction at work in the intervening decades (chapter 5).
In Argentina, a long history of close Church-state ties and close Church-military
ties produced an episcopacy that, in general, stood to gain by cooperating with a longtime socio-political ally, the Argentine military. As a less active participant in partisan
politics and civil society, the Argentine episcopacy also stood to gain relatively little from
a quick return to democracy. In Chile, a long history of Church-state separation helped
form an episcopacy accustomed to participating in a democratic polity, including partisan
politics and civil society. In addition, this separation allowed the Vatican a freer hand in
the selection of Chile's bishops during the era of reform in the international Church.
Without longstanding ties to the military, the Chilean episcopacy at large was willing to
tolerate a military coup aimed at the restoration of order, but stood only to lose influence
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by quietly enduring a long-term military government. In Brazil, the Church possessed
longstanding organizational autonomy vis-à-vis the state, but received significant
financial support from the state to help offset costs associated with its social work. While
the Brazilian episcopacy stood to gain little additional assistance from a long-term
military government, it did run the risk of losing a great deal by denouncing the military.
In addition, like the Chilean episcopacy, an increasingly reform-minded Vatican
appointed bishops during the 1950s and 1960s with minimal state interference. These
factors produced an episcopacy divided in terms of ideology, but especially political
strategy. Aversion to public confrontation and efforts at private influence are consistent
with long-standing patterns of Church-state interaction at the episcopal level in Brazil.
Many bishops had to be convinced this established pattern was no longer in the Church's
interest prior to securing broad support for prophetic denunciations of the military
regime. The remainder of this chapter examines these three cases, focusing on the
presence of ideological diversity at the grassroots in all three cases, the extent of postcoup repression directed at the Church, and the evolution of the episcopal response to that
repression.
Argentina
Juan Perón returned to the presidency in Argentina in 1973 in the midst of
growing economic, social and political turmoil. Successive crises mounted in the years
that followed. When the military seized power in 1976, the Church reacted in a manner
consistent with patterns of behavior well established since the 1930s. The conservative
nationalist tendency within the episcopacy lent support to the regime, the regime
strengthened Church-state ties and, with the exception of 5 bishops, the episcopacy at
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large withheld any serious criticism of the state even as Catholic priests and bishops fell
victim to repression.
Ideological Diversity in the Argentine Church
In any national context, to discuss “the Church” as though it were a single
monolithic entity would be a gross oversimplification. The Argentine Church is no
exception. From the end of Perón's first period in government in 1955 to the military
coup in 1976, the Church became increasing politically polarized (Richard 1987, 102).
Despite a clearly conservative "center of gravity” among the Catholic episcopacy,
progressive and left-leaning factions within the Argentine Church did exist. Bishops,
clergy and Catholic laity worked to call attention to unjust social conditions throughout
the second half of the 20th century and to denounce rights abuse during the Dirty War.
However, this segment of the Church (1) never rose to a position capable of dominating
the Argentine Church, (2) began to break apart in the years immediately prior to the 1976
coup, and (3) were targets of repression during the Dirty War.
The growth of a small progressive sector was inspired by the international
Church's opening in the wake of Vatican II (1962-1965), and especially CELAM's
Medellín Conference (1968). At the level of clergy, the "worker-priest" movement
arrived in Argentina in 1960. Participating priests took factory jobs alongside factory
workers, often became radicalized by the experience, and began participating more
actively in leftwing politics (Dodson 1979, 54). A handful of Argentine bishops
supported this work, but in general the episcopacy worked to minimize the influence of
activist clergy. Progressive priests whose political activity was deemed to have gone too
far faced suspension or transfer to remote parishes. Foreign priests faced possible
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deportation, a strategy requiring episcopal collusion with the state. At least one bishop,
Jerónimo José Podestá, was removed from his diocese in 1967 following his own public
support for social activism and worker organization (Dodson 1979, 55-6).
Despite this, The Movement of Priests for the Third World (MSTM) was founded
in Córdoba in 1968. The movement brought progressive priests together in association
with strikes, student demonstrations, peasant mobilizations, and neighborhood
organizations (Dodson 1979, 58; See also Burdick 1995). At its height, this organization
counted approximately 500 priests among its ranks (about 9% of the Argentine clergy)
(Klaiber 1998, 72-3). The movement criticized the Onganía government and its unjust
policies, and allied closely with the Peronist movement. However, the MSTM eventually
splintered and declined after 1974 (Dodson 1979, 61-2; Klaiber 1998, 73).
Repression Targeting the Church
As discussed in chapter 3, after the military seized power in 1976 it unleashed a
wave of repression, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths and disappearances, political
prisoners and instances of torture. During this period, thousands of victims and their
families made appeals to Catholic clergy, especially the episcopacy, to intervene on their
behalf (Anderson 1993, 191; Klaiber 1998, 80).
The small progressive sector of the Argentine Church fell victim to repression
during the post-1976 period. Enrique Angelelli, Bishop of La Rioja, was known for
having given public support to peasant cooperatives in his diocese in the late 1960s.
When two priests were kidnapped and killed in June 1976, Bishop Angelelli submitted a
report to the papal nuncio, who spoke to General Videla about the incident. Subsequently,
Angelelli visited the workplace of the two priests, collecting documents with information
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about the likely assassins. On his return trip, Angelelli was murdered in a staged car
accident and the documents were stolen (Anderson 1993, 188-91). Bishop Carlos Ponce
de Leon, bishop of San Nicolas, spoke at Angelelli’s funeral, describing his death as a
violation of human rights. Bishop Ponce de Leon was killed in similar circumstances later
that year. Three other bishops publicly denounced rights abuses during the period
between 1976 and 1983 as well. They included Jaime de Nevares, bishop of Neuquen;
Jorge Novak, bishop of Quilmes; and bishop Miguel Heseyne (Klaiber 1998, 82-3).
Progressive priests and laypeople were targets of repression in the years leading
up to the military coup and throughout the Dirty War. In May of 1974, Carlos Mugica,
who Klaiber identifies as the main spokesperson for the MSTM, was assassinated by a
death squad outside his parish church. Other members of the MSTM were killed or
forced into exile during 1976-1977 (1998, 73).
In sum, according to information compiled by Mignone (1986, 130-3), between
1974 and 1980, two bishops, Angelelli and Ponce de Leon, were killed under mysterious
circumstances; at least 16 priests and 6 seminarians were murdered or disappeared; and at
least 62 priests and 5 seminarians were arbitrarily detained (many of whom were also
tortured and later forced into exile).
The Argentine Episcopacy's Response to the Coup and Human Rights Abuses
In response to these abuses, most members of the Argentine episcopacy remained
silent. Meanwhile, several high-profile bishops publicly denied human rights abuses were
taking place. In October 1976, six months after the military coup, Archbishop Tortolo,
elected president of the episcopal conference, said to the press, “I have no knowledge, I
have no reliable proof, of human rights being violated in this country” (Mignone 1986,
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4). Other members of the episcopacy followed suit. As late as 1982, Cardinal Aramburu
of the Archdiocese of Buenos Aires told the press there were no disappearances in
Argentina. In 1983, Bishop Quarracino suggested those who had been disappeared had
simply left the country (Klaiber 1998, 80-1).
In other instances, prelates publicly defended or attempted to justify the military’s
seizure of power and violent campaign against ‘subversion.’ Archbishop Tortolo attended
a meeting with military leaders on the night before the coup. The next day, the
Archbishop attended a second meeting with the military as the coup was underway. He
emerged from the meeting urging the people of Argentina to “cooperate in a positive
way’” (Mignone 1986, 2). Six months later, Bishop Victorio Bonamin, vicar of the
military, explained in a speech given at a conference at the Universidad Nacional del
Litoral, “The antiguerrilla struggle is a struggle for the Argentine Republic, for its
integrity, but for its altars as well…This struggle is a struggle to defend morality, human
dignity, and ultimately a struggle to defend God…Therefore, I pray for divine protection
over this ‘dirty war’ in which we are engaged” (Mignone 1986, 6).
Collectively, the Argentine bishops issued four letters to the military government
pertaining to human rights during the period between 1976 and 1978, the height of the
repression.87 These letters used language that excused or justified the regime's repression.
Typical of this tendency is one letter from 1977, which states, "We are aware of the threat
to national life that subversion has meant and continues to mean. We understand that
those who are responsible for the welfare of the country have found it necessary to take
extraordinary measures" (quoted in Torres 1992, 165). Each document was couched in
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201

terms that avoided accusing the regime of bearing any responsibility for human rights
violations and framed reports of human rights abuses as accusations that may or may not
be true (Mignone 1986, 20-1, 25-33).
Several recorded instances of direct clerical involvement in interrogation of
political prisoners exist as well. Nunca Más, the official report of the Argentine National
Commission on the Disappeared, includes testimony from various political prisoners and
victims of torture who report visits from priests and higher-ranking clergy during
interrogation. Visiting clergy urged prisoners to reveal everything they knew, even as
prisoners would plead that they were innocent and ask for information about family
members they feared had been executed. Among these clergy members were Bishop Jose
Miguel Medina and priest Cristian von Wernich, who would later flee to Chile under an
assumed identity (Mignone 1988, 7-9; Feitlowitz 1998, 221; CONADEP 1992). Von
Wernich was later discovered, tried, and convicted for these crimes.
In other instances, members of the episcopacy attempted to discourage or subvert
the work of human rights organizations. In response to a 1978 letter from Amnesty
International denouncing rights abuses in Argentina, Archbishop of La Plata Antonio
Jose Plaza denied that there were any political prisoners in Argentina at all (Mignone
1986, 66). In 1979 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (ICHR) of the
OAS visited Argentina to investigate allegations of rights abuses. Several bishops
publicly denounced the visit either on the basis that serious rights abuses were not
occurring or that the visit amounted to a violation of Argentine sovereignty (67-70). In at
least one case, staff working for the Curia of Buenos Aires helped the military hide
prisoners from human rights observers. Shortly before the 1979 ICHR visit, Monsignor
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Emilio Grasseli, a Military Chaplain, arranged for the Church to sell to the military a
small island in the Tigre Delta. Called El Silencio, the island was owned by the Buenos
Aires Archdiocese and used by Archbishop Aramburu for weekend retreats.88 After its
sale, the island was used to hide prisoners suffering from torture-related injuries during
the month-long visit (Feitlowitz 1998, 219)
Consistent with decades of Church-state interaction, the Church gained increased
benefits by remaining nationalist in orientation, refraining from criticism of the state, and
retaining close ties to the military in the midst of national crisis. In February 1977,
General Videla issued law 21,540 mandating that all retiring archbishops and bishops
would be paid a life-long monthly salary equal to 70% of the first stage salary of federal
judges. In March of 1979 General Videla approved a government measure that began
paying the salaries of archbishops, bishops and other high-ranking members of the
Church hierarchy (Mignone 1986, 80-4). Despite a progressive activist sector at the
grassroots, a small core of progressive bishops, and repression targeting these members
of the Church, the long alliance between the Church’s dominant right wing and the
military held fast via Church-state ties.
Chile
During the Allende government, Chile's sharp class divide became even more
polarized stoking broad social and political disorder and prompting the Catholic
episcopacy to call for reconciliation. When the Chilean military staged a coup on
September 11, 1973, a wave of human rights abuses followed, as did the closure of
democratic institutions. Though an important segment of the Church quickly organized in
88
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support of victims of repression, the episcopacy assumed a cautious 'wait and see' posture
for the first 18-24 months. As it became clear the military intended to remain in power
indefinitely and sectors of the Church became targets of repression, the Chilean
episcopacy began to denounce the regime publicly while deepening its work on behalf of
victims. This response was consistent with patterns established during the late 1920s. For
decades the Church's interests and ideology were shaped by forces outside the state
during the era of Church reform; the Church pursued its interests by participating in
public, partisan politics; and the Church relied on relatively little support from or
cooperation with the state in order to pursue its own programs. Upon recognition of
repressive practices that targeted segments of society to which it had ties, the Church
began to act among those groups. When the indefinite closure of its mode of influence
became clear and repression targeting the Chilean episcopacy began, the Church
defended its interests and partisan allies (now banned) with public pronouncements and
organizational activity that unambiguously denounced the state's actions.
Ideological diversity in the Chilean Church
Decades of political autonomy with respect to the state created a politically
diverse Chilean Catholic Church that was deeply affected by the class divide. In the 1970
presidential election, working class, regularly practicing Catholics were more likely to
support Allende than other candidates. Meanwhile, middle and upper class, regularly
practicing Catholics were more likely to support conservative candidate Jorge Alessandri
(Smith 1982, 132). By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Chilean episcopal conference
included progressive, moderate and conservative bishops. However, the episcopacy’s
political ‘center of gravity’ stood apart from both Allende's Popular Unity (UP) coalition
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as well as traditional alliances with conservative social forces. Episcopal statements
followed defending the constitutional framework, warning against violence, and
encouraging cooperation with programs and reforms that favored the poor (Smith 1982,
183).
Despite the bishops' careful political neutrality, many Catholics, including priests,
nuns and lay people in poor areas, were openly supportive of Allende. Between 1968 and
1973 there arose a number of leftwing Christian organizations, including the Movement
of Unified Popular Action (MAPU), The Eighty, The 200, and Christians for Socialism
(CpS) (Dodson 1979, 56). Bishops affirmed the right of Catholics to support Allende,
especially as his government generally respected the freedom of religion and the rights of
the Church. However, during the Popular Unity government CpS emerged at the forefront
of clerical involvement in politics, counting among its members approximately 350
priests and nuns, or 5% of all religious in Chile (a proportion smaller than Argentina's
MSTM) (Fleet and Smith 1997, 57).
CpS members contended that critical analysis of Chilean reality combined with
Christian values could only lead one to support the Popular Unity government.
Consequently, CpS worked to push the Church to support the UP to the exclusion of all
other parties and actors. For example, in the congressional elections of 1973, CpS
campaigned openly for Popular Unity candidates only. Some CpS clergy also made
support for Popular Unity a requirement for participation in Christian Base Communities.
Bishops repeatedly requested that clergy cease such practices, but when it continued, the
bishops condemned the movement and banned clergy from participating in it (Dodson
1979, 63-4; Fleet and Smith 1997, 57).
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A smaller, but well-organized rightwing existed within the Chilean Church as
well. The Chilean Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property was founded
in 1967. The organization founded a magazine, which frequently denounced progressive
sectors of the Church, accusing it of aiding communism. Many of its members left Chile
after Allende's election in 1970 (Klaiber 1998, 46). Despite this, in 1976, the organization
published a book titled The Church of Silence in Chile that criticized the episcopacy for
its supposed movement to the ideological left. The book also interpreted the bishops'
work related to human rights as a manifestation of its affinity with the left (Lowden 1996,
57).
Diversity within the Church during the Allende period revealed a core tension
within Chile's Church-state trajectory. Until the late 1960s, the episcopacy pursued its
interests and social concerns via partisan politics and public pronouncements. However,
amid the decline of the Church's most recent partisan ally, the PDC, and growing
polarization, the episcopacy backed away from partisan alliances. To the bishops
conference, the moment instead called for public neutrality and calls for reformist
compromise and dialog. In contrast, among much of the popular sector laity and the
clergy who served them, the appeal of partisan attachments intensified because their
preferences trended to the left. Many organizations comprising the Christian left then
defied episcopal leadership and persisted in their pro-Allende activism, even attempting
to pressure the episcopacy to support the Allende government. The bishops resisted.
The Episcopacy and Allende
Though the Chilean episcopacy declared itself to be neutral during the 1970
presidential election, after Allende’s victory the Chilean episcopacy remained heavily
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involved in politics. Rather than act as a partisan organization advancing policy
preferences, the bishops took action and issued statements encouraging dialogue and
national unity. The Church's task was incredibly difficult. Allende's election and
revolutionary program intensified political polarization and social conflict rooted in
Chile's class divide.
Prior to Allende’s inauguration the episcopacy denied support to several attempts
aimed at preventing Allende from taking office. Once Allende took office, the Church
adopted a tolerant posture. After the inauguration, Archbishop Silva stated publicly that
the Church supported Allende’s proposed reforms, noting that socialism was more in line
with many “important Christian values” than was liberal capitalism. In May 1971, the
episcopal conference issued a statement with essentially the same message. The Chilean
bishops' letter followed the release of an apostolic letter by Pope Paul VI which
“discussed Marxism in more nuanced, less negative, terms than in previous social
encyclicals” (Fleet and Smith 1997, 55).
The episcopacy’s strategic shift to relative partisan neutrality, tolerance, and calls
for compromise during a period of political turmoil and reform were not without
precedent. As Smith observes of the period, "As in the case with the separation of Church
and state in 1925 and the coexistence of the Church with a Popular Front government in
1938, strategies and secular leaders were nonthreatening to one another and
operationalized mutually overlapping interests effectively" (1982, 184-5). That the
Chilean episcopacy had met earlier challenges with comparable flexibility does not imply
that the episcopacy avoided criticism. Calls for respect for the constitutional order were
interpreted by the right (and much of the PDC) as support for Allende’s legitimacy in
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pursuing his policy objectives, but the same statements were interpreted by the Popular
Unity government as calls to abandon Allende’s push toward socialism (Fleet and Smith
1997, 57).
As tensions rose, Chile's bishops issued a number of statements cautioning all
parties about the consequences of violence and civil war and calling for negotiations and
compromise. By mid-1973, as tensions rose further, Cardinal Silva attempted to arrange
meetings between Allende and PDC president Patricio Aylwin to prevent the impending
military coup (Aguilar 2003, 718; Klaiber 1998, 48). The effort was unsuccessful.
Repression Targeting the Church
A wave of human rights abuses followed the coup and among the thousands killed
and tens of thousands imprisoned for political reasons were members of the Catholic
laity, clergy, and, eventually, some members of the episcopacy.89 Early Church-affiliated
victims of repression were members of Christians for Socialism and other segments of
the Catholic left. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, three worker priests, Fr. Joan
Alsina Hurtos, Fr. Michael Woodward, and Fr. Gerardo Francisco Poblete Fernández,
were arrested, tortured and murdered by security forces. By December of 1973, over 45
additional priests had been arrested and another 50 foreign missionaries had been
deported (Aguilar 2004, 30). A seminal moment (discussed below) took place in August
1976, when a group of progressive bishops were attacked as they returned from a
conference in Ecuador (Smith 1982, 306). During this period, individuals with ties to the
Church's human rights office, the Vicariate of Solidarity (see below), were also subject to
threats and harassment (Lowden 1996, 58, 60)
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The Chilean Episcopacy’s Response to the Coup and Human Rights Abuses
In the wake of the coup and the wave of repression targeting the left that
followed, the Chilean episcopacy at large demonstrated an initial willingness to work
with the military government. This acceptance continued from September of 1973
through April 1974, at which time it showed signs of breaking down. By September of
1975, the Chilean episcopacy at large had denounced rights abuses perpetrated by the
military government. By January of 1976, through the leadership of Cardinal Silva and
the Archdiocese of Santiago, the Chilean episcopacy began work documenting cases of
abuse and assisting in legal actions on behalf of victims.
In the days after the coup, Chilean bishops displayed a range of different
reactions. Privately, most of the bishops believed military intervention was necessary in
September 1973, though many distinguished between the need for intervention and the
violence that followed (Smith 1982, 210). Six of the thirty members of the Chilean
episcopacy publicly thanked the military for ‘saving’ the nation via individual statements.
On September 16, Cardinal Silva met with the military government and agreed to preside
over the traditional prayer service with the military celebrating Chile’s independence day
on September 18, though the celebration was moved to a less prestigious location, the
Church of National Gratitude, rather than the customary cathedral. Meanwhile, auxiliary
bishop of Santiago, Fernando Aristia, marked the occasion by sending a letter to Pinochet
denouncing ongoing human rights abuses committed by the military (Klaiber 1998, 50).
The Permanent Committee of the Chilean Episcopal Conference issued a public
statement urging the military to “show moderation to the vanquished” while requesting
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that the Chilean people cooperate with the military government in the hopes of a quick
return to “institutional normality” (Smith 1982, 288).
In October of 1973, Pope Paul VI sent a private letter to Chile’s Bishops that
expressed concern about the violation of human rights in the wake of the coup and called
for the immediate restoration of democracy. The Pope wished the letter to be made
public. The military visited Cardinal Silva and asked him to convince the Pope not to do
so, suggesting that he had been misinformed. The Cardinal traveled to Rome in an effort
to persuade the pope not to publish the letter so that the Chilean episcopacy might
maintain a cooperative relationship with the military government. The letter was not
published.90 On November 5th, Cardinal Silva stated publicly that the Church would
cooperate with the military government. In his remarks, which were published in El
Mercurio the following day, the Cardinal likened the Church’s cooperative position vis-àvis the military junta to that pursued by the Church during the Allende government.
However, Silva requested that the military extend the same level of autonomy to the
Church as had been the case from 1970-1973 (Aguilar 2004, 50-1). On January 2, 1974
the press was informed that the Cardinal and a group of Chilean bishops met with
members of the military junta to discuss plans for the year (58).
During this period families of victims approached the Church for help locating
relatives who had been arrested by the military government, as well as material aid after
losing jobs. Cardinal Silva responded by making the first phone calls that culminated in
the creation of the ecumenical Committee of Cooperation for Peace (Comite de
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Cooperation para la Paz en Chile, COPACHI). COPACHI was created by a number of
religious leaders on October 9, 1973. The organization’s founding members included
Chilean leaders from the World Council of Churches, the Baptist Church, Methodist
Church, Pentacostal Methodists, Lutheran Church, Orthodox Church and the Jewish
community in addition to the Catholic Church (Aguilar 2004, 49; Lowden 1996, 32).
COPACHI began offering legal advice to those who had lost their jobs for political
reasons, but “very soon it started providing legal advice to relatives of those who had
been arrested, killed or disappeared” (Aguilar 2004, 49). Though originally conceived as
a temporary relief organization, COPACHI grew very quickly and by mid-1974 had 103
personnel in Santiago and 95 staff members working in the provinces, and by the end of
the year there were 24 different offices spread throughout the country (Aguilar 2004, 62;
Lowden 1996, 34-6).
COPACHI would later collapse in 1975 as repression targeting its leadership and
rank-and-file members increased, and some religious organizations withdrew their
support. That year, DINA captured members of the MIR who had received shelter and
medical aid from priests and nuns in Chilean convents and then been turned over to
COPACHI (Lowden 1996, 47). Ultimately, Pinochet himself sent a request to Cardinal
Silva to dissolve the organization and the Cardinal complied (Aguilar 2004, 96-101).
Despite being in operation for only a short period, the COPACHI provided
assistance to many. It presented more than two thousand habeas corpus demands in
Chilean courts and defended 550 accused in military courts. COPACHI also denounced
435 cases of forced disappearance as well as other leadership actions in response to
political violence. In addition to this overtly political activity, COPACHI provided legal,
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medical, educational, and material assistance to tens of thousands more workers, students
and families (Aguilar 2004, 101-103).
The Chilean bishops’ conference at large became more critical of the military
regime by mid-1974, though their tone remained cautious. The first collective statement
marking a slight move towards criticism of the military government’s rights abuses, titled
“Reconciliation in Chile,” was issued on April 24, 1974. In it, the bishops raise concerns
about the “lack of efficient judicial safeguards for personal security which results in
arbitrary and excessively long detentions…[and] interrogations under physical and moral
duress” (Klaiber 1998, 51). However, the document as a whole is politically ambiguous
as it prefaces its diplomatically worded criticism by acknowledging the military's "good
intentions" (51). Despite the ambiguity, three bishops expressed disagreement with the
statement.91
In August of 1974, a number of religious leaders including Cardinal Silva wrote
privately to Pinochet. The letters signatories requested "the end of the ‘state of war,’" and
suggested "a general amnesty for all political prisoners" (Aguilar 2004, 64). In addition to
explaining the reasons for the state of war, Pinochet responded by questioning the
premise of the letter, contending that “he would not consider requesting changes within
ecclesiastical organizations” despite his belief that the Church had been infiltrated by
Marxists (Aguilar 2004, 64). Pinochet then published these letters, which had been
confidential up to that point.
Episcopal denunciation of rights abuse sharpened the following year when on
September 5, 1975 the episcopal conference issued “Gospel and Peace.” In this document
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the bishops asserted that without total fulfillment of 10 conditions there would be no
lasting peace in Chile. The listed conditions included respect for: "the universal right to
life," "the right to physical and moral integrity, " "the right to create," and "the right to
participate" (Aguilar 2004, 94-5). Aguilar (2004, 94) suggests that each condition could
be read as a direct critique of government policy and Klaiber contends that this document
marks a turning point for the Chilean bishops (1998, 52). Smith (1982, 298), however,
correctly notes that this document never explicitly states that torture was actually
occurring in Chile or that the right to participate was significantly restrained. Moreover,
the document reserved space for further statements of thanks to the military for saving the
nation from Marxism. Such restraint on the part of the bishops is symptomatic of their
widespread belief during the years immediately after the coup that private dialogue with
the military was a more effective strategy for curtailing rights abuses than were public
denunciations (Smith 1982, 298-9).
Repression helped trigger unambiguous denunciations of regime abuses in 1976.
In mid-August of that year, a group of Latin American bishops met in a conference in
Riobamba, Ecuador to discuss continued application to pastoral work of Vatican II and
Medellín documents. Accusing the bishops of Marxist subversion, Ecuador’s military
government detained and then expelled all bishops in attendance, including three
members of the Chilean episcopacy, Enrique Alvear, Fernando Ariztía and Carlos
González. These events were covered widely in the Chilean media, which was critical of
the bishops, claiming they were “leftist bishops” and too heavily involved in politics.
When these three bishops arrived at the Santiago airport they were met by a group of pro-
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government demonstrators and members of DINA. The group physically attacked the
bishops, shouting insults and throwing stones (Smith 1982, 306).
The Permanent Committee of the Episcopal Conference responded by denouncing
the media attacks against the bishops and the demonstrations. The statement identified
members of DINA who took part by name and noted that canon-law requires
excommunication of anyone who does violence to a bishop or archbishop. However, the
statement proceeded with a much broader and direct condemnation of the regime and its
pattern of abuses:
The actions which we denounce and condemn are not isolated
incidents…By a constant appeal to national security, a model of society is
being consolidated that takes away basic liberties, runs roughshod over the
most fundamental rights and subjugates citizens to a dreaded and
omnipotent police state…The Church cannot remain passive or neutral in
face of such a situation. The legacy which it has received from Christ
demands that it speak out in favor of human dignity and for the effective
protection of the liberty and rights of the person. (quoted in Smith 1982,
307)
Subsequent Episcopal Conference statements criticized the regime with the same
vigor. March 1977 saw the publication of “Our Life as a Nation,” which analyzed the
Chilean political system’s structural weakness and positioned the Church behind those
calling for constitutional reform and representative government. During Christmas 1977,
the Episcopal Conference issued a statement calling for an amnesty for those forced into
exile and a public letter asking that the recently announced constitutional referendum be
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postponed to guarantee meaningful participation. In 1978, statements were issued on
salary restrictions and workers’ rights, information on the fate of the disappeared and
repression leveled against the clergy. In 1979, statements criticized government treatment
of the Mapuche and the government’s agrarian program. The bishops also called for the
return of the remains of all those killed and buried in mass graves in the wake of the
coup. In 1980, the Episcopal Conference again called for increased information, freedom
and participation in the debate over the new constitution. In December of 1980, five
bishops issued a statement (without the support of Cardinal Silva) excommunicating
anyone in their dioceses complicit in torture, including torturers themselves, those who
order torture, and those with the power to stop it but who do not act (Smith 1982, 30811).
The shift to unambiguous denunciations of regime abuses in 1976 was
accompanied by the Church’s second effort at organizing opposition to human rights
abuses. This effort was the Vicariate of Solidarity. The Vicariate was the idea of Cardinal
Silva and designed to replace COPACHI, this time with an organization under the direct
authority of the Archdiocese of Santiago (Lowden 1996, 53). In addition to its exclusive
organizational ties to the Church, the Vicariate was distinct from COPACHI in the sense
that it was tasked with putting into practice those social teachings of the church
articulated in Vatican II and Medellín documents, taught at Catholic universities, and
preached in homilies (Aguilar 2004, 107). The central idea of solidarity was the result of
the Cardinal’s reflections on what COPACHI had been working toward (Aguilar 2004,
105; Lowden 1996, 54-5). The Cardinal asked a young priest, Cristián Precht, who had
worked with COPACHI, to head the Vicariate (Aguilar 2004, 105-6). Officially founded
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by the decree of Cardinal Silva on January 1, 1976, and the creation and work of the
Vicariate was supported by a majority of the Chilean episcopacy (Lowden 1996, 53).92
The offices were housed in a very central location, Plaza de Armas 444, beside the
Metropolitan Cathedral in Santiago. The Vicariate's staff included "lawyers, social
workers, administrative staff, [and] doctors" as well as many volunteers (Aguilar 2004,
106).
From its first days, the Vicariate of Solidarity confronted the human rights
situation with enormous energy. After its first 8 months of work, the Vicariate produced a
report in September of 1976 documenting its activity to date. The office's work included
11,242 appointments with Vicariate lawyers, in addition to hundreds of food distribution
centers, worker and peasant training programs, and pension programs (Aguilar 2004,
125-6).
By the end of the 1976, the Vicariate became even more aggressive in its response
to human rights abuse. On the 24th of December 1976, the Vicariate filed a petition to the
Chilean Supreme Court to appoint an ad hoc judge to investigate 415 cases of
disappearance (Aguilar 2004, 134). By 1978, the Vicariate began a serious effort to
document every case of disappearance (Aguilar 2004, 162-63).
The Vicariate also organized the International Symposium on Human Rights that
took place over three days starting on November 22, 1978. The symposium was the
largest international meeting to be held in Chile since the coup. The event included three
days of gatherings of relatives of the disappeared that drew 750 attendees. One of the
speakers was Bishop Alejandro Jiménez. Also present was Sola Sierra who, since the
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1976 disappearance of her husband, was a highly visible leader of family members of the
disappeared. The conference issued press releases, created a sphere in which Chileans
could meet and organize, and drew international attention (Aguilar 2004, 164-7; Lowden
1996, 67-9).
The last example of a major organizing effort on the part of the episcopacy in
response to political repression comes from the successor to Cardinal Silva, Archbishop
of Santiago Francisco Fresno. Beginning in 1983, Fresno helped organize and mediate
talks between rival opposition parties, including the PDC, the National Party, the Radical
Party and the Christian Left. This occurred despite the fact that all political parties
technically remained either illegal or suspended. The meetings produced the National
Accord on the Transition to Democracy, which called for the immediate normalization of
Chilean politics. The ultimate result of these negotiations was the Concertación de
Partidos por el NO, the leading organization in the final push for democratization during
1988-1989. Afterwards, this organization became Concertación de Partidos por la
Democracia, the organizational basis for the coalition that ruled Chile for the next twenty
years (Meacham 1987; Aguilar 2004, 113-4).
As in Argentina, the Chilean episcopacy's response to post-coup human rights
abuses was consistent with patterns of Church-state interaction that had been established
for decades. Following a brief 'wait and see' period, the Chilean episcopacy used public
political strategies, including pronouncements, organization, and the legal system to
criticize and embarrass a regime that it came to oppose. Whereas in Argentina, silence on
human rights was followed by state payment of bishops' salaries, in Chile one of the most
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outwardly conservative bishops helped organize the political opposition and rebuild a
party system in which the Church had once wielded considerable influence.
Brazil
Like the Church in Argentina and Chile, the Brazilian Church's immediate public
reaction to the military coup was one of thanks and relief. However, as state repression
escalated and it became clear that the military planned to retain power indefinitely, the
Church in Brazil responded to the military government's human rights abuses with a
pattern distinct from those followed by Chile and Argentina. From the March 1964 coup
until 1970 Brazil's bishops played no significant role in opposition to the military
government. Then, from 1970 to 1974, the Church entered into secret private negotiations
with the military in an effort to curtail human rights abuses while bishops serving in more
marginalized and politicized areas began to denounce the state more forcefully. After
1976, the CNBB began to openly criticize the military regime and its rights abuses with
broad support from the episcopacy at large. Then, after 1977, the CNBB's criticisms
became unambiguous denunciations.
Ideological diversity in the Brazilian Church
By the time of the 1964 military coup, a well-established progressive sector of the
Catholic Church already existed in Brazil, just as in pre-coup Argentina and Chile.
Emboldened by the CNBB's pre-1964 support for Goulart's social reforms, a number of
organizations played a role in the progressive sector of the Church. Most prominent was
Brazilian Catholic Action (ACB). The ACB encompassed many Catholic Action
organizations with progressive inclinations. The most radical of these included the
Catholic Youth Workers (JOC), Catholic University Youth (JUC), and Catholic Workers
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Action (ACO) movements. An additional component of the Brazilian Catholic left was
the Basic Education Movement (MEB), which performed consciousness-raising work
among marginalized groups, especially in rural areas (Serbin 2000, 36; Mainwaring 1986,
60-75; de Kadt 1970, 58-72). The influence of the Catholic left in Brazil during the early
and middle 1960s should not be overstated, however. Though progressive bishops came
to dominate the country's Northeast prior to 1964, other regions later associated with
Catholic progressivism such as the Amazon and São Paulo would not experience this
transition until the 1970s (Mainwaring 1986, 84-94, 103-8). Moreover, by the early
1960s, the JUC was drawing public criticism from moderate bishops who viewed it as too
radical and too autonomous from episcopal control (de Kadt 1970, 77-80).
An important rightwing tendency existed within the Brazilian Church at this time
as well. Between 1963 and 1968 the Catholic right, which possessed close ties to the
military, played a high-profile role in Brazilian politics (Mainwaring 1986, 81). This
tendency within the Church included Tradition, Family and Property (TFP), which
routinely denounced the Catholic left and Bishop Hélder Câmara (Klaiber 1998, 28) In
addition, after the 1964 coup, General Castelo Branco publicly praised the Family Rosary
Crusade and expressed gratitude for its contribution in sustaining opposition to Goulart
(Gribble 2003, 551). Led by Irish priest Fr. Patrick Peyton and with financial support
from the CIA and shipping magnate J. Peter Grace, this fervently anti-communist
missionary organization organized enormous public prayer sessions across Brazil
between July of 1962 and the end of 1965 (Gribble 2003, 543-551). The actual
contribution of the Family Rosary Crusade to the coup is debatable, but Branco's public
rhetoric is an indication of both the presence and the perceived importance of the
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Catholic right. A substantial conservative presence remained in the episcopacy and rose
to prominence in the CNBB after 1964 as well (see below). Thus, but the early 1960s,
progressives were temporarily able to marginalize conservative voices, but the future of
this progressive dominance was uncertain.
During Kubitschek's, Quadros', and Goulart's governments, the Church retained
cordial relations with the state. Some criticism emanated from the Catholic right, but the
CNBB continued to issue a number of progressive documents in support of major
reforms similar to those pursued by the state. As Mainwaring puts it, "The bishops
perceived the state as the instrument for social change, and throughout the late populist
years (1956-63), the CNBB supported the government" (1986, 58). This continued well
into Goulart's presidency. In June of 1963, when Goulart moved to the left, this support
faded away not unlike the shifting views of Brazilian moderates during the same time.
This helped clear the way for the Catholic right to ascend to a position of temporary
power in the episcopacy and publicly support the military as it conspired to overthrow
Goulart.
Repression Targeting the Church
Human rights abuses peaked in the immediate aftermath of the March 1964 coup
and reintensified during a second wave between 1968 and 1974.93 Progressive segments
of the Brazilian Church were targets of repression during both waves. Immediately after
the coup, the Catholic left, especially the JUC, was among the most targeted groups
(Skidmore 1988, 17). In the Northeast, bishops' statements were censored by the military
after 1964. After 1971, bishops in the Amazon were subject to similar treatment as they
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became increasingly outspoken on issues of human rights and development. Repression
targeting bishops included police intimidation, arbitrary searches, and death threats
(Mainwaring 1986, 88-93). More severe repression was directed at clergy and laity.
Particularly in the Amazon, Northeast, and São Paulo, priests with ties to progressive
movements or who publicly denounced the regime often risked arrest, torture and formal
charges of subversion (Mainwaring 1986, 89, 99-101). Church members were sometimes
subject to private violence and death squads as well. After 1966 in the Amazon, the
repressive violence organized by landowners broadened its focus from secular activists to
include progressive priests and religious workers as well (Mainwaring 1986, 84-9). The
first clergyman assassinated during the military regime was Father Antõnio Henrique
Pereira, a young priest who worked with the JOC and who collaborated with Bishop
Hélder Câmara. Pereira was tortured and shot by a death squad in 1969 (Klaiber 1998,
27-9; Mainwaring 1986, 99-100). Serbin (2000, 39) cites a "partial Church tally" of
documented "acts of repression" against the Church that includes actions taken against 33
bishops, between 1968 and 1978. Also included in the tally are "hundreds of arrests of
priests, seven deaths, and numerous cases of torture, expulsion of foreign priests,
invasions of buildings, threats, indictments, abductions, infiltration by government
agents, censorship, prohibition of masses and meetings, and forgeries and falsifications of
documents and publications" (39).
The Brazilian Episcopacy's Response to the Coup and Human Rights Abuses
In May of 1964, a group of 33 leading bishops assembled to draft a public
response to the coup. Characteristic of the Brazilian episcopacy as a whole, this group
was divided between conservatives and progressives with contrasting perspectives about
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what the document should say. The progressive group produced a draft that recognized
the "martyrdom" of Catholic victims of repression (such as members of the JUC),
criticized the military for formulating and disseminating its own distinction between
Christianity and Marxism, and denounced the regime's lack of respect for the pope
(Serbin 2000, 37). Meanwhile, the conservative group produced a draft that thanked the
military for the coup. The final draft issued on June 2nd was an attempt at compromise
between the two drafts in a document Serbin describes as a "confusing, self-contradictory
pronouncement" that both thanked the military for the coup and appealed to the military
to protect the Brazilian people from "the abuses of liberal capitalism" and end attacks on
Catholic activists (quoted in Serbin 2000, 37).94 From the publication of this statement
until the early 1970s, most bishops, including Hélder Câmara, avoided public criticism of
the regime (Serbin 2000, 38).
In 1964, a confluence of events tipped the precarious balance of the ideologically
divided Brazilian episcopacy in a conservative direction. In addition to Goulart's
disintegration and the March coup, Dom Armando Lombardi died. Lombardi was the
papal nuncio who for a decade had worked to marginalize conservatives in the Brazilian
episcopacy. Then, two archbishops important to the CNBB's progressive evolution, Dom
Carlos Coelho and Dom Mousinh, died the same year (Bruneau 1982, 53). A
conservative resurgence in Brazilian episcopal structures followed. In October of 1964, a
slate of conservative candidates was elected to top positions in the CNBB, including a
new conservative secretary general, Bishop José Gonçalves (Mainwaring 1986, 82). For
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the next four years, the CNBB's pre-1964 interest in social justice took a backseat to
"internal housekeeping" and attempts to rein in the Catholic left (Mainwaring 1986, 82).
In 1966, the JUC was dismantled by the CNBB. During the same period, MEB was
brought under closer control by the bishops and forced to moderate much of its rhetoric
(Mainwaring 1986, 67-8, 82). The CNBB continued to issue statements on social
conditions, but they were abstract critiques of capitalism with no reference to ongoing
repression, the military regime, or the regime's economic reforms (Mainwaring 1986, 83).
Emblematic of the period is the CNBB's first statement after the 1968 CELAM
conference in Medellín. In it, the bishops explained, "The Church recognizes the
autonomy of the civil authority and expresses the support that this authority deserves
from us. Furthermore, with its authority, the Church hopes to collaborate with those
responsible for the common good" (cited in Mainwaring 1986, 83).
By 1970, however, state repression targeting the Church and the persistence of
large, region-based progressive sectors of bishops, clergy and grassroots activists pushed
the episcopacy at large to change tactics. Part of this shift involved profound but private
exchanges between bishops who shared a commitment to human rights, but who valued
different strategic interactions with the state. Those advocating greater public
confrontation, such as Archbishop Hélder Câmara, Archbishop Paulo Arns and Catholic
intellectual Alceu Amoroso Lima, hoped to pressure the regime in the international arena.
Those advocating caution, such as Dom Eugênio de Araújo Sales, sought to protect the
private, congenial component of Church-state relations as a means of resolving
disagreements (Serbin 2000, 76-8). Such tactics, this latter group reasoned, were
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especially important in a dictatorship where "open protest could only serve to irritate
those in power" (Serbin 2000, 78).
During this time, a number of bishops interested in defending human rights
participated in precisely the type of official dialog Dom Eugênio sought to protect. Called
the Bipartite, representatives of Church and the regime began meeting in a secret
commission that lasted from 1970-1974.95 For the Church, two main themes drove the
discussion. The first was the preservation of cordial Church-state collaboration on
mutually shared goals, and the second was the Church's defense of human rights. In this
way, the church hierarchy was reacting to the influence exerted by the reform-era Vatican
and activist clergy and bishops at the periphery while attempting to preserve a major,
historically successful mode of influence: private dialog with public officials (Serbin
2000, 52-3). Because these discussions were conducted without public knowledge, the
Bipartite reveals continuity in the collaborative nature of private, post-1930s church-state
relations.
Ultimately, however, the Church gained less from the discussions than the state.
Through the dialog, the state was able to get the hierarchy to rein-in the public
denunciations of the CNBB. Meanwhile, the Church gained a brief and limited reprieve
from attacks by the state, but little progress was made in addressing the broader problem
of human rights abuse (Serbin 2000, 224). This process of engaging in fruitless dialog
combined with ongoing discussion between bishops with differing strategic inclinations
helped persuade many moderate and conservative bishops that public denunciations of
the regime's human rights abuses were warranted.

95

For a full accounting of this commission see Serbin (2000).

224

Meanwhile, other crucial developments involving Vatican influence set the stage
for more contentious interaction with the state over the issue of human rights. In 1970,
Cardinal Rossi, conservative archbishop of São Paulo and president of the CNBB, was
recalled to Rome to head the Congregation for the Evangelization of the Peoples. Rossi
was replaced in São Paulo by progressive Archbishop Paulo Arns and the following year
moderate Archbishop Aloísio Lorscheider succeeded him as CNBB President (Klaiber
1998, 30).96
In the years that followed, Arns joined Hélder Câmara as an outspoken critic of
the regime. In addition, under Arns' leadership, the Archdiocese of São Paulo began
pursuit of human rights organizing via its Peace and Justice Commission. Promoted by
the Vatican, the commission was founded in 1968 and headquartered in Rio de Janeiro.
The organization remained unassertive while overseen by conservative Bishop, and later
Archbishop, Eugênio Sales. However, in 1972 Arns founded his own São Paulo chapter
of the commission. Under Arns, the commission conducted extensive investigation and
documentation of allegations of human rights abuse. It also provided assistance to victims
and their families (Klaiber 1998, 31). With Arns' expansion and acceleration of the
commission's work, the commission grew to include offices in four regions and 42
student groups by 1978 (Bruneau 1982, 80). Given the tasks it assumed and the
organization's reach, the commission was comparable to the Vicariate of Solidarity in
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Chile. Documentation of abuses was eventually compiled and published in a volume
titled Brasil: Nunca Mais (Klaiber 1998, 32).97
Meanwhile, after 1970, Lorscheider's position as president of the CNBB, coupled
with his status as a moderate, helped secure his influence in conservative sectors of the
episcopacy. In 1973, the CNBB began planning an international conference on human
rights that would eventually take place in 1978 (Bruneau 1982, 81) In the same year,
Lorscheider was assigned the position of Archbishop in an archdiocese in the Northeast,
bringing him into increased contact with this progressive regional bloc of bishops. From
this position, Lorscheider worked with great efficacy as a consensus-maker on the issue
of human rights during a period of increased repression aimed specifically at the Church
(Klaiber 1998, 34-5).
When the Bipartite finally broke down in 1974, Lorscheider helped convince
moderates and many conservatives who cautiously avoided direct confrontation with the
state to join in public denunciations of abuse. After 1973, the episcopacy's position on
human rights hardened with a gradual progression of CNBB statements offering
restrained criticism of the regime (Bruneau 1982, 75-7; Mainwaring 1986, 111-2, 152),
and episcopal involvement in protest following the murders of student Alexandre Leme
(Serbin 2000, 200-18) and journalist Vladimir Herzog and two priests in 1976
(Klaiber1998, 31-4). Then, in November 1976, the bishops' conference released an
official statement titled "Pastoral Message to the People of God," which unambiguously
denounced regime policies the bishops blamed for creating a general sense of
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lawlessness, insecurity, and inequality.98 The following year, under the leadership of
Archbishop Lorscheider, the CNBB approved and published an even more forceful
message titled "Christian Requirements for the Political Order," which unambiguously
denounced the regime's use of torture as well as the basic premise of the national security
doctrine. This document was passed by a 210 to 3 vote of the bishops (Mainwaring 1986,
152).99 These denunciations and the publication of Brasil: Nunca Mais in 1979 were
followed by heavy involvement in the democratization movement of the late 1970s and
early 1980s, including support for workers on strike and pro-democracy jurists (Klaiber
1998, 38). Consistent with patterns of avoiding direct partisan alliances, the Church
refrained from endorsing either the newly formed Worker's Party (PT) or the opposition
PMDB throughout the process (Klaiber 1998, 38).
Church-State trajectories, Constant Causes and Proximate Causes
The responses of episcopal conferences to waves of human rights abuse during
the authoritarian period in Argentina, Chile and Brazil were structured by the
accumulation of ideological preferences and strategic assumptions generated by historical
interaction with the state, Vatican and other forces. It is only with reference to these path
dependent trajectories that serious study can make sense of arguments that seem entirely
persuasive within single cases, but inconsistent when applied across cases. This is most
obviously the case with reference to two pervasive arguments attempting to explain
varying episcopal commitments to human rights advocacy: the importance of a pre-
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existing progressive sector in the Church and the importance of repression targeting the
Church.
At the start of the authoritarian period, high-profile progressive movements with
varying levels of support from bishops existed in Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. This is
significant for a number of rival hypotheses proposing various proximate causes. The
development of a popular Church in response to religious competition is an essential part
of the logic of Gill's (1998) hypothesized link between religious competition and prohuman rights episcopal conferences. According to Gill, religious competition helped
create acceptance for progressive theologies serving the poor, which in turn created
greater affinity between the Church and groups later targeted by state repression.
Refuting this logic is the emergence of the progressive Priests for the Third World in
Argentina despite relatively little competition from evangelical protestants. In Chile, the
radicalization of Christians for Socialism (and related groups) and its subsequent conflict
with Chile's bishops raises questions for Gill's argument as well. If Chile's bishops
perceived CpS as a threat in the Church's competition with Marxism, why come to the
defense of such competitors after they were subject to repression unless bishops were
primarily motivated by other forces, such as deep religious conviction, Vatican II and
Medellín-era reforms, and/or broader political strategy? Finally, the emergence of Brazil's
progressive sector in the 1950s substantially predates the rise of religious competition in
that country which is not clearly discernible until the 1980s (Philpott 2007, 513). Rather
than religious competition, explanations of varying responses to rights abuses must lie
elsewhere.

228

Suggesting an alternative proximate cause, Mainwaring (1986) convincingly
argues that early progressivism, at least in the Brazilian Church, came from close Church
interaction with popular sectors as they became politically activated and the Church
entered a period of theological change (115). Then, repression of these sectors and
eventually the Church pushed bishops into public defense of human rights (111). Smith
(1982) makes a similar argument in the case of Chile. The logic of this argument is more
persuasive than Gill's, but if this argument is valid, why did the presence of progressive
Catholics and clergy in Argentina, as well as the repression of those sectors of the Church
by the military regime, not prompt human rights advocacy among the episcopal
conference at large? In Argentina, two progressive bishops were killed under suspicious
circumstances, but the rest of the episcopacy refrained from accusations that the state
bore any responsibility for their deaths, let alone the deaths/disappearances of thousands
of other, lower-profile victims of repression. Moreover, why did Brazil's first wave of
repression, which heavily targeted Catholic youth activists, not trigger confrontation over
human rights abuses more quickly?
Finally, an implication of Levine's (1981) theoretical understanding of Church
politics suggests an alternative, constant cause argument. Levine argues that
institutionally weak Churches are necessarily more tolerant of a multiplicity of voices
within their organization. Thus, a plausible extension of Levine's theory might suggest
that varying institutional strength might instigate greater Church affinity with popular
sectors. When these sectors became victims of repression episcopal conferences were
more likely to permit and later support the Church-affiliated human rights organizations
that emerged to defend them. Here too, a convincing argument exists, but alone it cannot
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explain all evident variation. If the episcopacy takes its cues from the grassroots in such
contexts, why was so much of the Chilean and São Paulan Churches' human rights
activism organized from the top-down (as in the Vicariate of Solidarity and the
Commission on Peace and Justice, respectively), while activism in the Brazilian
Northeast appeared to have come from the bottom-up?
Gill's competition hypothesis notwithstanding, these proximate and constant cause
hypotheses are convincing and well-evidenced at the national and subnational level.
However, their inconsistency across cases is explained via the elaboration of the
historical evolution and sustained effects of varying Church-state relationships. Where
Church and state were bound together by a dense network of official and financial ties,
the episcopacy's interests were defined in part by the state. Moreover, these interests were
best protected by cultivating the identity of a nationalist institution and remaining outside
most partisan battles. To such a Church, development of a progressive sector at the
grassroots in the wake of Vatican II and Medellín is not unexpected, though such voices
were marginalized by an episcopal conference dominated by conservative nationalists.
When these sectors became targets of repressive violence, coming to their defense (or the
principled defense of human rights in general) would have been a stance that ran contrary
to a long-established source of political influence that came from making nationalist,
conciliatory appeals during moments of national crisis.
Where Church and state were long-separated, as in Chile, the Church derived its
interests from sources other than the state (such as the Vatican) and pursued those
interests via strategic participation in public politics long before the breakdown of
democracy. Such episcopacies lost a great deal of influence with the rise of an
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authoritarian regime. With greater room from progressive and moderate voices in the
episcopacy, the repression of Church-affiliated activists and political parties that spoke on
behalf of popular sectors was of greater importance in Chile than in a context where
bishops worked to marginalize such voices and activities. In such a context, taking a
'wait-and-see' approach was anathema to decades of episcopal engagement with public
political struggles. This was especially true after it became clear that the military did not
plan to hand power back to a civilian government and when the Church became a target
of repressive violence. Working publicly to discredit the military regime and defend likeminded individuals and organizations was therefore consistent with the political interests
of the dominant faction in the episcopal conference.
In Brazil, where the Church and state lacked formal ties but retained financial ties,
even moderates and conservatives were receptive to concerns about human rights in the
wake of Vatican II and Medellín. However, substantial delays in united public response
took place because moderates and conservatives feared loss of traditional, private modes
of influence, material support, and problem-solving strategies. In this environment, failed
experiments in private negotiation that coincided with increased state repression against
the Church tipped the scales, leading to substantially delayed (but forceful) public
denunciation of the regime.
Finally, rival hypotheses stemming from antecedent conditions bear mentioning
as well. The distinct trajectories of Church-state interaction that culminated in the human
rights commitments of each episcopacy during the authoritarian period were set in motion
decades earlier during critical junctures. These critical junctures reconfigured Churchstate ties at moments when sociopolitical crises disrupted the influence of antecedent
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conditions on Church-state relationships. Prominent features of Church-state
relationships that existed prior to each critical juncture either ceased to determine the
contours of Church-state politics or were incorporated into subsequent patterns of
interaction.
The most notable of these pre-existing features was the presence of conservative
ideological factions seeking integral Church-state ties. Indeed, Catholic nationalist
ideology was a pronounced force in the Argentine Church prior to the critical juncture
and clearly played a role in the episcopacy's response to rights abuses after 1976.
However, comparable ideological currents existed in Chile and Brazil prior to their
critical junctures as well. Chilean bishops' hesitance to accept Church-state separation
and subsequent support for the Conservative Party are one manifestation of the desire
among some bishops to retain Church-state union.100 The Brazilian Church also contained
a staunchly conservative faction. This took the form of the Neo-Christendom faction
among Brazil's bishops and the Acção Integralista Brasileira at the clergy and grassroots
levels. In each case, these conservative lines of thought persisted through the
authoritarian period, most noticeably in the TFP movements discussed in this chapter.
However, the critical juncture's Church-state-military alliance in Argentina elevated the
status of the conservative faction at a time when a significant social reform-oriented
faction still possessed some influence in the Argentine episcopacy. In Chile's and Brazil's
critical juncture, pre-existing conservative factions did not benefit from such an increase
in status. Then, when the era of international Church reform swept each national-level
Church, these conservative factions became marginalized.
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Prior to critical junctures in Chile and Argentina, both episcopacies were tied to
participation in partisan politics through alliances with each country's Conservative Party.
By the authoritarian period, these alliances had ceased to exist. In Argentina, the
episcopacy's exit from partisan politics and alliance with conservative social forces in
control of the state proved a more valuable strategy for protecting its institutional
interests than did continued partisan commitments. Thus, participation in democratic
politics ceased and this served the Church well as it accrued privileges and favors from
subsequent regimes. In Chile, during the decades following the critical juncture, partisan
commitments remained a key component of exerting influence in Chilean society.
However, prompted by Vatican influence (which was far less present in Argentina)
during the era of reform in the international Church, the Chilean episcopacy's partisan
alliances shifted substantially. The Chilean episcopacy's interests benefited, not by
retaining close ties to subsequent regimes, but from participation in Chilean democracy.
During its critical junctures, the Argentinian episcopacy dropped the partisan politics, but
kept the conservative nationalist orientation. The Chilean episcopacy kept the partisan
politics, but eventually dropped its conservative orientation.
In Brazil, where partisan activity was less important prior to the critical juncture,
the episcopacy was also largely shut out of successive regimes. This changed when
Vargas effectively granted the Brazilian Church a much bigger stake in the future of
Brazilian policy-making and, by extension, democracy. What Vargas could not grant,
however, was a stronger party system through which the episcopacy could form partisan
alliances. The result was the birth of a lobbyist Church, an organization with its own
interests and priorities but that depended on continued access to power to achieve them.
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As Neo-Christendom and Catholic integralism declined in the international Church, the
Brazilian Church's priorities shifted as well. This occurred, however, without the obvious
partisan manifestations present in Chile.
Thus far, this study has staked out a theoretical and empirical argument on the
basis of close comparative analysis of three ostensibly similar cases. I have argued that
each case followed a different historical trajectory resulting in distinct responses to
human rights abuses during the authoritarian period. The next chapter adds analytical
leverage to this study by taking up three additional cases in which episcopal responses to
waves of human rights abuses diverged once again, this time in the midst of full blown
civil wars.
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Chapter 7: Path Dependence and Episcopal Responses to
Human Rights Abuse during Civil Wars

Faced with the rise of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes after 1964, some
national-level bishops' conferences played leadership roles in nascent human rights
movements, others delayed public criticism while pursuing private human rights
advocacy, and still others responded with silence or public support for repressive
governments. Yet to be addressed is the puzzling historical span and contextual scope of
this divergence in the response of bishops waves of human rights abuses. In terms of
chronology, diverse reactions to periods of human rights abuse appeared in the years
immediately following Vatican II (1962-1965), but remained identifiable until at least the
early 1990s despite the emergence of ostensibly homogenizing forces. During this period,
communication and organization between the region's bishops increased and successive
papacies took an active interest in the issue of human rights. Moreover, Church leaders in
nearly every Latin American country were attempting to manage tumultuous divisions
between assertive right and left wings. The former demanded anticommunism coupled
with a return to social order, while the latter demanded firm commitment and public
proclamations in support of radical redistributive social change. In reaction to these
extremes, there grew a middle faction in the regional episcopacy committed to the idea
that the Church must reunite the faithful by remaining outside politics and providing
broader moral guidance for society as a whole. By the conclusion of the 1979 CELAM
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conference in Puebla, this third group remained the most powerful within the region's
episcopacy (Levine 1981, 50-1).
Despite these common forces, diverse episcopal responses to human rights abuse
appeared once again in a new decade and in a political context distinct from that present
in Argentina, Chile and Brazil. Throughout the 1980s similar patterns of divergent
responses to human rights abuses occurred again in the midst of major civil wars that
were sparked or reignited in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Nicaragua.
These conflicts produced waves of human rights abuses, sometimes committed by
insurgents, but more often by the military, the police, and private militias and death
squads tied to the state. As is often the case in such polarized situations, political
neutrality’s tacit approval of the status quo inevitably produced contradictions for Church
moderates because the Church's professed values necessarily drew the Church into
struggles over a wide range of overtly political values observed in society. Inevitably
forced to risk being perceived as sympathetic to one side or another in each civil war, the
willingness and capacity of each episcopal conference to denounce state-sanctioned
abuses varied considerably, much like it had roughly a decade earlier under bureaucratic
authoritarian regimes.
Varied episcopal responses to human rights abuses during civil wars of the 1980s
closely resembled patterns exhibited by southern cone Churches when they responded to
the rise of repressive bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s.
Resembling the Chilean Church's vocal human rights advocacy and organizational work
via the Vicariate of Solidarity during the 1970s, prior to El Salvador's civil war of the
1980s, the Archdiocese of San Salvador denounced human rights abuses and created
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support networks for the victims of state repression (via Socorro Jurídico). During the
civil war, the archdiocese remained a public human rights advocate and deepened the
assistance and documentation component of its human rights work (via Tutela Legal).
Resembling the Brazilian Church's extended period of silence prior to joining the human
rights movement in the mid-1970s, in Guatemala, public episcopal denunciations of state
abuses were forthcoming in the mid-1980s only after several years of delay. Resembling
the Argentine Church's general silence during a massive wave of repression beginning in
the mid-1970s, in Colombia, episcopal denunciations of rights abuses did not emerge
until the mid-1990s, a decade after they might have contributed to human rights advocacy
or peace negotiations during the resurgence of the war with the FARC and ELN in the
1980s.
This chapter argues that even in the context of full blown civil war, patterns in
episcopal conferences' varying responses to state-sanctioned human rights abuses
stemmed from the same source outlined in previous chapters: a path dependent process
that sustained distinct historical trajectories in Church-state relationships. These
trajectories were reinforced by different densities in the network of institutional ties
linking Church and state. Where ties were dense, the Church derived its interests in
conjunction with conservative social forces in control of the state, relied on the state to
pursue those interests, and worked to ensure a close and generally collaborative
relationship with successive governments via generally non-contentious political
behavior. These dynamics produced episcopacies that eschewed or undermined human
rights activism in the 1960s-1980s period. This pattern is typified by the cases of
Argentina and Colombia. Where Church-state ties were minimal or nonexistent, the
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interests of larger sectors of the Church were derived from sources other than the state
(such as the varying ideology and experience of bishops, the Vatican, the experience of
clergy and/or adherents) and the Church did not rely on state approval or support to
pursue those interests. These dynamics blocked opportunities for Church-state collusion
that could become institutionalized and it removed obstacles that discouraged the Church
from confrontation with the state when it was faced with state practices or policies that it
opposed. Such episcopacies publicly and unambiguously denounced human rightsabusing states with minimal or no delays and they are typified by the cases of Chile and
El Salvador. Where the network of Church-state ties is of intermediate density, the
interests of large sectors of the Church are derived from non-state sources (such as the
Vatican, clergy, and grassroots), but pursuit of those interests via Church programs are
contingent on state support or approval. As a result, engaging in contentious interaction
with the state necessitates difficult cost-benefit analysis, provokes sharp division between
bishops, and produces significant delays prior to denouncing waves of human rights
abuses. This pattern is typified by Brazil and Guatemala.
To demonstrate the broader applicability of this argument, this chapter sketches
the evolution of Church-state ties and their impact on subsequent human rights
commitments made by Catholic bishops in Colombia, Guatemala and Brazil. The same
path dependent theoretical framework and related concepts used to explain Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile hold sway in these civil war cases. Chapter 8 will offer some
concluding comparisons and discussion of all six cases examined by this study.
Colombia: Complicity
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The episcopacy has long been tied to conservative social forces in Colombia.
Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this took the form of partisan alignment
with the Conservative Party. During this time the fate of Church-state ties was closely
related to changes in the party system, deepening during period of Conservative rule and
eroding (once even severed) during periods of Liberal Party rule. However, the disastrous
consequences of a civil war in the late 1940s and early 1950s led to a critical juncture in
Church-state relations. With the beginning of the National Front in the late 1950s,
Liberal-initiated threats to an existing, dense network of Church-state ties ceased. So too
did the episcopacy's exclusive alliance with the Conservatives, aligning instead with the
broader, power-sharing political regime. These ties to the state insulated the Colombian
bishops conference somewhat during the era of international Church reform, sustained a
collaborative relationship between the Church and the post 1950s political regime, and
curtailed support for human rights advocacy among bishops during a wave of abuses in
the 1980s.
Antecedent Conditions
In mid-19th century Colombia, the privileged position of the Catholic Church was
a highly contentious political issue. After securing the presidency in mid-century, the
Liberal party formally disestablished the Church on June 15th 1853 (Mecham 1966, 122).
However, Liberal dominance in Colombian politics was not permanent, and neither was
the Liberal-imposed experiment with church-state separation. In 1884, Colombian
president and "Liberal turned Conservative" Rafael Núñez helped forge a compromise
between Liberals and Conservatives by reestablishing close church-state ties that
included heavy state involvement in Church activity. This compromise took shape
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formally in 1888 through two documents approved by the legislature in that year, the new
constitution and a concordat with the Vatican. The Constitution of 1888 rolled back
anticlerical legislation enacted over the previous 30 years and officially reunited church
and state. This constitution recognized “the primacy of the Catholic Church” in
Colombia by "proclaim[ing] God as the supreme fountain of all authority" and that
"Roman Catholicism was to be respected as an essential factor of the social order" (1256).
The terms of the concordat delineated close administrative and financial ties
between church and state. All candidates for bishop and archbishop were to be
nominated by the president and then approved by the Vatican. The Church was granted
authority over education, including supervision of textbook content. The state also
assumed the role of financer for many organizational activities, agreeing to grant a lump
sum every year to the Colombian Church to aid in the operation of various church units.
The state also agreed to lend financial support to the Church’s mission work within the
county (129-32). At the time, the Church regarded the concordat as “the most
satisfactory agreement possible” (126). The main precepts it established remained in
effect through at least the early 1980s (Levine 1981, 71; Mecham 1966, 126).101
Following this compromise, church-state relations remained a politicized issue in
Colombia's party system, though its prominence ebbed and flowed. Though relatively
unchallenged in the early 1900s, but the 1930s Liberal Party reforms again sought to roll
back Church privileges (Mecham 1966, 133). During this time, the episcopacy retained
close ties to the traditional landed oligarchy and the Conservative Party. Consequently,
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until the late 1940s, the Colombian episcopacy’s ideology, mode of political influence,
and position relative to the state were directly related to the waxing and waning influence
of the Conservatives. The Church benefited greatly from access and influence among
Conservatives during their period of uninterrupted rule, which lasted from 1880 to 1930
(Levine 1981, 63).
Crisis and Critical Juncture
In 1948, Colombia experienced its own profound break with routinized political
competition that involved the Church. In that year, a period of civil war known as La
Violencia erupted, provoking communal violence that pitted Liberals against
Conservatives and claimed several hundred thousand lives (Levine 1977, 227). Though
Liberal anticlerical sentiment had begun a return to latency by this period, the Church's
alliance with Conservatives pulled the Church into the conflict. Despite a few important
voices of dissent, the Colombian episcopacy publicly supported Conservatives during the
conflict, participating in campaigns, denouncing Liberals as atheists and communists, and
describing the conflict in messianic terms (Mecham 1966, 134; Levine 1977, 229). Much
of the civil war came to take on elements of a religious conflict between Catholics,
Liberals, and, occasionally, small Protestant communities. However, as the war
proceeded the Church became the target of widespread violence, including the burning of
the residence of the Archbishop of Bogotá (Levine 1981, 84; Mecham 1966, 134).
Reacting defensively to these attacks, during the mid-1950s the episcopacy at large
attempted to extricate itself from the conflict by calling on both sides for an end to the
violence (Levine 1981, 86).
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Initially, the episcopacy’s calls for peace included support for the caretaker
military government of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) and its efforts to
restore order. At the outset of his government, Rojas saw Church-state collaboration as an
essential part of the restoration of order and his government sharply curtailed the
proselytizing activity of Protestant sects (Bushnell 1993, 215). However, as Rojas
expanded efforts at nation-building, his government withdrew some state support
previously directed to the church. Rojas also began to challenge the Unión de
Trabajadores de Colombia (UTC), the labor union with which the Church had allied in
order to exert an anticommunist influence among urban workers. Rojas sought briefly to
build his own support within organized labor via the Confederación Nacional de
Trabajadores (CNT), though he would later back away from this effort (Bushnell 1993,
220-227).
In response, the episcopacy partnered with the Conservatives to protect the
Church’s interests (Palacios 2006, 152; Mecham 1966, 136), a move that coincided with
the Conservative Party’s decision to join the anti-Rojas coalition (Palacios 2006, 134).
Despite this, the bishops firmly asserted their independence from partisan politics (Wilde
1984, 11-12). In June of 1956, when Rojas announced the creation of the Third Force, a
corporative state project, Cardinal Cristano Luque denounced the plan as “fascistic” with
other episcopal complaints against the dictatorship and its police repression following
suit (Mecham 1966, 136; Wilde 1984, 13).
After Rojas’ negotiated and peaceful resignation of executive authority, a new era
of Colombian politics began and with it came the critical juncture in Church-state
relations. From 1958 through 1974, Colombia was governed by the National Front, the
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organizational face of a power-sharing agreement between Liberals and Conservatives.
After its formal dissolution in 1974, heavy influence of this power-sharing arrangement
persisted until 1986. During this latter period, the winner of each election was obliged to
invite the runner-up to join the government (Bushnell 1993, 224-5, 250; Chernick 1988,
83, fn 1).
The Colombian episcopacy's exclusive alliance with Conservatives ended with the
creation for the National Front, producing a critical juncture in Church-state relations.
This development was actively pursued by both episcopal leaders and secular elites.
Deeming it to be a necessary condition for peace, Colombia's bishops welcomed and
endorsed the National Front agreement enthusiastically (Levine 1977, 231; Bushnell
1993, 239).
This choice was not a foregone conclusion, as a significant faction of bishops
preferred at the time to retain the Church's relationship with the Conservative Party. A
simultaneous and critical contingency was that the Liberal Party publicly agreed to cease
any return to questions of the Church's special status or privileges (Wilde 1984, 7-10).
Assessing the important transition of this period, Levine and Wilde (1977) argue that the
disastrous unfolding of La Violencia compelled many Colombian bishops to regard
involvement in socio-political conflicts in subsequent decades as dangerous. The
effective extrication of the episcopacy from such conflicts, however, was only made
possible via the historical contingency of the National Front agreement and its alternation
of Colombia's political environment. The National Front agreement dismantled the logic
of the Church's old partisan alliance allowing the episcopacy to renounce any further
partisan activity (Levine and Wilde 1977, 231). Wilde argues that the episcopacy
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ultimately came to see that support for such an oligarchical government that included
Liberals and provided more security for the Church than partisan alliance with
Conservatives (1984, 9-10). This pronouncement, combined with the effective exclusion
of non-National Front voices from the political arena (Bushnell 1993, 224), essentially
ended the possibility of altering ongoing Church-state ties.
Mechanisms of Reproduction and Outcomes
The consolidation of an uncontested, dense network of Church-state ties in
Colombia in 1958 established a Church-state relationship that discouraged involvement
of the Church in partisan struggles. The configuration of these ties included state
authority over important internal Church affairs, state support for Church programs and
activities, and an ideologically conservative episcopal conference. Operating as selfreinforcing mechanisms of reproduction, these ties bound together the interests the
Colombian episcopacy with those of successive Colombian governments, undermining
both the ideological and strategic appeal of public confrontation with the state.
The most important Church-state ties consolidated by the critical juncture were
first put into place by a 1942 reform of the 1887 concordat. From this time until the
renegotiation of Colombia's concordat with the Vatican in 1973, the Church was afforded
special privileges. The state allowed heavy Catholic involvement in public education,
substantial state financial support for religious education, and state support for Church
activities in official designated "mission territory" (encompassing two-thirds of
Colombia's territory) continued unabated (Neuhouser 1989, 241). During the same
period, bishops continued to be nominated by the president and approved by the Vatican.
After the 1973 concordat, the Vatican assumed more control over the selection of
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bishops, but the state retained the right to reject any nomination on political grounds
(Williford 2005, 211-2; Wilde 1987, 8). Emblematic of the growing closeness between
the hierarchy and Colombia's military, the 1973 concordat granted an honorary
generalship to the Archbishop of Bogota. In the Colombian bishops' formal statement on
the concordat, the bishops praised the military describing it as a permanently mobilized
force essential for achieving internal peace (Wilde 1987, 9). With its status no longer
threatened and its participation in partisan politics abandoned, the episcopacy's partisan
messages were replaced with calls for national unity after the mid-1950s. Significantly,
these calls continued to insist that separation of Church and state would undermine this
unity (Levine 1981, 86-7).
Nevertheless, the proximity of this critical juncture to the height of the
international era of Church reform affected episcopal rhetoric. Shortly after their
withdrawal from partisan politics (after 1958) and Vatican II (1962-65), the episcopacy
engaged in a brief period of broadly progressive pastoral statements commenting on
unjust social structures (Levine 1981, 88-95; Bushnell 1993, 227). This period included
the episcopacy's 1961 call for agrarian reform, a stance that would have been
unimaginable only a decade earlier (Mecham 1966, 136).
The episcopacy's period of progressive political pronouncements came to an end
in the late 1960s. The majority of Colombia’s bishops rejected the final documents of the
Medellín Conference, pronouncements often noted for their progressive content and calls
to social and political involvement (Mutchler 1971, 133). By 1971, the Colombian
episcopacy completed an abrupt about-face and became one of the harshest critics of the
Catholic left (Levine 1981, 90-94). In essence, the Colombian episcopacy's established
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eschewal of partisan political activity contributed to a broader aversion to progressive
political statements they viewed as divisive. The episcopacy began to describe structural
explanations of social problems and dependencia as naïve and overly simplistic and warn
of the dangers of Church involvement in political entanglements. This was particularly
the case in the 1976 document Christian Identity in Actions for Justice, which openly
criticized clerical progressive political activity as distracting for priests and a source of
crippling division within the Church (Levine 1981, 92). However, perhaps nowhere is
the rejection of political involvement of the church more evident than in the 1971
episcopal document, Justice in the World, which is worth quoting at length:
Perhaps in the past his [the Christian’s] revulsion from violence led him to
minimize injustice or resign himself to it, but today sensitivity to injustice and
oppression tends to aggravate itself and run the risk of contributing to escalation
of the struggle between men who should be brothers. It is said that now no way
out is seen other than the defeat of an adversary. The eschatological teachings of
the Sermon on the Mount and their culmination in the nonviolence of the Cross
cannot be converted directly into norms of human conduct for complex situations,
but they can and must be translated into love in the midst of even the most
difficult and intractable conflicts. (quoted in Levine 1981, 92)
To the Colombian bishops, sensitivity to injustice on the part of the episcopacy
was a dangerous proposition because it could lead to the Church's political involvement
in contentious disputes that might undermine a valuable alliance with the post 1958
political regime. Therefore, from 1971 onward episcopal documents instead emphasized
moral failings as the root cause of social problems (Levine 1985, 305), which remained
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otherwise uncritical of the status quo (Wilde 1984, 24). For example, in the episcopacy's
1984 statement on drug trafficking and addiction, individuals involved in immoral actions
are the subjects of criticism, but this almost never extends to the state, its leadership, or
its policies (Colombian Episcopal Conference 1984). Similar themes were paramount in
other documents issued during this time. The result was an episcopacy since recognized
as one of the most outwardly conservative in all of Latin America (Gauding 1991;
Richard 1987).
Outside of the episcopacy, progressive political ideologies and political activity
existed, though they were marginalized within the Colombian Church. Some progressive
voices appeared among Colombia's religious orders, which were not under the direct
ecclesiastical authority of local bishops. Other voices appeared among members of the
clergy. From such sources sprung some clergy-led popular organizing, including Jesuitinspired trade unions and radio schools aimed at rural populations (Levine and Wilde
1977, 231). The well-known case of Fr. Camilo Torres notwithstanding, progressive
clergy were less prevalent in Colombia than in Brazil, Peru and El Salvador (Bushnell
1993, 245).102 Ultimately, however, progressive voices emanating from the Colombian
clergy, such as the Galconda Group, were regarded by the episcopacy as rebelling against
Church hierarchy (Wilde 1984, 24). This dynamic, born in the episcopacy's support for
the National Front, was replayed during the human rights crises of the 1980s and 1990s.
In the late 1970s, Colombia's long-simmering civil war reignited. Despite the
presence of competitive elections, by the early 1980s an already serious human rights
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situation was growing far worse. Civilian authorities granted broad autonomy to the
armed forces in matters of internal security (Aviles 2001, 33). During this time, security
forces lent direct support to paramilitary organizations that "targeted social and
community leaders, local public employees, human rights defenders and trade unionists,
among others… [and] terroris[ed] the population through torture, selective homicide, and
massacres" (UNHCR 2005, para. 18, 21). Death squads linked by both activists and
academics to security forces also grew in urban areas during the 1980s (Chernick 1988,
56). This war against subversion suppressed political opposition parties and movements
(IACHR 1999, Ch. IX) and included the systematic eradication of members of the Unión
Patriótica, the emergent political wing of the FARC during peace negotiations, including
the murder or disappearance of over 3,500 party members (Pardo 2000, 72).103 By the
mid-1990s, the military and various paramilitary forces were responsible for “kill[ing]
thousands of peasants suspected of supporting the guerrillas and displac[ing] hundreds of
thousands” (Goodwin 2001, 241).
Victims of violence during this period included Church personnel. According to a
UN reports that the state has formally accused some Church members of maintaining ties
with guerrillas, and that, "between 1984 and 2002, more than 50 lay workers and clergy
were killed, including a Bishop, and a further 17 were kidnapped and 38 threatened"
(UNHCR 2005, para. 113)
The growing human rights problem of the 1980s prompted few if any public
episcopal responses, other than moral condemnation of terrorist attacks attributed to the
FARC and the ELN. The episcopacy framed the civil war in terms identical to those
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employed by the regime, Colombia's problems stemmed from the breakdown of
"authority and security rather than social justice and democracy" (Wilde 1984, 24). Statesanctioned rights abuse during the 1980s did not sufficiently threaten church interests to
risk alienating those in control of the state and various resources afforded the Church.
Although the episcopacy denounced the broad moral failings it saw in Colombian
society, the scope of its political pronouncements remained very narrow, excluding
denunciation of the officials, governments, or institutions that tolerated human rights
abuses (Wilde 1987). 104
The Colombian episcopacy also actively resisted involvement in grassroots efforts
to document military and paramilitary-linked rights abuses. The most prominent of these
was the Intercongregational Commission for Justice and Peace which was founded by
Javier Giraldo, a Catholic priest and Jesuit. By 1986, Giraldo was able to secure a
resolution of support for his work from various leaders of religious orders in Colombia,
but the bishops conference blocked this work (Tate 2007, 115-6). After 1988, Giraldo and
his network of supporters were able to resume their work with international financial
support. After 1989, very tentative episcopal support began, but only for investigation
into cases of the persecution of clergy (Tate 2007, 59-60). Episcopal involvement in
human rights advocacy became more significant in the mid-1990s, when Girlado's
organization became a part of the episcopacy's organizational structure, called the
Commission on Justice and Peace. Afterwards, the episcopacy began to speak more
openly about the human rights, particularly the plight of the internally displaced. In sum,
the Colombian episcopacy remained remarkably united and silent during a wave of
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human rights abuse in the 1980s and provided minimal or no assistance to victims of
repression until the 1990s.
Guatemala: Delayed Advocacy
The evolution of Church-state ties in Guatemala follows a very different path than
that of Colombia. Church and state in Guatemala formally separated in the late 19th
century in the midst of a bitter liberal-conservative conflict. Some limited Church-state
ties persisted for over a half-century. Then in 1954, the US-sponsored coup that
overthrew the Arbenz government created a political opportunity to re-establish Churchstate collaboration on the basis of anticommunism. The first years of the Armas
dictatorship, culminating in the 1956 constitution, witnessed a critical juncture in Churchstate relations. Following the critical juncture, the Guatemalan Church retained control
over its internal affairs, but secured new and significant state support for its activities.
This support allowed the Church to expand its presence in rural areas. As the rural
episcopacy came into greater contact with the peasantry during the era of Church reform
and in the context of development initiatives, this section of the episcopacy moved away
from conservatism. The urban episcopacy, however, remained closely tied to
conservative social forces in control of the state. The result was an episcopacy that, while
small, became extremely divided in ideological terms. This division, combined with
conservative dominance in Guatemala's only archdiocese and intensive state repression,
delayed the episcopal conference's rhetorical and practical support for the human rights
movement for several years.
Antecedent Conditions

250

The separation of church and state in Guatemala was the direct result of the
Liberal revolution of 1871. The first act of the revolutionary government of García
Granados in May of 1871 was to expel the Jesuits and expropriate their properties
(Mecham 1966, 317-8). Attacks against the church mounted throughout the rest of the
1870s. The archbishop of Guatemala and his auxiliary bishop were permanently exiled.
All religious orders and communities were forcibly disbanded, and all church-owned
property was expropriated by the state. Religious education was suppressed and the
education system was secularized, with expropriated Church buildings turned into staterun schools. Civil marriage was legalized, cemeteries were secularized, and the Church
was denied juridical personality (Klaiber 1998, 221; Mecham 1966, 318-9). By
December of 1879, these restrictions and the official disestablishment of the Church was
codified in a new Constitution that would last until 1945 (Mecham 1966, 318).
In spite of all of these restrictions, the de facto separation of church and state was
not absolute. Although the state surrendered its right to nominate bishops, it continued to
exile most archbishops until the late 1930s (Mecham 1966, 319-20). The state also paid
meager salaries to some members of the clergy and the Concordat of 1884 mandated the
transfer of 30,000 pesos from the state to the church annually (Mecham 1966, 319). Such
measures allowed the state to play a role in the construction of an episcopacy that was
less antagonistic in its dealings with the political elite.
Guatemala's small size allowed it only one archdiocese until 1996, a reality that
inflated the influence of the country's only archbishop. As a result, the most powerful
members of the episcopacy in Guatemala's post-1870 period were archbishops that were
ideologically compatible with conservative elites. Following disestablishment,
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Archbishop Ricardo Casanova Estrada (1886-1913) established ties with the new coffee
oligarchy that would last into at least the 1960s (Klaiber 1998, 223). Casanova was
succeeded by a number of archbishops with comparatively short tenures. However, as
the 1930s came to an end, Mariano Rossell y Arellano (1939-64) was elevated to the
position of archbishop. Rossell would come to play a decisive role in the reconfiguration
of Church-state ties.
Crisis and Critical Juncture
Guatemala experienced destabilizing social and political reforms between 1944
and 1954, culminating in the crisis of the 1954 coup. Elected reformist governments of
the period were led by Juan José Arévalo (1944-1950) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-1954).
Reforms began under the quasi-ideological umbrella of Arévalo's "spiritual socialism,"
which, though vague, involved reforms aimed at improving the social and economic
position of Guatemala's peasants and workers. Built on support from a shifting coalition
of revolutionary parties, reforms promoted increased credit to small farmers, the
formation of some cooperatives, the strengthening of unions, and the establishment of an
"extensive" social security network (Handy 1994, 27, 30-2). Rising coffee prices in the
international market helped offset the expense of the reforms. However, a high inflation
rate and a growing deficit necessitated tax reform, which the government attempted to
formulate equitably. In addition to restructuring the income tax, the state increased taxes
on imports and exported agricultural commodities (Handy 1994, 27). These reforms
provoked intense opposition among landowners and conservative parties, and over the
course of his term of office, Arévalo withstood nearly 30 coup attempts (Handy 1994, 323).
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Matters intensified after the contentious election of Arévalo's successor, Jacobo
Arbenz, in 1951. Opposition to his government gathered momentum and international
support by focusing on his cooperation with the Guatemalan Communist Party (Handy
1994, 36). Of greatest controversy in programmatic terms was Arbenz' proposal for
agrarian reform, passed by Congress in 1952, which further stoked conflict with
landowners. In addition to the expropriation of land owned by the United Fruit Company,
the Agrarian Reform Law raised concerns in the CIA and Eisenhower administration
about the influence of communism in Guatemala (Handy 1994, 173-9). Subsequently, the
US leant critical support to the small "Liberation Army," which was in training abroad
since 1952, fervently anticommunist, and led by Castillo Armas. In late June 1954 the
"Liberation Army" invaded and the Guatemalan military declined to defend the Arbenz
government. Arbenz was overthrown and went into permanent exile. By September 1954,
Armas had consolidated his power and on October 10 he was "elected" president by an
oral public vote (Handy 1994, 178-9, 189-90, 193-4).
After assuming control of Guatemala, Armas began an effort to 'reconstruct' the
country. One partner in this endeavor was Guatemala's Catholic episcopacy. The most
powerful figure in the Guatemalan Church at the time was Mariano Rossell y Arellano,
Archbishop of Guatemala City's archdiocese. Elevated to his position as archbishop in
1939, Rossell strengthened ties to elites via his own fervently anticommunist rhetoric,
which was consistent with international Catholic social doctrine. From 1945 until the
Arbenz' overthrow, Rossell and other Guatemalan bishops were publicly critical of
communist influence in the Arévalo and Arbenz governments (Holden 2008, 497, 503-6).
During the early years of this criticism, however, the exclusive pursuit of staunchly
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conservative anticommunism was not a foregone conclusion. Early episcopal statements
paired denunciations of communism with criticism of Guatemala's exploitative social
structure that included vague calls for reform (Holden 2008, 508-12). However, by the
early 1950s, Rossell became one of the most prominent opponents of the Arbenz
government. In 1954, as tension mounted in the prelude to Arbenz' overthrow, Rossell
called on Guatemalans to "rise up as one man against the enemy God, of our fatherland,"
and against "the worst of the atheistic doctrines of all time, anti-Christian communism"
(quoted in Handy 1994, 175; see also Pike 1959, 110).
As a result, Rossell became the ally of Carlos Castillo Armas, both before and
after his 1954 coup. Once Armas was in power and institutions were fundamentally
redesigned, the historically contingent relationship between Armas and Archbishop
Rossell produced a critical juncture in Guatemalan Church-state relations. Klaiber marks
the formation of this alliance as a major turning point in Guatemalan church-state
relations, stating that, "From that moment on, rightwing groups recognized the church as
an important ally and rewarded it. The 1956 and 1966 constitutions eliminated nearly all
of the anticlerical restrictions" held over from 1871 (1998, 223). This included the lifting
of bans on Church ownership of land, clerical freedom of association, clerical
participation in questions of labor, and prohibitions on religious instruction in public
schools (Pike 1959, 92-3).105 Prior to Armas' assassination in 1957, the general presented
Rossell with a national award for his anti-communist work (Mecham 1966, 320).
Mechanisms of Reproduction and Outcomes
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Out of Guatemala's critical juncture came self-reinforcing mechanisms of
reproduction in which based the institutional ties between Church and state on
anticommunism. State authority over the internal operations of the Church was not part of
that reconnection and so, unlike Colombia, the state possessed no discretion over the
selection of bishops. Thus, the role of the Vatican took on heightened importance in
Guatemala. Despite this, collaboration with the state after 1954 ultimately pulled the
Guatemalan episcopacy in two directions. Archbishop Rossell's association with the
oligarchy, anticommunism, and Armas laid the foundation for the provision of two
crucial benefits for the Church. The first was state permission for the entry of a wave of
foreign clergy. The second was state permission and support for Church-initiated rural
development projects. However, these benefits created secondary, long term effects
within the Guatemalan Church. The influx of foreign priests coupled with Catholic
Action's work in the countryside became a center-piece in the Church's effort to
accomplish its spiritual and organizational mission. This brought some sectors of the
Church, including the episcopacy, into closer contact with popular sectors, especially
peasant and indigenous communities in rural areas. The Church outside of Guatemala
City's archdiocese began to develop interests apart from Rossell, his like-minded
successor, Archbishop Mario Casariego (1964-1983), and the Guatemalan oligarchy. The
result was an episcopacy intensely divided about its social mission and how to achieve it
during the rampant state-sanctioned violence of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Under Rossell's leadership, over 100 foreign priests were permitted to enter the
country, increasing the total number of priests to 250 by 1956. Negotiated by the papal
nuncio, foreign priests were needed alleviate Guatemala's severe priest shortage (Pike
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1959, 107-8). In part, this was made possible by Rossell's successful efforts to win the
trust of Armas and other powerful Guatemalan conservatives. In addition to securing the
return of the Jesuits to Guatemala, Rossell's influence made it possible for the influx of
missionaries to organize peasants into Catholic Action and other Church-affiliated
groups. Catholic Action proved remarkably successful in the Guatemalan countryside
and Rossell planned to put it to use strengthening Catholic orthodoxy (Pattridge 1995, 26;
Grandin 1997, 11).
Catholic Action trained rural Guatemalans who returned to their homes and
interacted with various local authority structures. Prior to 1954, this often provoked
conflict with traditional leaders, which Catholic Action members often attempted to
overcome via anticommunist appeals. This work contributed to the breakdown of many
traditional authority structures in rural areas (Pattridge 1995; Grandin 1997, 11).
However, after Armas' consolidation of power, independent peasant organizations were
repressed and Catholic Action became one of the sole sources of developmental work and
community organizing in Guatemala's countryside (Grandin 1997, 14; Garrard-Burnett
2010, 120). By the late 1950s, Catholic Action "initiated community improvement
projects such as the construction of schools, the repair of roads and bridges, and the
creation of savings and loans cooperatives" (Grandin 1997, 14). By the mid-1960s this
work evolved into the organization of peasant leagues and by the late 1960s Catholic
Action catechists became involved in participatory literacy campaigns inspired by Paulo
Freire and the formation of Christian Base Communities (CEBs). As a result, Guatemalan
Catholic Action provided the impetus for organized (and eventually politicized) claims-
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making arising in the 1960s (Garrard-Burnett 2010, 120-6; Grandin 1997, 14; Klaiber
1998, 223).
Many of these demands would be taken up by rural bishops in the 1960s, forming
the basis for an ideological transformation necessary to produce the episcopal
denunciations of the mid to late 1980s. Although clearly an unintended consequence
from the perspective of Rossell, his work to extend the reach of the church into the
countryside would form the basis for the church's gradual renewal over the next two
decades.
Archbishop Mario Casariego (1964-1983), Rossell's successor, was an intensely
conservative figure and during his tenure as archbishop, he continued Rossell's
denunciations of communist subversion. This ideological stance included staunch
opposition to nearly all of the progressive tendencies within the clergy as well as
progressive organizations run by lay organizers (Klaiber 1998, 224). Casariego's first
year as archbishop was also the first year of the Guatemalan Episcopal Conference. As
Guatemala's only archbishop and head of the conference, Casariego was able to derail the
efforts of progressive bishops, produce paralyzing internal division, and create the public
image of a Church that remained silent on social issues.
It was in the midst of such bitter intra-episcopal conflicts that the Guatemalan
Church was faced with what was arguably the worst wave of human rights abuse in the
Americas in the 20th century. Human rights abuse had been a persistent feature of the
government’s counterinsurgency during Guatemala’s prolonged civil war (1962-1994).
However, human rights violations rose steadily after 1974, and especially sharply during
the regimes of Generals Romeo Lucas Garcia (1978-1982) and Efrain Ríos Montt (1982-
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1983). During the late 1970s, successive waves of political murders targeted urban labor
and grassroots leaders and activists. However, the total number of human rights abuses
skyrocketed during Lucas’ “scorched earth” highland counterinsurgency offensives
during 1981 and early 1982, and stayed tremendously high during the Ríos Montt-led
counterinsurgency offensives during the second half of 1982 and 1983. Serious rights
violations continued after this time, but the period between 1980 and 1983 represents the
peak of state-sanctioned repression and violence. Characteristic forms of human rights
abuse during this period included village massacres, extrajudicial executions, forced
disappearances, rapes, irregular detentions and torture (REMHI 1999, 211-41, 302).
Moreover, the vast majority of rights abuse was attributed to security forces tied directly
to the state, including the army, civil patrols, and death squads (REMHI 1999, 290-91, fn
3).
Two key progressive figures in the Guatemalan episcopacy during this period
were Bishop Mario Ríos Montt and Monsignor Juan Gerardi Conedera.106 Both were first
appointed to positions in the episcopacy by the Vatican during the height of reformism in
the international Church and both began their work as bishops in rural areas.107 Both
bishops were frequently at odds with Archbishop Casariego over social issues, including
human rights, and their political activities made them targets of repression. Gerardi was
the bishop of the diocese of El Quiché, which experienced a wave of particularly intense
and violent repression in 1980. Returning from a visit to Rome in December of 1980,
Gerardi was denied entry to the country. Gerardi became involved with the Guatemalan
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107
Gerardi was made a bishop in 1967 and his first assignment was the diocese of Verapaz, Coban. Mario
Rios Montt was first made titular bishop of Tiguala in 1974.
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Church in Exile (IGE), a group that attempted to monitor the human rights situation in
Guatemala from Mexico City. Both Gerardi and Ríos Montt routinely received death
threats and in 1980 an attempt was made on Gerardi's life (Jonas, McCaughan and
Martínez 1984, 145-8).108
Even as growing numbers of progressive clergy and lay workers became victims
of death squads, Casariego was non-cooperative, at times even obstructive, when dealing
with progressive clergy and bishops. In both 1974 and 1976, the archbishop refused to
sign documents addressing the problems of violence, and poverty and injustice,
respectively. In 1978, after the bishops had prepared a document to orient churchgoers
prior to municipal elections, Casariego "took the document, eliminated the parts that did
not please him, and published it without consulting the other bishops" (228). This
incident prompted six bishops to write the Vatican asking for his removal (228).
Despite the Lucas and Ríos Montt regimes’ sweeping use of brutal violence and
intimidation during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and despite Bishop Gerardi's forced
exile, the forced closure of the El Quiché diocese, and the targeting of progressive priests
and catechists, the Guatemalan episcopacy at large remained silent as an organization. It
is possible that escalating repression forced the progressive church into silence,
particularly in rural dioceses. There is little doubt that the exile and repression of figures
such as Bishops Gerardi and Ríos Montt significantly impacted the potential of
progressive episcopates to create their own human rights organizations. Indeed, had
Casariego possessed a greater personal concern for human rights, it is unclear how
effectively he would have been able to protect activist clergy and laypeople from state
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repression. It is also unclear how effectively Casariego would have been able to create a
human rights-oriented archdiocese that more closely resembled that of Oscar Romero's or
Arturo Rivera y Damas' in San Salvador. Nevertheless, repression leveled against the
Church in El Salvador was extreme as well. More than half of the 40-plus priests and
nuns murdered in Central America between 1971 and 1990 died in El Salvador (Peterson
1997, 63). Meanwhile, the Archdiocese of San Salvador demonstrated perhaps the
clearest commitment to denouncing state human rights abuses of any other in the region.
Thus, repression alone does not completely explain the Guatemalan episcopacy's delayed
response.
Essential to understanding this delay is the ability of the ultra-conservative faction
of the episcopacy, led by Archbishop Casariego, to block forceful denunciations of state
rights abuses that unambiguously spoke on behalf of the Guatemalan Church (Klaiber
1998, 227). Throughout 1980 and 1981 episcopal statements that involved Casariego
remained "conciliatory" and "did not point to those responsible for the repression" (Jonas,
McCaughan and Martínez 1984, 146). Public statements in 1982 took a slightly harsher
tone, but still sought dialogue with the military regime (146).109
The impasse in the Guatemalan episcopal conference would not be undone until
the end of the Efrain Ríos Montt regime. That events that set this development in motion
played out between 1982 and 1983. When Ríos Montt came to power in a junior officer
coup he was a retired general who had converted to an evangelical sect called the Church
of the Word. His evangelical zeal became a main feature of his tenure as head of the
military government. Once in power, Rios Montt “surrounded himself with advisors
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Klaiber characterizes the pre-1983 Guatemalan episcopacy's response in similar terms (1998, 227-9).

260

from his church and every Sunday gave a televised message to the nation on "'morality
and the family'" (Klaiber 1998, 220). Evangelical missionaries were welcomed into the
country in large numbers and Rios Montt even earned praise from Pat Robertson. Under
Ríos Montt’s direction, the military forces, which previously had mistrusted all religious
organizations in the countryside, now distinguished between Protestant groups that it
viewed as allies, and Catholic groups, particularly catechists and Catholic activists, that it
viewed as enemies, regardless of whether or not they practiced liberation theology
(Klaiber 1997, 220-1; REMHI 1999, 240-42). Finally, the regime restricted the freedom
of Caritas, the Church’s main social welfare agency (Cleary 1989, 137). Not
surprisingly, Ríos Montt’s appeals to Protestant groups “irritated many Catholics and
some Protestants” (221). Ríos Montt’s isolation also effectively sidelined any remaining
ability of Church elites to privately pressure his regime on human rights.
In June of 1983 Casariego died and in August Ríos Montt was overthrown. The
result was an opportunity for renewed episcopal unity around the desperate human rights
problem, which by this period was more aptly described as genocide. At the start of the
new year, the Vatican's selection for Casariego's successor ended decades of conservative
control of Guatemala's only archdiocese and tipped the scales in the ideological stalemate
within the Guatemalan episcopal conference.
In January of 1984 the Vatican appointed Bishop Próspero Penados, then bishop
of San Marcos, to become Archbishop. Penados would become a high-profile human
rights advocate helping to present the new unity position of the episcopacy that called for
respect of human rights and an end to violence. In 1984 the bishops conference
published To Construct Peace, a document that described the massacre and exploitation
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of the peasantry at the hands of the military and proposed specific steps to address the
problem. These included lifting restrictions on the Church’s ability to provide material
assistance and legal aid to Guatemalans, a return to respect for Guatemala’s constitution,
and legislation to “condemn, as abominable crimes of a warped humanity, the abduction,
torture, and disappearance of persons. The practice of these crimes which, to
Guatemala’s disgrace, have become so frequent, is an affront to Guatemala and has
placed us in a sad position in our relationships with other civilized nations” (Guatemalan
Episcopal Conference 1984, 144). In 1989, Penados founded the Office of Human Rights
of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, which rapidly grew from a staff of 4 to a staff of 29,
including "lawyers, educators, sociologists, [and] economists" (Klaiber 1998, 229). After
considerable delay the Guatemalan Catholic Church came into its own as an important
public defender of human rights.
El Salvador: Contentious Denunciation
Archbishop Oscar Romero's denunciations of the Salvadoran regime and his
tragic assassination is perhaps the most widely known instance of Church-state
interaction in Latin American history. Less known are the historically contingent set of
circumstances that set Salvadoran Church-state relations on a remarkably different path
than Guatemala. Though both experienced Church-state separation in the late 19th
century, ties were never re-established despite a moment that might have prompted such a
reconfiguration. Unlike Guatemala, in El Salvador the rise of a Marxist left during the
early 1930s did not prompt the state to restore Church-state ties to facilitate programs
meant to undermine the influence of the left. As a result, the Salvadoran episcopacy at
large lacked some of the resources that allowed the Guatemalan Church to become
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organized in rural areas. At the same time, El Salvador's only archdiocese was heavily
influenced by the Vatican, rather than the constellation of conservative social forces in
control of the state. The era of international Church reform affected San Salvador greatly.
Untethered to the state, the episcopacy became a public, if dissonant, voice in Salvadoran
partisan politics. The result was a rural episcopacy that remained largely disconnected
from the political activation of the peasantry and conservative in the countryside. At the
same time, a stridently progressive episcopacy centered in San Salvador took shape,
sending its own personnel to work with campesino communities in rural dioceses. This
division persisted. Though never united in the defense of human rights, the institutional
weight of the archdiocese facilitated the organization of early human rights activists and
pulled the Salvadoran Church into the forefront of human rights advocacy.
Antecedent Conditions
The story of 19th century liberal-driven separation of church and state in El
Salvador is remarkably similar to that of Guatemala. Church and state were separated in
1871 with the Liberal overthrow of a conservative regime. Since that time, the
Salvadoran state has held no right to participate in the selection of bishops or other
ecclesiastical officers. Moreover, religious freedom was restored, civil marriage
legalized, cemeteries secularized, education removed from the control of the clergy,
monastic orders declared illegal, and Church acquisition of new properties banned.110
These restrictions were codified and maintained in all of El Salvador's subsequent
constitutions until 1962 (Mecham 1966, 324-5).
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As the church worked to reorient itself to the new liberal-dominated Salvadoran
reality, the episcopacy sought to build informal ties with social and political elites. This
was most likely the case through at least the 1920s, when church prelates joined the
ruling coalition of "coffee-growing oligarchs, foreign investors and military officers"
(Klaiber 1998, 173). However, the episcopacy's informal ties did not secure a reversal of
liberal-era restrictions on the Church. These remained in place through the mid-20th
century and beyond. Indeed, the only noteworthy changes during the 20th century were
provisions in the 1962 constitution allowing clergy to teach religion classes in public
schools at the request of parents, and granting the Church the right to acquire property
(Mecham 1966, 325). In subsequent decades, this separation would hold fast.
Crisis and Critical Juncture
Between 1929 and 1932, El Salvador suffered through a series of crises like most
of the region. With the onset of the Great Depression, commodity prices fell sharply.
Coffee comprised 85 percent of El Salvador's exports and its price fell by 45 percent in
only six months. Between 1928 and 1931, national income declined by 50 percent. Credit
disappeared, plantation workers' already meager wages declined by 50 percent, and
approximately one-third of peasant tenants lost their land because they could no longer
pay. State revenue declined by 30 percent and the Salvadoran government defaulted on
loans while owing back pay to civil servants and soldiers (Dunkerley 1982, 22).
This economic catastrophe coincided with the election of liberal Arturo Araujo in
1930. Araujo assumed the presidency in the midst of large-scale demonstrations by
workers and students, the appearance of various Marxist organizations with international
ties, and the founding and rapid growth of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS)
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(Anderson 1971, 25-37; Dunkerley 1982, 24). When Araujo rejected pressure from the
oligarchy to devalue the colon and a wave of arrests targeting popular sector activists
failed to stem protests, the military deposed him after having served in office for only
five months. Araujo was replaced by General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez. This
move provoked even more popular mobilization particularly in central and western
regions of the country, areas where the PCS had been most active (Dunkerley 1982, 24).
In January 1932, after municipal and congressional elections called by the
Martínez regime were tightly controlled by the National Guard, the PCS launched an
insurrection centered in western rural areas. By all accounts, the insurrection resulted in
disaster. Three principle leaders of the PCS, including Farabundo Martí, were arrested
before the rebellion began and later executed. The revolt proceeded anyway, though the
PCS lacked both sufficient organization to direct it and a sufficiently large working class
base to carry it into urban areas (Dunkerley 1982, 27-31). Estimates of casualties in the
initial revolt range, but Anderson suggests no more than 35 soldiers, police and civilians
combined were killed and few posit more than 100 total casualties (Anderson 1971, 136).
However, the revolt triggered a massive, state-led wave of violence in the countryside
known as la matanza (the massacre). Approximately 30,000 peasants were killed,
including women and children (Dunkerley 1982, 29).111
The aftermath of the 1932 insurrection and the massacre that followed
reconfigured the means through which the Salvadoran oligarchy, along with the
repressive capacity of the National Guard, ruled El Salvador in previous decades. After

111

Anderson discusses variation in the totals given by various sources, suggesting the actual totals may be
significantly lower, though the disproportionate scale of violence was sweeping and egregious regardless of
the precise total (1971, 134-6).

265

the massacre, subsequent regimes would continue to partner the Salvadoran oligarchy
with the military and rely on alternating periods of easing political concessions in urban
areas and violent repression of popular sector organization in the countryside (Byrne
1996, 23-4). Martínez remained in power for 12 more years, followed by a period of
intra-military factional struggle (1944-1948). Once settled, an extended period followed
typified by military authoritarianism with the façade of electoral democracy and a party
system that was extremely weak if not totally irrelevant.112
Absent from the Salvadoran military-authoritarian regime's strategy to end rural,
class-based dissent was any formal collaboration with the Salvadoran Catholic Church.
This was true from 1932 onward. General Martínez avoided any cooperation with the
Church comparable to that arranged in Guatemala between Archbishop Rossell and
Castillo Armas. This decision could not have had its source in a lack of concern about the
influence of Marxism on the part of Church leaders. Anticommunism had been a highprofile concern in the international Church since Rerum Novarum in 1891. Moreover, in
1927, three years before the founding of the PCS, Archbishop of San Salvador
Monsignor Belloso y Sánchez issued a pastoral letter stating that "a Catholic who pledges
himself to any of the systems of socialism runs the grave risk of heresy" (Dunkerley 1982,
108, emphasis added). Instead, the lack of formalized collaboration between Martínez
and the Church stemmed, at least in part, from among the most idiosyncratic of historical
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contingencies, Martínez' own religious views. Martínez was a theosophist who believed
in reincarnation of the human soul in addition to various other "occult manifestations" at
odds with even the most syncretic practitioners of Catholicism (Anderson 1971, 50;
Dunkerley 1982, 24).
Mechanisms of Reproduction and Outcomes
Free of ties to the state, El Salvador's episcopacy followed a trajectory in which
support from the state was sought, but achieving little in the area, confrontation with the
state risked little. Consequently, the Salvadoran Church became a public, partisan
advocate on behalf of its own interests. Without state interference in the selection of
bishops, these bishops were shaped primarily by the Vatican and the experience of
bishops themselves.
Martínez' period in power stretched from 1932 to 1944. During that time,
Martínez' religious views continued to precluded anticommunist-oriented collaboration
with the Church. Even more, the insertion of those views into other facets of his political
agenda antagonized Church leaders. In accordance with one of Martínez' directives, in
1940 public schools began implementing a new curriculum related to moral instruction.
This curriculum had been personally revised by Martínez and "embodied his own
theosophical beliefs" (Parkman 1988, 57). Citing this effort as well as speeches given to
Martínez' Pro-Patria party that attacked Church doctrine, the Church took up public, selforganized opposition and protested with public letters and pamphlets. These materials
were then confiscated by the state (Parkman 1988, 57).
In larger institutional terms, when the Salvadoran Constitution was revised in
1939 and again in 1944 the Church lobbied the state to alter some of the anticlerical
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tenets in effect since the 1871 constitution. However, these efforts were entirely
unsuccessful. The 1939 constitution added language stating that "ministers of religious
cults must abstain from putting their spiritual authority at the service of political
interests" and placed private schools under the control of the state (Parkman 1988, 57).
After Martínez was ousted, the Church fared no better in this arena. Despite the Church's
lobbying, the 1949 constitution retained the 1939 prohibition as well as all other preexisting limitations on the Church. Once again, when reforms were not forthcoming, El
Salvador's bishops issued a joint pastoral letter criticizing the constituent assembly (Pike
1959, 94).
As efforts to lobby the state remained ineffective, Church-state separation allowed
the Vatican a free hand to appoint bishops and otherwise influence the actions of the
Salvadoran Church. In 1938, the Vatican appointed a new archbishop of San Salvador,
Luiz Chávez y González. Ideologically moderate and strategically flexible, Chávez'
impressive tenure as archbishop spanned four decades (1938-1977). During this time,
Chávez followed the Vatican line and embraced the evolving social position of the
Church established during Vatican II and Medellín. This adaptability allowed Chávez to
play a prophetic role in politics when he deemed such action appropriate. One early
example took place in April of 1944. As General Martínez faced the earliest of a series of
military insurrections that would eventually depose him, he ordered a wave of executions.
Archbishop Chávez along with members of the clergy called on those executions to cease
(Parkman 1988, 59-61).
Archbishop Chávez consistently implemented Catholic programs and their
reorientations during the era of Church reform. The result was that the Salvadoran
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Church developed an independent political voice, ties to independent political
organizations, a demonstrated willingness to publicly criticize the regime. These included
a commitment to Catholic Action and related organizations working on specific social
problems such as alcoholism (Pike 1959, 110), Catholic unionism, and the creation of
peasant cooperatives as early as the 1940s and 1950s. In 1958 Chávez founded the
Diocesan Social Secretariat, which “coordinated and promoted assistance programs and
self-help projects in parishes in the archdiocese of San Salvador” (Peterson 1997, 49; see
also Pike 1959, 104). In the 1960s, Chávez spread progressive reforms and themes
adopted at Vatican II and Medellín by promoting the reading of their documents and
issuing a series of socially progressive pastoral letters (Brett 2008, 718; Peterson 1997,
49; Klaiber 1998, 173). Grassroots organizing led by the Church accelerated after 1964
with the formation of the country's first CEB's and the Christian Federation of Salvadoran
Peasants (FECCAS), both of which began with the support Chávez (Bakhtiari 1986, 29;
Montgomery 1983, 62; Dunkerley 1982,98-9). Both efforts were supported by major
reforms in the training of priests and laity pursued by Chávez and Bishop Rivera Damas
in conjunction with Jesuit seminary faculty members (Brett 2008, 719; Byrne 1996, 28).
By the time of his retirement in 1977, Chávez frequently collaborated on pastoral letters
with the most progressive Bishop in El Salvador at the time, Bishop Arturo Rivera
Damas (Brett 2008, 717-22). In 1976, despite being attacked as "communist" by
members of the oligarchy, Chávez was able to unite both conservative and progressive
bishops in a public call, in conjunction with emerging campesino organizations, for the
conversion of some unused cotton and coffee plantation lands into small holdings for
peasants (LaFeber 1983, 222; see also Wood 2003, 61; Dunkerley 1982, 108).
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The Salvadoran episcopacy had a potential ally in the Christian Democratic Party
(PDC). Until the late 1970s, the Salvadoran PDC espoused some progressive positions in
line with pastoral letters, particularly on the issue of agrarian reform, though these issues
remained a relatively low priority for the party (Dunkerley 78-9). Some ties existed
between Bishop Rivera and the PDC (Brett 2008, 726); however, ties with the rest of the
Salvadoran episcopacy were relatively weak, perhaps due in part to the minimal influence
of political parties in El Salvador. During Oscar Romero's tenure as archbishop (see
below), Romero's hostility toward the regime and those complicit Romero distanced the
official Church (and especially its progressive sectors) from the PDC (Dunkerley 1982,
134).113 By the early 1980s, Rivera's continued association with the PDC drew criticism
from progressive sectors of the Church at a time when Rivera was being criticized for
being too cooperative with the regime (Brett 2008, 726, 728).
Despite its separation from the state and the progressive activity of Archbishop
Chávez, the Salvadoran episcopacy at large remained ideologically conservative.
However, this characterization requires some important caveats. The Salvadoran
Episcopal Conference was predominantly conservative in the sense that bishops in
peripheral dioceses tended to be conservative and they outnumbered moderate and
progressive bishops who typically worked in San Salvador (Bakhtiari 1986, 29-38).
Relying on this arithmetic alone produces an overly simplistic characterization of the
episcopal conference's ideological configuration. Until 1968, there were only 5 dioceses
in El Salvador, including the Archdiocese of San Salvador. Thus, throughout the
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twentieth century the entire episcopal conference was very small. Moreover, during the
descent into civil war, the Archdiocese of San Salvador contains 40 percent of the
country's population and 57 percent of its priests, nuns, and brothers (Montgomery 1983,
68), making San Salvador more than just the symbolic center of the Church in El
Salvador. Many of Archbishop Chávez' efforts to reform seminary training and promote
CEB's demonstrate the ability of this position to circumvent, if not ignore, El Salvador's
peripheral diocese and their bishops.
Finally, the sustained influence of conservatives in the Salvadoran episcopacy
also can be traced, in part, to El Salvador's conservative papal nuncio. This ideological
inclination had the Vatican's official representation in El Salvador working at crosspurposes with a human rights-oriented pope during one of the most progressive periods
of the papacy. From 1973-1980, Emanuele Gerada served as El Salvador's papal nuncio.
As the official representative of the Salvadoran Church both to and from the Vatican,
Gerada was himself a conservative a sided with conservative bishops in rural areas (Brett
2008, 723, 724; Bakhtiari 1986, 39). As a result, the final years of the era of reform in the
international Church arrived in El Salvador through the filter of an ideologically
conservative lens.
By the late 1970s, this conflict within the episcopal conference was faced with a
rapidly deteriorating human rights crisis. From these years into the next decade,
professing social progressivism in El Salvador was to invite state repression (UN 1993,
43). Rights abuses committed by the state during the late 1970s and early 1980s were
rampant, with the total number of victims reaching into at least the tens of thousands
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(Goodwin 2001, 237).114 Frequent victims of murder and disappearance included trade
unionists and members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), a socialdemocratic coalition of parties which would align itself with the FMLN (Goodwin 2001,
238). Indiscriminant violence in the countryside, extrajudicial killings in both rural and
urban areas, and the widespread use of torture against suspected subversives (which
included nearly all of the political opposition) were characteristic of the late 1970s, and
particularly the early 1980s (UN 1993, 43-44). In addition, no military personnel were
prosecuted for any rights abuses throughout the entire decade of the 1980s (Goodwin
2001, 238).
In the midst of this brutal counterinsurgency, Archbishop Chávez was succeeded
by Oscar Romero (1977-80), despite Chávez' preference that progressive Bishop Rivera
assume his position (Brett 2008, 722). Vatican officials would later explain to Rivera
that he was passed over due to fears that he was too confrontational in dealing with the
government (Brett 2008, 722). When Romero was first appointed he was believed by
many to be relatively conservative.115 Prior to 1977, he had remained relatively silent on
political matters and when he did offer public criticism it was, at least on one occasion,
directed at the Jesuits for promoting views too close to Marxism (Whitfield 1994, 102-3;
Brett 2008, 721). However, Romero was motivated by a genuine conviction to defend the
people of El Salvador (Whitfield 1994, 105; Klaiber 1998, 174) and acting through a
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Church organization that was autonomous from the state. This position of autonomy
allowed Romero flexibility, as it had his predecessor.
After the assassination of Fr. Rutilio Grande, a progressive Jesuit priest and friend
of Romero's, along with two others traveling with him in 1977, Romero quickly became
the central organizer and prophetic voice of the Salvadoran Church (Whitfield 1994, 1049). Romero drew heavily on the support of the Jesuit faculty of the University of Central
America (UCA) (Whitfield 1994, 104-7, 112). Romero's early actions were typically to
draw on information collected by the Archdiocesan office of Socorro Jurídico (Legal
Aid) and make forceful and specific denunciations of rights abuses during his Sunday
sermons and weekly radio broadcasts. However, as violence intensified in early 1980,
Romero's denunciations broadened to include general condemnations of state repression
of peaceful demonstrations and ultimately a call to soldiers not to obey orders to kill
civilians. This work drew attention and praise from progressives in El Salvador and
human rights advocates around the world (Klaiber 1998, 174). The force of Romero's
denunciations meant that even he, the most powerful and well-known church figure in the
country, was no longer safe, and on March 24, 1980, Romero was killed by an unknown
sniper while celebrating mass (UN 1993, 127-31).116
Although Romero's work was sufficient to push the institutional strength of the
Salvadoran church in a human rights-oriented direction, his actions stoked harsh division
present within the church since the time of Archbishop Chávez. Siding with Romero, and
defending his positions after his death, were sympathetic moderates, Bishop Arturo
Rivera Damas and Auxiliary Bishop Gregorio Rosa Chávez. The majority of the
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Salvadoran Episcopal Conference, which resided outside of the Archdiocese of San
Salvador, was more conservative and voiced criticism of Romero's work. Anti-Romero
conservative bishops included Bishop Romeo Tovar, Marco René Revelo, Jose Eduardo
Alvarez, and Pedro Arnauldo Aparicio (Klaiber 1998, 176; Bahktiari 1986, 29).
Conservative Catholic groups such as the Traditional Catholic Movement also rejected
the legacy of Romero's popular church (Klaiber 1998, 186).
Despite this division, Arturo Rivera y Damas (1983-1994) succeeded Romero and
continued his work.117 Rivera's appointment, which came during the papacy of John Paul
II and the end of the era of international Church reform, signaled the Vatican's desire to
maintain a careful balancing act in El Salvador. On the one hand, given Rivera's
background, the Vatican's selection demonstrated support for Romero's prophetic defense
of human rights. On the other hand, Rivera was closely monitored by the Vatican and not
formally elevated to Archbishop of San Salvador until 1983, long after Rivera had
extricated the Church from some of its more confrontational stances with respect to the
government (Brett 2008, 726). During this period, Rivera continued Romero’s practice
of denouncing specific cases of human rights abuses on his weekly radio addresses.
However, Rivera immediately inherited the conservative backlash to Romero's forceful
progressivism. As a result, unlike Romero, Rivera also included information about
supposed abuses committed by the FMLN and backed away from Romero's evolution
that some feared would lead him to legitimize revolutionary violence. Rivera also
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criticized the FMLN when it launched major offensives (Brett 2008, 727; Klaiber 1998,
175).
But denunciations were not the sum of Rivera's human rights advocacy. He also
founded Tutela Legal (Legal Defense) in 1982, which succeeded Romero's Legal Aid and
functioned like the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile, by documenting, publishing and
pursuing human rights cases, in addition to providing a support network and relatively
secure environment for victims of repression and their families. The archbishop drew on
their findings for his own radio denunciations. Legal Defense became an effective tool in
the international arena, unmatched for its ability to draw international attention to the
egregious human rights situation in El Salvador (Klaiber 1998, 177). Rivera also went on
to play a central role in the early stages of negotiations that would eventually result in the
1992 peace accords (Brett 2008, 731-8).
Although the Salvadoran episcopacy did not produce a united document
denouncing repression, the dominance and leadership of progressive archbishops, free to
act without state interference in internal church affairs, allowed the Church to come to the
aid of many victims of repression and call international attention to the El Salvador’s
egregious human rights violations by presenting a forceful and credible critique of the
regime’s security forces and their practices.
Conclusion
The Catholic episcopacy's response to waves of state-sanctioned human rights
abuse during counterinsurgencies in Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador differed
substantially. Faced with an increase in human rights violations that accelerated rapidly
in the 1980s and remained high into the 1990s, the Colombian episcopacy remained
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largely absent from discussions of human rights that cast any blame on the state.
Episcopal statements on violence focused on individual moral failings and a lack of
respect for rule of law and authority, rather than identifying and denouncing culpable
parties with ties to the state. Only at the end of the 1980s did the episcopacy move from a
posture of obstruction to hesitant acquiescence with respect to clergy who wished to
investigate abuses and promote of human rights. Even then, its focus remained on victims
of rights abuses who were members of the clergy until the mid-1990s. In Guatemala,
sharp increases in human rights abuses in the late 1970s and early 1980s were followed
by intra-episcopal conflict about how to respond, rather than a decisive response. Bishops
from rural areas moved to denounce rights abuses relatively early but faced obstruction
from the archbishop. After the archbishop's death, the Vatican moved to replace him with
a human rights-oriented bishop. The next four years produced a sharp political turn for
the episcopacy that came to include denunciations of the regime and the creation of a
human rights office. Finally, in El Salvador intra-episcopal division of a different kind
took place. Under the leadership of Archbishops Oscar Romero and Arturo Rivera, the
Archdiocese of San Salvador denounced rights abuses early and often. The Archdiocese
also assisted in early phases of the organization the human rights movement and
collaborated with it in the years that followed. Meanwhile, bishops of rural dioceses
tended to be more conservative and resisted association with the human rights movement.
Though their recalcitrance prevented a unity statement on human rights abuses from the
episcopal conference, the actions of the archdiocese successfully threw the weight of the
institutional Church behind the human rights movement.
Church, State and Path Dependence
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These differing responses coincided with different trajectories in the evolution of
Church-state ties that privileged some forms of Church interaction with the state over
others. Indeed, the twentieth century evolution of Church-state relationships in Colombia,
Guatemala, and El Salvador exhibits a collection of distinct path dependent trajectories.
In all three cases, opportunities to alter Church-state ties arose in the wake of a deep
socio-political (and sometimes economic) crisis. Each crisis led to fundamental shifts in
the political arena and major revisions to the institutions of government. As an important
social institution that was openly skeptical of the politically ascendant Latin American
left, the Catholic Church was a potentially influential resource for political elites
navigating an altered landscape. These critical junctures afforded Church leaders and
those who assumed control of the state an opportunity to reconfigure Church-state ties.
Each critical juncture presented viable options to both sets of leaders, and
historical contingency, rather than antecedent conditions like episcopal conservatism,
weighed heavily on their choices. In Colombia, the consolidation of dense Church-state
ties was made possible by Rojas' political miscalculations in his effort to secure the
support of the episcopacy in the wake of la violencia, the abrupt willingness of the
Liberal party to abandon anticlericalism, and the preference of Church leaders to extricate
the Church from partisan politics. In Guatemala, episcopal concern with unjust social
structures gave way to the strident anticommunism of Archbishop Rossell during a period
of major social reforms. Armas' US-sponsored coup created an opportunity for a new
regime to partner with the Church via a common interest in stamping out Marxism. In El
Salvador, outspoken episcopal denunciation of socialism in all its forms did not translate
into renewed Church-state ties in the wake of the 1932 insurrection and the state-led
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massacre that followed. Though the Church sought the restoration of some stateguaranteed privileges, general-turned-dictator Maximiliano Martínez dismissed the idea,
publicly attacking the Church and pursuing policies that further alienated Church leaders.
Whether the opportunity for change was seized or not, decisions made about the
ties between Church and state produced lasting effects because they established
mechanisms of reproduction. In Colombia, the retention of Church-state ties under the
National Front also placed alteration of these ties out of the normal boundaries of partisan
politics. This configuration upheld state participation in the selection of bishops and
sustained state leverage over Church activities. These ties constructed a politically
quiescent bishops conference that defended its interests by defending the post-1958
regime. Such a conference had little ideological interest and few material incentives that
might induce it to take up contentious political issues, let alone denunciation of the state
in the name of defending human rights.
In Guatemala, a renewed Church-state alliance provided the Church with
resources that allowed it to expand its organization into rural areas without allowing the
state to participate in the appointment of Church leaders. Bishops assigned to rural
dioceses were appointed by the Vatican during the era of Church reform and were in
contact with the peasantry while it was being organized by Catholic Action. These
bishops would later demonstrate a relatively early interest in confrontation with the state
over human rights. Meanwhile, the archdiocese, which helped create the renewed
Church-state collaboration at mid-century, retained its affinity with conservative forces in
control of the state and obstructed rural bishops' efforts to speak out against the regime
collectively. When the Vatican, free from state intervention, appointed a new archbishop
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in 1984, the rift within the bishops conference was resolved in favor of public
confrontation with the state and support for human rights activism.
In El Salvador, the regime rejected collaboration with the Church in its efforts to
repress and marginalize the left. In doing so, the state accrued no control over the
appointment of bishops or material support to use as leverage with Church leaders. It
followed that members of the Salvadoran episcopacy who were not ideologically
compatible with the regime faced few incentives to remain silent on issues of interest to
the Church, other than the risk of repression. As a result, the episcopacy was relatively
free, if not unanimously ideologically inclined, to lead, join, or alter its participation in
social and political struggles including public criticism of the state.
Proximate Causes
As in the bureaucratic authoritarian cases, Church-state ties and the Church-state
relationship trajectories they induce cannot fully explain episcopal responses to human
rights abuse. Rather, a number of proximate causes acting in conjunction with one
another explain episcopal responses. The interaction between the bishops and these forces
was structured by the ties linking Church and state and the broader patterns of political
behavior these institutions helped perpetuate. However, systematic variation between
proximate causes and episcopal responses cannot be identified without first
acknowledging the different types of institutional arenas in which Church and state
interacted and their relationship evolved. The basic framework of these arenas was the
network of institutions linking Church and state.
Two key sets of variables entered these different arenas, and together, prompted
alternative responses from each episcopacy. Arguably, the most important was state
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antagonism of Church personnel. At its worst, this involved outright violent repression in
which agents of the state were either directly involved or provided tacit approval. State
obstruction of Church programs or use of anti-Church rhetoric fall within this set of
variables as well. State antagonism of at least some sectors of the Church was present in
Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador. However, it was far more extreme in El Salvador
and Guatemala then in Colombia.
State antagonism of Church personnel in Colombia provided little impetus for the
Colombian episcopacy to denounce the state. This was because the Colombian
episcopacy interpreted the forms of progressive political activity that invited repression
as dangerous to the Church at large. Participation in partisan or socio-political struggles
by clergy or laypeople acting in the name of the Church was strongly discouraged.
Disobedience in such matters was seen as a direct challenge to episcopal authority. Thus,
when overtly political and progressive Church-people became the victims of rights
abuses, subsequent episcopal denunciations of the state would have been made on behalf
of activists who were actively antagonizing Church leaders. In conjunction with the
episcopacy's own established political strategy of avoiding political challenges to the
status quo, the deck was stacked against such denunciations.118
Meanwhile, in El Salvador the archdiocese had been acting on behalf of
progressive causes and helping to organize progressive political claims-making among
campesinos since at least the early 1960s. When Church personnel were harassed in this
work, forthcoming criticism of the state was not on behalf of those perceived to be acting
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It is noteworthy that when the Colombian episcopacy began, with extreme tentativeness, to assist in the
investigation of alleged abuses, the bishops restricted the Church's involvement to investigation of attacks
against clergy.
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against the edicts of the archdiocese. Reservations about defending priests or laypeople
who had become too 'radical' did exist, but assessing a victim's radicalism was a different
matter than judging a victim's basic loyalty to the Church hierarchy. The well-known
narrative of Archbishop Romero's shift to a confrontational position after the
assassination of Fr. Rutilio Grande is one such iconic moment. In the case of El Salvador,
repression against the Church fueled the archdiocese's human rights advocacy. After
Archbishop Romero's assassination, though some of the outlines of confrontation with
the state were altered, it would have been unthinkable for the archdiocese to abandon its
broader stand on human rights.
In Guatemala, the effect of state antagonism of the Church was greater still. This
is because the Guatemalan episcopacy was at an impasse when antagonism accelerated.
The ascent of Efrain Rios Montt, was followed by the harassment of Caritas and no doubt
further excluded from state power even the most conservative voices in the Guatemalan
episcopacy. Combined with repression targeting clergy and prominent Church figures
like Bishop Gerardi, state antagonism of the Church diminished the state's leverage over
Church programs and helped tip the balance in favor of episcopal confrontation.
Another set of variables that interacted with varying Church-state trajectories was
the influence of the Vatican. A key argument of this study has been that fewer Churchstate ties increased the influence of the Vatican over a given episcopacy's long-term
ideological evolution and medium-term political behavior. The general assumption
embedded in this argument has been that greater Vatican influence during the era of
international Church reform increased the influence of progressives relative to
conservatives either through the intentional promotion of moderates or the intentional
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marginalization of conservatives. However, for a variety of reasons, conservatives were
sometimes appointed to fill open positions in episcopal conferences. The stakes of such
appointments were higher in small episcopacies, such as those in El Salvador and
Guatemala, where a single position might determine the ideological center of gravity
within the bishops' conference.
In Guatemala, the 1964 appointment of conservative bishop Casariego to the
position of archbishop was not typical of the period, though it represented ideological
continuity in the Archdiocese. When Archbishop Casariego was replaced in 1984, the
Vatican selected Bishop Penados in the midst of a rift between the archdiocese and rural
dioceses. In this instance, the Vatican's selection helped make possible the episcopal
conference's confrontation with the state over human rights abuses.
In El Salvador, a conservative papal nuncio, secured the appointment of Oscar
Romero as a bishop and then archbishop at a time when he was believed to be relatively
conservative and non-confrontational with the state. The latter appointment, which was to
succeed progressive Archbishop Chávez, passed over the progressive Bishop Rivera.
However, untethered to the state via any formal state controls or state leverage over
Church programs, Romero's political orientation was free to evolve in response to local
developments. Thus, he became a forceful human rights advocate, in spite of the efforts
of the Vatican's official liaison in El Salvador.
These cases' path dependent trajectories and their interaction with proximate
causes are strikingly similar to those of the bureaucratic authoritarian cases examined in
previous chapters. The next chapter draws comparisons between these two sets of cases.
It then concludes this study with a discussion of its main findings and implications.
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Chapter 8: Path Dependence and Catholic Responses to
Human Rights Abuse in Latin America

This chapter summarizes and discusses the key analytical findings in terms of all
six cases examined in this study. The first section notes key analytical similarities via
pairs of cases with similar outcome types: contentious denunciation in Chile and El
Salvador, delayed advocacy in Brazil and Guatemala, and complicity in Argentina and
Colombia. Next, the chapter presents a brief synthesis of the central comparative
evidence consistent with the presence of path dependence in Latin American Churchstate relations. This section takes up the key empirical questions a robust critical
junctures argument must answer to convincingly demonstrate the existence of a path
dependent process. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the external validity and
implications of these findings.
Contentious, Delayed and Silent Episcopacies
The central theoretical claim of this study has been that the density of ties linking
Church and state form the foundation of path dependent trajectories of Church-state
relationships during significant portions of the 20th century in Latin America. The core
attributes of these trajectories had a profound impact on the development of ideological
tendencies within each episcopal conference, the strategies and tactics each episcopacy
used with greatest effect to exert influence on the state, and the impact of various outside
forces on the Church. These path dependent trajectories enhanced or mitigated the effects
of important outside forces including reforms in the international Church during the
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1960s and 1970s, the growth of the left, and state repression targeting progressive,
politically active sectors of the Church. The result was that the core attributes of each
trajectory shaped Catholic episcopacies' responses to waves of human rights abuse that
accompanied both bureaucratic authoritarian regimes and counterinsurgencies. Important
case characteristics are summarized in Table 8.1 and the trajectories of all six cases are
summarized in Figure 8.1.
Complicity
In Argentina and Colombia, the institutional reconfiguration that occurred during
critical junctures gave the state a measure of control over internal Church affairs and
institutionalized state support for Church operations and programs. In this context, both
episcopacies derived social and political influence by avoiding contentious interaction
with the state, including partisan politics, unless the Church itself came under attack by
the state (an exceedingly rare occurrence in this group). During times of crisis, each
episcopacy's political involvement focused on calls for national unity and, especially
pronounced in the case of Argentina, nationalism. This trajectory mitigated the impact of
the era of international Church reform following Vatican II, the immediate influence of
Rome, and the scale and targets of repression. Radical and progressive movements
emerged among clergy and the grassroots, but their inherently partisan or contentious
political stances threatened dominant ideological factions and well-established modes for
exerting influence. When nonviolent activists, either Church-affiliated or secular,
encountered state-sanctioned violence and repression, the episcopacy stood to gain little
(and risked losing quite a bit more) by defending victims of repression via some
contentious or prophetic public stance.
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Figure 8.1: Church-State Path Dependence Causal Diagram
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Delayed Advocacy
In Brazil and Guatemala, the institutional reconfiguration that occurred during
critical junctures gave the state no significant control over internal Church affairs but
institutionalized the Church's reliance on state approval or support for many of its
important operations or programs. In this context, both episcopacies derived and
sustained political influence via private lobbying of the state. Later, they pursued broader
social influence via the programs the state supported or, in the more repressive context of
Guatemala, merely allowed. This trajectory elevated the influence of the Vatican relative
to the state during the era of reform in the international Church and extended the reach of
the Church into marginalized sectors. But, this trajectory also preserved some state
leverage over the Church. When confronted with state policies and practices to which
they objected, delayed advocate episcopacies experienced particularly sharp internal
division about how to respond. Public denunciation risked the effective termination of
important Church activities. In effect, reliance on private lobbying or dialog to protect
such privileges temporarily sidelined post-Vatican II calls for bishops to engage in
socioethical leadership. Overcoming these divisions took time and involved different
processes in Brazil and Guatemala. However, Vatican-directed changes in Church
leadership, a demonstrated loss of influence with the regime, and state repression
targeting the Church helped trigger both episcopacies' eventual movement toward public
involvement in human rights movements already underway.
Contentious Denunciation
In Chile and El Salvador, the institutional reconfiguration that occurred during
critical junctures gave the state no control over the internal affairs of the Church and
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permitted relatively little or no state support for Church operations or programs. In this
context, political, ideological and theological interests were shaped far less by the state
than by Vatican appointments and instructions during the era of international Church
reform. Moreover, the state possessed minimal leverage over the tactics used to pursue
those interests. To exert influence, pursue reform-oriented state policy, and/or respond to
crises, these episcopacies did not hesitate to engage in private dialog, mediation, or public
politics. Such efforts were sometimes partisan, sometimes contentious, and occasionally
both. Lacking leverage over the Church, the state was not in a strong position to curtail or
delay denunciations. Consequently, these episcopacies were able to play a contentious
prophetic role much earlier, positioning them as leaders in the early stages of the human
rights movement. When these movements began to mature, these episcopacies shifted
their focus to a new set of concerns such as the transition to democracy and the
facilitation of peace negotiations.
The Catholic Church and Path Dependence in Latin America
The path dependent trajectories described in the previous section helped shape the
broader political behavior of Catholic episcopacies because they maintained a set of
stable core attributes. These attributes were created during a critical juncture, sustained
by mechanisms of reproduction, and not pre-ordained by conditions established prior to
that critical juncture. Adoption of a critical junctures perspective requires clear answers
to three key comparative questions. These questions are: (1) If antecedent conditions
present plausible rival hypotheses, do those conditions vary systematically with the
outcome to be explained? (2) Did factors pre-dating the critical juncture predetermine the
"choices" made by key actors during the critical juncture itself? (3) Once a set of
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institutions was chosen, did mechanisms of reproduction readily permit shifts to an
alternative set of institutions? Affirmative answers to these questions cast doubt on the
presence of path dependence. The evidence presented in this study suggests the most
appropriate answer to each of these questions is no.
Antecedent conditions that offer the most plausible rival hypotheses took shape
during the era of liberal political ascent, mainly during the 1870s and 1880s. At this time,
the Church was an active participant in otherwise secular political struggles between
liberals and conservatives. One might suspect that sustained periods of political
dominance by anticlerical, liberal forces between the 1870s and a case's critical juncture
might systematically correspond to a subsequent separation of Church and state.
Conversely, one might expect that conservative dominance during this period might have
secured the perpetuation of a dense network of Church-state ties. However, such
systematic variation was not the case. The experiences of Argentina and Colombia, where
critical junctures left Church and state closely bound, refute such hypotheses. Prior to its
critical juncture, Argentina had just exited an extended period of liberal government via
military coup. However, Church-state ties were not consolidated by the Catholic
nationalist Uriburu regime that followed. Instead, consolidation of Church-state ties was
accomplished during the government of General Justo, who had been the leader of a
relatively liberal rival faction in the military. In Colombia, Church-state ties were
reaffirmed in the midst of a power-sharing agreement between the Liberal and
Conservative Parties. Meanwhile, Guatemala and El Salvador experienced protracted
periods of liberal dominance after the 1870s, but Guatemala went on to re-establish ties
to the state, whereas El Salvador did not.
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If not a function of partisan dominance, one might instead hypothesize that the
density of Church-state ties prior to the critical juncture systematically varies with
institutional designs selected during a critical juncture. Three alternatives stand out. First,
one might expect institutional inertia to discourage change. Second, one might expect
Church frustration with status quo arrangements to induce change in Church-state ties
during a period of reform. Third, one might expect Church-state separation to produce
better organized Churches that were more politically appealing partners for Church-state
re-establishment. However, none of these conditions systematically varies with later
outcomes.
By the 1870s and 1880s, every case experienced some measure of liberal-driven
reform to Church-state ties. Church and state were formally separated in 1871 in
Guatemala and El Salvador and in 1889 in Brazil. Liberal reforms stripped the Church of
various privileges related to education and the civil registry during the 1880s in
Argentina and Chile. Church and state were disestablished in Colombia in the 1850s only
to resume official ties in 1888 via a political compromise.
Though the institutional position of the Church changed frequently, all six cases
entered the 20th century with varying levels of Church-state ties. Colombia, Argentina
and Chile retained the densest network of ties. Meanwhile, Church and state remained
entirely separate in Brazil, Guatemala and El Salvador. Each set of Church-state ties was
still subject to political contestation. The Church in all six cases uniformly sought to
defend its interests or restore lost privileges, typically by forming alliances with
conservative social forces and/or political parties. In Argentina, Chile and Brazil, by the
1920s such efforts were coupled with early measures to increase Church influence among
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non-elites, including organizing activity among different configurations of immigrant,
working class, and middle class populations. Despite political activity that was uniformly
pro-clerical and traditional in its objectives, the Church fared differently across the six
cases. Colombia and Argentina retained dense networks of ties, Chile's network was
severed, Brazil and Guatemala's networks were partially re-established, and El Salvador's
network remained separate.
Finally, one might suspect that pre-existing conditions within each Church or
episcopacy might have systematically predisposed the selection of dense Church-state
ties. The most obvious such hypothesis might argue that where various forms of Catholic
nationalist ideology held sway within the episcopacy, conservative political forces may
have seen a potential ally for the regimes they hoped to defend or construct. Argentina
clearly presents a case in which Catholic nationalism and conservative political forces
began to come into alignment prior to the critical juncture. However, a high-profile
faction of Argentine bishops interested in social reforms benefiting workers remained
important until losing influence after the ecclesiastical expansion approved by the Justo
government in 1932. A comparable divide existed in Guatemala prior to the RossellArmas alliance. Furthermore, variants of Catholic nationalism, neo-Christendom, or
Catholic integralism existed in nearly all episcopacies prior to or during critical junctures
without necessarily resulting in the creation of dense networks of Church-state ties.
Brazil's Catholic integralist movement predated Vargas' reconfiguration of Church-state
ties. Catholic integralist sentiment in Chile's episcopacy prompted the Vatican to
explicitly instruct Chile's bishops to accept Church-state separation and, later, not to
endorse the pro-clerical Conservative Party.
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As each case entered its own critical juncture, leaders of both the Church and the
state had viable alternatives in the types of Church-state ties they selected. The selections
themselves depended on immediate or short-term historical contingencies. Each of the six
cases offers examples of such contingencies. Close personal ties between Archbishop
Leme and Vargas in Brazil and a personal ideological affinity between Archbishop
Rossell and Armas in Guatemala facilitated re-establishment of Church-state ties in those
critical junctures. Alessandri took the personal and political initiative to negotiate
Church-state separation directly with the Vatican while he was in exile. Colombia's
Church-state ties were only consolidated after the Liberal Party decided to cease
contestation of Church privileges as part of the National Front accord. And, perhaps most
historically contingent of all, despite Church lobbying to regain lost privileges, El
Salvador retained Church-state separation due in large part to Martínez' personal religious
views.
Finally, once Church-state ties were established, mechanisms of reproduction
made changing course a difficult proposition. In a sense, the preponderance of evidence
in support of this claim resides in the rarity of serious efforts to alter established norms in
Church-state relations. In Brazil, for example, state funding for Church programs
continued despite substantial executive (and later legislative) discretion over funding
decisions and significant changes in the ideological orientation of successive
administrations. Furthermore, Church-state ties did not return as a subject of political
contestation when the National Front regime was dissolved in Colombia. When
challenges to Church-state ties did take shape, the resilience of post-critical juncture
Church-state ties was apparent. The clearest such example is Perón's attempt to sever
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Church-state ties, a political miscalculation that stoked opposition more than it achieved
any gains for Perón or his supporters. Challenging an established nationalist institution
proved too costly and Perón backed down only to be deposed shortly afterward and watch
from exile as Church-state ties were normalized by the regime that succeeded him.
End of Church-State Path Dependence
By the end of the 1990s, the legacy of the path dependent processes described in
this study appeared to be breaking down. This was the result of a number of forces that
began chipping away at the mechanisms of reproduction that influenced episcopal
political commitments in previous decades. As discussed in chapter 3, the papacy of John
Paul II brought the era of reform in the international Church to a close. Appointments of
conservative bishops, while not universal, shifted the attention of some episcopacies
away from social issues in favor of issues related to individual morality. Democratization
and the rise of religious pluralism contributed to this shift as well. Though occurring
unevenly at the cross-national level, these forces added new dimensions to the complex
logic of episcopal political commitments. Caught between the secular left and right, it is
often difficult for the Church to find allies that are simultaneously on the socio-economic
left and moral right (Hagopian 2008). Episcopacies that are tolerant of significant
pluralism within the Church may prove better able to negotiate this new environment,
whereas episcopacies that insist on orthodoxy may find exerting political influence
increasingly difficult.119
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On this issue, see Levine (2009), which essentially applies the best insights of his influential earlier
work (specifically 1981), and calls attention to the heightened value of those insights in the current
pluralistic political and religious environments.
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Nevertheless, recent comparative research on post-democratization Catholic
episcopacies in Latin America suggests that a divergence in attention to different types of
social issues still exists. Some episcopacies have become more involved in social justice
issues and others have become more involved in ‘public morality’ issues such as
abortion. Hagopian (2008) found a divergence in public political positions taken by the
preponderance of bishops in Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina since 2000. Analyzing
620 episcopal statements, letters and messages from bishops in her four cases, Hagopian
finds that the episcopacy in Chile and Argentina focus on moral issues like opposition to
abortion and homosexuality, while Brazilian bishops tend to focus on social justice issues
including human rights and poverty. Mexico occupied a sort of middle ground in which
bishops make public statements about social justice and human rights, but with less
frequency than their Brazilian counterparts.
Hagopian’s findings may suggest a final reactive sequence in the legacy of 20th
century Church-state ties.120 The contemporary Brazilian and Argentine cases reflect their
respective human rights commitments from previous decades, whereas the Chilean case
does not. Hagopian's empirical findings may suggest that cases of contentious
denunciation from earlier decades no longer prioritize episcopal human rights advocacy
in a new environment of left-right political competition. Meanwhile, cases of delayed
advocacy may have retained an internal pluralism capable of sustaining an interest in
(and ability to propagate) meaningful human rights critiques.
Additional anecdotal evidence is consistent with this trend. Chile's Vicariate of
Solidarity was converted from a working human rights office to an historical archive in
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1992. In the other case of contentious denunciation, El Salvador, a similar pattern may
have played out in the years following the end of the civil war. Many observers expected
(and subsequently noted) a pronounced conservative shift in the episcopacy with the
announcement that conservative Bishop Fernando Sáenz Lacalle would succeed
Archbishop Rivera as Archbishop of San Salvador. Budget cuts reduced the staff of
Tutela Legal after the Peace Accords, despite a significant continued workload.
Despite this possibility, further research is needed. A significant portion of Tutela
Legal's budget cuts were the result of a loss of international donors rather than the
episcopacy's conservative shift. In addition, more recent developments in El Salvador
have demonstrated greater variability, particularly as the Archdiocese has taken some
interest in recent violence against anti-mining activists. The Colombian episcopacy's
statements with respect to the rights of the internally displaced pose questions for this
extension as well.
Institutions and Agency
As noted in chapter 1, while emphasizing the centrality of Church-state ties to
understanding the political behavior of Latin American episcopacies, this study does not
assert that Church-state ties constitute a mono-causal explanation. Rather, this study
argues that a confluence of forces interacts in the context of cross-nationally varied
Church-state relationships. As a result, Church-state ties and their impact on episcopal
political behavior demonstrate an interesting interplay between the dual roles of
institutions and agency. Institutions created modal forms of episcopacy-state interactions,
established varied sets of inducements and constraints, and influenced the ideological
center of gravity in each conference. However, these forces did not pre-determine the
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actions or efficacy of individual bishops. Even in institutional environments less
favorable to mounting criticism of the state, it was possible for agency to fly in the face
of institutional constraints. A handful of Argentine bishops worked to denounce human
rights abuses, though two paid the ultimate price for doing so. In institutional
environments like Brazil and Guatemala, the importance of agency seems greater still as
early episcopal calls for a strong stand on human rights emanated from specific
subnational groups of bishops who helped to persuade others in the national-level
conference.
Environments with fewer constraints on criticism of the state reveal the
importance of agency as well. The agency of Archbishop Oscar Romero in El Salvador
and Cardinal Silva in Chile are noteworthy in this regard. Both became forceful human
rights advocates, but with some hesitance. As discussed in chapter 7, Romero underwent
a profound personal conversion to arrive at this position. Romero's agency (and, of
course, the advice he received) accounts for the decision to begin organizing Socorro
Jurídico. When Pope Paul VI expressed a desire to criticize the Chilean military in a
letter shortly after the 1973 coup, Cardinal Silva asked the pontiff not to publish it. In the
midst of separate tensions with the regime, Silva stepped down as chancellor of the
Catholic University in 1974 and complied with Pinochet's insistence that COPACHI be
dissolved. Silva would go on to play central leadership roles in the challenging task of
organizing the episcopal conference's denunciations of the regime and the Vicariate of
Solidarity. Silva's evolution was perhaps less dramatic than Romero's, but he evolved
from seeking dialog with the regime to denouncing it. For both men, it would seem a
delicate negotiation took place between their perception of the challenges they faced,
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their understanding of their own moral obligations, and the strategies and resources at
their disposal. Church-state separation, repression, and ideology played roles in
presenting the contours of the alternatives available to bishops, but navigation through
successive challenges, confrontations, and setbacks relied on agency.
Given the role of agency and the deep historical roots of the Catholic Church in
Latin America, the external validity of the argument presented in this study must be
assessed with caution. The extension of these findings from the bureaucratic authoritarian
cases to the counterinsurgency cases is a promising indicator of broader generalizability.
Similar processes unfolded in bureaucratic authoritarian environments and in the midst of
full blown civil war. Also, the long-term effects of these path dependent processes
persisted into the early years of the papacy of John Paul II, a conservative shift in the
Vatican signaling the end of the accelerated international Church reforms of the period
from the 1950s through the 1970s.
These findings are consistent with Philpott's (2007) much broader findings that
Church-state differentiation and changes to political theology are the most important
variables influencing support for democracy across multiple world regions and faith
traditions. Though Philpott oversimplified the full range of variance in these two
variables within Latin America, under closer scrutiny of the 1960s-1980s period,
Philpott's broader argument about the centrality of these two variables remains
persuasive.
Despite these positive indications, important questions remain unaddressed in this
study and warrant future research. In particular, cases of dense networks of Church-state
ties examined here involved states where conservative social forces tended to dominate
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the institutions of government. Despite this, progressive political theology in Brazil was
encouraged via intermediate Church-state ties under reformist governments in the early
1960s. Thus, dense networks of Church-state ties during sustained periods of left
governments (democratic or not), such as Peru after 1968 or Nicaragua after 1979,
remain unexamined. Further study of such cases may reveal that regime ideology is an
important additional variable in the production of a distinct trajectory not fully examined
here. Such cases may provide stronger Latin American tests of arguments that emphasize
the causal importance of Church-state ties. Additional extensions of this argument should
take up examples of Church-state separations that are so intensive they more closely
resemble heavy state regulation of religion and thus dense networks of conflictual
Church-state ties. The two most prominent examples of such scenarios would be postrevolution Mexico and Cuba.
More generally, tests of the extension of this argument outside of Latin America
are warranted as well. The most logical starting point would be an examination of other
predominantly Catholic, Iberian/Iberian-influenced countries with similar authoritarian
experiences. Spain under Franco, Portugal under Salazar, and the Philippines under
Marcos are natural candidates.
Should future research convincingly demonstrate broader generalizability of these
findings, some important implications are evident in the findings presented here. Clear
institutional separation of Church and state allowed and encouraged Church leaders and
organizations to act as vibrant participants in civil society and defenders of democratic
norms and institutions. Thus, institutional separation of Church and state is distinct from
notions of Church-state separation that would exclude religious participation from the
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public debates about government action. Rather, separation of these institutions fosters
more dynamic participation in public politics. This ultimately encourages a vested
interest in the maintenance of democracy among religious organizations. The boundaries
of this participation must, however, preclude the state's ability to co-opt religious
organizations with the dispersal of state funds or other resources. Moreover, state
guarantees of disputed moral codes or other privileged roles not broadly shared by
society at large risk demobilizing an important source of support for democratic norms.
In essence, the price of religious support for democracy is paid by religious organizations'
willingness to remain separate from the state.
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